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This thesis begins by exploring the notion of ‘The Big Society’  promoted by David 
Cameron at the time of the UK general election in May 2010 and arguably one of the 
most significant ideological themes to have emerged from the British Conservative Party 
in recent years. This conceptual analysis then explores the intellectual antecedents 
which inform Big Society ideology, arguing that the eclectic nature of Conservative Party 
thinking draws on liberal, conservative, radical and socialist models of community, civil 
society and the role of the state in relation to these. Theoretical models  such as Lévi 
Strauss’s (1962) model of bricolage,  Hall’s (1998) agency of political ideas and 
Vidovich’s (2007) ‘hybridised model’  help uncover the contradictions and limitations in 
Big Society policy-making and implementation. The thesis argues that there is a distinct 
silence in relation to the role of capitalism, either in the historical narratives or its place in 
the new political order that makes up the Big Society.  
 
Absent also, is any clear notion of the role and contribution of education in this context. 
Analysis of Secretary of State Michael Gove’s education policy 2010-2014, 
demonstrates that an education system constructed on notions of freedom, 
responsibility and fairness may have radically changed the education landscape in 
England but has ultimately failed to stem the tide of neo-liberal hegemony, the effects of 






















In an article about the current phase in education policy post 1997, Stephen Ball 
(2012, p.89) argues that English Education policy under New Labour and the 
Conservative led coalition government has come full circle from the first 
constitution of a state system of education in the 1870s to the ‘beginning of the 
end’ of that state system in 2010. In doing so he identifies a parallel between the 
‘first liberalism’ of the early to mid-nineteenth century, and the ‘second 
liberalism’, neo-liberalism of the late twentieth–early twenty-first century (ibid). 
The argument is constructed around notions of ‘the reluctant State’ or as Crouch 
(2013) puts it, the balance between ‘the market where possible’ and ‘the state 
where necessary’. Both political parties were essentially looking to devolve, or as 
Ball (2012) argues ‘deconcentrate’ power and responsibility for the delivery of 
state services from the centre to local public, private and voluntary institutions 
and organisations. What has emerged, then, is a new mix of ‘hierarchy, 
heterarchy and market’ which (may) herald a return to the ‘messy, patchy and 
diverse ‘system’ of education’ that existed at the time of the ‘first liberalism’ (Ball, 
2012, p.100). The logical progression and continuity of education policy reforms 
across the party-political divide is significant.  Not only does this focus attention 
on the role of the State as facilitator or coordinator of the education policy 
landscape, but it also calls for a different rhetoric and policy discourse on the part 
of each political party in power so as  to distinguish one form of governance from 
the other. Where New Labour couched public service reforms including 
education (initially at least) in terms of the ‘Third Way’, David Cameron, leader of 
the coalition, promoted a more ‘compassionate Conservatism’ under the banner 
of a Big Society. 
 
‘a society with much higher levels of personal, professional, civic and 
corporate responsibility; a society where people come together to solve 
problems and improve life for themselves and their communities; a society 
where the leading force for progress is social responsibility, not state 
control (Conservative Party Manifesto 2010). 
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It is the construction and outworking of the ideology of the Big Society that forms 
the focus of this thesis. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis addresses the question how far English education policy 2010-2014 
encapsulates the aims and purposes of the Big Society. 
Chapter 1 sets out to explore what is understood by the Big Society and how this 
articulates with Conservative/Liberal Democrat education policy following the 
general election in the UK in 2010. Big Society was meant to represent the 
antithesis of Big Government and signal a step change from the centralising 
effects of New Labour policy-making, particularly in terms of education and social 
care. Yet in a continuation of New Labour policy in opening up the delivery of 
public services to private sector operators, the Big Society calls for an active and 
participatory society that will benefit both personally and collectively from 
engagement with local community needs. 
 
Sections of the thesis on the ideological background to Big Society thinking focus 
on notions of community and civil society. This is done by first explaining 
localism and the Localism Act (HMG 2011c), central to the coalition public 
service reform. Next models of community are considered, from early biblical 
principles that have influenced proponents of the Big Society such as Phillip 
Blond and John Milbank, to Robert Putnam’s concept of community as social 
capital. Work by Etzioni and Saul Alinsky also contribute to Big Society thinking 
in relation to active civil societies and communitarianism. It is against this 
background that the Big Society is constructed as an answer to the perceived 
faults of civil society, which are supposedly the causes of a now ‘Broken Britain’. 
In the final section of this chapter, the influence of capitalism on community is 
discussed in the light of work by Hirschman and Polyani. 
Chapter 2 looks beyond these recognisable strands in political thinking to the 
underlying theoretical antecedents of the Big Society. It traces both Conservative 
and Liberal thought through the writings of one of the key exponents of the Big 
Society, Phillip Blond. In his construction of what he calls ‘Red Toryism’ (Blond 
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2010), Blond asserts the merits of conservatism over a liberalism which he 
considers has contributed to what he perceives as the social and political 
malaise of contemporary Britain. His arguments have roots in the political 
theology of John Milbank's ‘radical orthodoxy’ and the writings of Edmund Burke 
and Benjamin Disraeli. Blond’s economic arguments find parallels in the German 
Mittlestand and Foucault offers a useful critique of his particular understanding of 
capitalism and neoliberal economics. The chapter ends with an attempt to trace 
the evidence of liberal thought in both conservative and liberal discourse with 
reference to Hayek - a conservative who declared himself a liberal and 
Oakeshott - a liberal who declared himself conservative. 
Having established the political and intellectual antecedents of the Big Society in 
Chapter 2 and demonstrated the eclectic nature of conservative intellectual 
thought about understandings of community, civil society and the role of the 
state, Chapter 3 sets out the education policy of Michael Gove, Secretary of 
State for Education 2010-2014 using the liberal/conservative insights of 
Oakeshott referred to in the previous chapter. 
Finally, Chapter 4 offers some reflections on policy making in relation to the Big 
Society. Central to this discussion is the limited purchase the notion of the Big 
Society has had, either with politicians or with the general public. The chapter 
explores the limits and possibilities of a Big Society using two complementary 
heuristics: first, that of Levi-Strauss’s (1962) notion of bricolage and second, 

















Keep a close eye, not on what the Coalition says, but on what it does or doesn’t 
do’ (Benn 2010, p.285).   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the origins of the concept of the Big 
Society and to consider how far current education policy, including the 
Academies and Free Schools agenda, represents the Big Society in practice. 
This entails examining understandings of ‘community’ from early biblical 
principles that have inspired thinkers such as Phillip Blond and John Milbank, to 
radical expressions of community empowerment in the twentieth century such as 
those expounded by Saul Alinskey. The underlying question is how far the 
positioning of the Big Society is in response to, or undermined by, modern day 
capitalism, where the writings of Hirschmann, in articulating rival views of capital 
society, are particularly helpful.    
 
The Big Society is defined as much by what it is not, as by what it is. It is not, for 
example, a new concept but draws extensively on a wealth of traditions and 
ideas about strengthening communities, civic action, and co-ownership of public 
services that have developed over time. The House of Commons, Public 
Administration Select Committee (PASC 2011) identified a number of links with 
political and philosophical thought including Edmund Burke’s notion of the ‘little 
platoons’ to which we belong in society: ‘the first principle…of public affections’. 
Connections were also made with the Christian vision of society, the collegiate 
activity of the Co-operative movement, and the left-wing American radical, Saul 
Alinsky. Added to this there are roots in Putnam’s (1995) discourse on social 
capital, Etzioni’s view of communitarianism, notions of people power and social 
entrepreneurship which are also noted (PASC 2011). These ideas point to a 
redistribution of state power, shifting from the centre, to localities and 
communities at the periphery. According to the Select Committee, this 
necessitates a change in the role of the institutions of government at both 
national and local level, together with a re-conceptualisation of the rights and 
10 
 
responsibilities individuals and non-government organisations have in their 
relationship to the state.   
 
Vernon suggests that phrases such as the ‘great society’, coined variously by 
President Johnson, Walter Lipmann, Graham Wallace and F.A. Hayek, depend 
for their popular appeal on transforming the complex into the epigrammatic and 
displacing attention from what is problematic to what is persuasive (Vernon 
1976, p.261). In so doing attention is distracted away from precisely what is at 
issue. This is no less true of the idiomatic expression “Big Society.’ For David 
Cameron, Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative party, ‘Big Society’ 
represents the antithesis of ‘big government’ demonstrable, it seems, by a move 
from ‘state action to social action’ (Cameron 2009). At its heart, it appears, is the 
desire to promote social action for the benefits of community empowerment. The 
emphasis is on facilitating a renaissance of local, rather than state institutions in 
the determination of policy at community level.  The approach, according to 
government rhetoric, is two-fold: first, by making opportunity more equal, 
primarily through educational reforms and second, by actively making a stronger 
and more responsible society. However, the appeal of a ‘Big Society’ obfuscates 
the real issues at hand. It raises a number of significant questions about the 
purpose and organisation of a state system of education, about what is 
understood by community and the function of civil society and, finally, about the 
role of the state in a post welfare society. 
 
Education Policy 2010-2014 
 
Education policy became centre-stage following the 2010 election and the 
formation of the Coalition Government. Government concern centred on 
England’s purported descending trajectory in international league tables, 
indicating for the Conservatives all that was wrong with the state system of 
education under thirteen years of New Labour and signalling a crisis for 
England’s economic competitiveness on the world stage. The state was too 
invasive, binding schools with overbearing bureaucracy which limited teacher 
professionalism and the freedom to maintain discipline (c.f. Gove 2010a). The 
National Curriculum and attendant qualifications were no longer fit for the 
11 
 
purpose of creating ‘superb’ state schools (Gove 2009). What was called for was 
greater autonomy for schools and teachers: freedom to convert to Academy 
status, freedom to set up new ‘Free’ Schools, freedom to exert discipline. This 
was to be underpinned by improving the quality of teaching, reforming the 
examination system, the National Curriculum and vocational training and, finally, 
through ‘closing the gap’ between rich and poor.  
 
This rhetoric was to find purchase in the Coalition’s Conservative dominated 
education policy, enshrined in the Education Act (HMG 2011a). It is of note that 
this act was the first major piece of education legislation enacted by the new 
government, an indication of the significance of education to their overall policy 
agenda. Its remit was sweeping, making fundamental changes to the state 
provision of schooling and Higher Education (HE), and bears close association 
with the Conservative proposals for education outlined whilst in opposition. The 
Opportunity Agenda (Conservative Party 2007) held the state schools system 
responsible for the inequalities in society because it failed to give poor children a 
fair chance and was hounded by over-centralisation in terms of decision-making 
processes, archaic admissions policies and an inability to respond to parental 
demands for new schools. In an age marked by greater ownership of information 
by ordinary people, the assertion was that these issues can be addressed by 
replacing state power with people power and bureaucracy with democracy. The 
proposed new approach purported to be based on trust and a belief that people 
will do the right thing (ibid). Devolving power and control allows for better 
decisions than the state can make on an individual’s behalf, signifying the 
Conservative’s rationale for involving families, businesses, communities and the 
‘myriad of institutions of civil society’ in schooling, one of seven key areas 
requiring reform that include housing, skills, pensions, and enterprise. 
Transferring power from the state to the citizen is presented as the natural 
progression of the democratic process and a belief in empowerment through 
shared information choice. The school systems of Sweden, where money is said 
to follow the individual pupil, and that of the Netherlands, where a quorum of 
parents can set up a new school to meet local demand, provide examples of 




However, the 2011 Education Act (HMG 2011a) appeared to centralise rather 
than devolve government power. Apart from extending the duty of local 
authorities to provide fifteen hours of free childcare to parents of two year-olds 
identified as disadvantaged and granting new disciplinary powers to school staff 
and head teachers in relation to searching or excluding pupils, the powers of the 
Secretary of State were increased. The General Teaching Council for England 
(GTCE), the Teaching and Development Agency (TDA), the Young People’s 
Learning Agency for England (YPLA) and the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Development Agency (QCDA) were all disbanded under the Act and their powers 
reverted to the Secretary of State. The Act also conferred additional powers on 
the Secretary of State in relation to setting up new schools or imposing Academy 
status on schools rated by Ofsted as requiring improvement. In this regard, a 
number of additions and amendments were made to the Academies Act of 2010 
(HMG 2010a) and student tuition fees for HE increased to a maximum of £9,000 
per annum. However, these policy changes do articulate with the notion of a ‘Big 
Society’ in two specific ways. First, the Academies and Free Schools agenda 
widens the diversity of the state schooling system and transfers the delivery of 
state education into the hands of private companies, charitable organisations 
and philanthropies, theoretically enhancing community engagement and 
accountability. Second, the aims of the reforms stress a social mobility /equality 
agenda with a focus on ‘raising the bar and closing the gap’ in terms of teacher 
training, pupil behaviour, curriculum and the offer of a pupil premium. But the 
questions remained as to how these ideas of enhanced community involvement, 
social mobility and a small state might be used in the conceptualisation of the 
notion of a big society.  
 
Ideological background to the Big Society  
 
Understanding community and civil society 
  
The antecedents of the ‘Big Society’, by and large, have a long history and have 
been used variously in establishing a rationale for Conservative Party and later 
Coalition Government approaches to public sector and social welfare reform. 
What is common amongst them is an appeal to a former, ‘golden’ age of familial 
13 
 
and social networks of associations: the natural conduits of a moral code and set 
of values that permitted the flourishing of individual and social well-being. To this 
end, ‘community’ features strongly as an organising tool in public policy 
discourse, particularly since the late 1960s and the waning of the post-war age of 
political consensus which had consequences for constructs of community based 
on spatial or identity boundaries. The Labour government of 1945 was faced with 
a number of interlinked problems including housing, transport, and urban 
renewal, which involved the disruption and upheaval of certain communities 
(Hoggett 1997). It is out of this context that two specific political discourses of 
community have emerged.  
 
On the one hand, there is acknowledgement of the positive benefits of grass-
roots community action. In the 1970s, priority was given to strategies of conflict, 
rather than participation, in order to effect local reform (ibid, p.9). In this respect, 
some local authorities sought to facilitate the development of oppositional 
communities through radical decentralisation initiatives, concentrating support on 
new community alliances around identities such as race or gender, as opposed 
to class. On the other hand, the state also looked to strategies of incorporation, 
encouraging participatory action in centrally funded initiatives, as a means of 
sustaining administrative stability and subduing ‘troublesome elements’ (ibid, p.9) 
witnessed, for example, during the race riots of the 1980s in urban areas of 
England. Community groups, therefore, became embroiled in the competitive 
battle for scarce government resources in order to fulfil their aims. This was, 
inevitably, to have a deleterious effect on any sense of community, exacerbating 
existing tensions between diverse social groups. What was occurring between 
community groups and providers was also mirrored on a larger scale, in that 
cities and regions were set in competition with one another in a global market. 
Community has also become synonymous with the absence, or withdrawal, of 
state services, promoted in the first instance as a local authority strategy of 
community governance. This became central to New Labour’s approach to 
localism via New Public Management. Thus, in Hoggett’s (1997) analysis, the 
problem of community represents either the dysfunctional outcome of social and 
economic policy (system dysfunction) or dysfunctional families and social 
networks, social instability and a threat to the existing order (social pathologies). 
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Community also represents an imaginary safety net, or a form of social capital, to 
be enlisted in the competitive struggle for survival or an essential element of 
emancipatory  politics, a resource of resistance based on identities or a lost ideal 
of society (ibid, p.11).These perceptions of community are persistent and 
evidenced in Big Society discourse. The idea of community as the nexus of 




Superficially, localism is about government devolving powers to local 
communities and institutions such as schools. According to Giddens (2002 cited 
in Olssen et al. 2004, p. 211) localism is the ‘freedom to do things differently’, 
offering flexibility and opportunities for innovation. It is more inclusive of people in 
the democratic process and encourages democratic citizenship.  Whereas 
centralism generates inefficiency and bureaucracy, localism produces greater 
competence in the management of public services. However, in Olssen et al.’s 
(ibid, p.212) analysis of this notion of localism, local community groups and 
institutions are unequal in power and influence, yet equality, professional 
standards, expertise and justice all require uniformity in both provision and 
enforcement. Localism celebrates difference and diversity, but challenges 
fairness and equality, a tension being played out through the Academies and 
Free Schools agenda. The state’s role is one of facilitating and coordinating, 
whilst allowing institutions such as schools to make their own decisions. In 
reality, the state still effects control: power is merely reorganised via networks 
and partnerships rather than reduced, and may even be increased, in attempts to 
iron out the inequalities in power relationships within and between local 
authorities and partners (ibid, p.212-3). Therefore, the role of localism in the 
support and furthering of democratic processes does not, of itself, produce a shift 
in real power.   
 
Localism is predicated on certain understandings of community. ‘Community’ is a 
word with varied interpretations. The term is variously used for fellowship, joint 
ownership, a state or organised society, a common identity, or interests, for 
example legal, scientific, academic, religious or business communities (Yudice 
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2005, p.51). As such, ‘community’ often implies a connection such as kinship, 
faith, cultural heritage, or shared values and goals, in other words something that 
is deeper than a mere contractual association of individuals such as the market 
or the state. ‘Community’, thus, can refer to the geographical and physical, or 
groups bound by common interest. Smith (2001), for example, uses concepts 
such as ‘place’ (locality), ‘interest’ (non-place forms of community) and 
‘communion’ (a spirit of communion) to identify different, even conflicting, notions 
of community. Since the mid-1980s, the discourse of community has been used 
to legitimate conservative private assistance and self-help projects as well as 
liberal public-private partnerships that empower communities to govern or police 
themselves (ibid, p.53). To this end, according to Yudice, there has been a 
number of administrative initiatives including community policing, community 
care, community centres, and community arts. Such initiatives assume an ability 
to facilitate community interaction.   
 
The fact that people may live in close proximity to one another does not of itself 
create a community; rather it is the social networks that exist between 
individuals, their friends,  families, colleagues and associates that bind people 
together (Lee and Newby 1983; Held 2006). ‘Community’ is a ‘warmly persuasive 
word’ (Williams 1976, p.76) and as such, has become a powerful organising tool 
in political discourse serving to define who is ‘excluded’ as well as who is 
‘included’. Community, for example, served as a core constituent of New 
Labour’s social policy, demonstrated through the promotion of ‘community 
empowerment’ via New Public Management. Communities were to take 
responsibility for their own circumstances. Whilst government would provide the 
opportunities and systems that would facilitate change, local communities were 
to take ownership of the policies and services that could make this possible. 
Furthermore, discourse on community under New Labour, became a means of 
countering individualist theory and culture arising from neoliberalism.   
 
The Localism Bill 2012   
 
In its analysis of the Big Society, the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Public Administration (PASC 2011) argues that a coherent policy agenda across 
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government is lacking and, in the absence of such a coherent plan, the 
Government so far has been unable to communicate effectively what the Big 
Society means in terms of practical policies. Scrutiny of coalition policy during 
their first term of office, however, may suggest otherwise. If communicating the 
Big Society has proved difficult, the measure of it is indeed detectable in current 
policy making, particularly in the passing of the Education Act, (HMG 2011a), the 
Localism Act (HMG 2011c) and The Opening Public Services White Paper (HMG 
2011b). 
 
In England, the Localism Act (HMG 2011c) offers a legal framework for the Big 
Society project in demonstrating the intentional shift from state governing to 
governance. The aim is to devolve greater powers to councils and 
neighbourhoods, and give local communities more control over housing and 
planning decisions. There is the potential for greater community involvement in 
decision-making via referenda called for by the local authority or local residents, 
including the election of local mayors in certain authorities, and the ability of local 
community and voluntary groups to challenge service provision. Local authorities 
receive greater flexibility in relation to social housing, local business rate relief 
and the protection of services and facilities threatened by closure. In essence, 
the powers of the local authority are extended to include ‘anything that 
individuals generally may do', as long as that is not limited by some other Act. 
For some, the changes contained within the Act hold potential for the further 
devolution of powers from central government. The Localism Bill promised the 
transfer of a range of powers, currently held with civil servants in Whitehall, to 
eight ‘core English cities’ including Manchester and Birmingham, with some in 
Cornwall wishing for a devolution of power to a Cornish Assembly (Western 
Morning News 2011).   
 
The intended outworking of the Big Society is contained in the Open Public 
Services White Paper (HMG 2011b). Organised around five ‘key principles’: 
choice, decentralisation, diversity, fairness and accountability the objective of 
divesting the public sector of its responsibility for service provision and 
transferring this to other organisations in the private and third sectors is clear. 
These key principles resonate with the political concepts and models discussed 
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earlier, such as Blond’s ‘politics of virtue.’  However, it is argued that merely 
shifting responsibility for the delivery of one-time public services out of the hands 
of the state does not necessarily mean greater efficiency or the promotion of 
equity promised by adherents to the principles of Big Society. Lord Adebowale 
(2010), for example, warns of the US experience that indicated volunteerism 
alone could not provide reliable, dependable public services. Nor can it be 
assumed that all charitable organisations are necessarily either capable or want 
to deliver public services, or indeed that all public services are suitable for third 
sector delivery. There will be an impact on the charitable sector, in terms of how 
it operates, becoming in essence an agent of public policy. The House of 
Commons Select Committee Report warned against the potential of the Big 
Society agenda to compromise the independence of the sector with a 
subsequent loss in the activist nature of some of these organisations. There is 
also the issue of how charitable and voluntary groups compete for and work with 
the private sector in the delivery of services and how commissioning bids are to 
be managed. This process has had deleterious effects on many charities both 
through an increased demand for their services, through competition from private 
enterprise, often in receipt of government funding and through the transfer of risk 
from the state to providers (Charities Evaluation Services, n.d.). Overall ‘open 
public services’ raises important questions about the underlying assumptions 
driving the localism agenda, and the impact this has on the balance of power 
between government and service providers and between different sectors 
involved in service provision. These questions of power also relate to citizenship 
and democracy. Opening public services to a range of new providers with 
greater local determination of provision, suggests local variations in services and 
raises important issues of equity, choice, accountability and representation.   
 
Models of Community    
 
A number of models of community were indicated in the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Public Administration (PASC 2011) which suggest how 
community in the Big Society is envisioned and throws some light on the 




The Christian church – a faith model of community 
 
Biblical understandings of community are at their most developed in the pages of 
the New Testament through the descriptions and teachings of the early Christian 
church. At one level, the church consists of a number of diverse local 
congregations, each with their own constitutional structure and officers. Yet, at a 
deeper level, all these communities are part of one universal church united to 
Christ, as the body is to the head [Col. 1:18; Col. 1: 24; Eph. 4:15; Eph. 5:23] or 
as branches are to a vine [Jn. 15: 5] (Holy Bible New International Version 2011). 
Thus, the church represents a special, distinctive grouping: inheritors of the 
promises of God, and brought into being by Him. Membership of this spiritual 
community (the church universal) is voluntary, and depends on a personal 
acceptance of the authority of Christ over a believer’s life. Membership of the 
empirical church, the ‘local congregation’, is accredited through a public 
profession of faith (baptism - and/or confirmation depending on denomination) 
and, particularly in non-conformist churches, by approval of the church officers 
and election into full membership. Church membership is dual focused. Members 
have responsibility both to the local congregation and the community of believers 
worldwide. They also seek to serve the local community and the community of 
non-believers worldwide. 
 
The outworking of this commitment is demonstrated by two specific concepts, 
brotherly love or philadelphia and koinonia or fellowship. The activities of service 
and worship in the communal life of the church are summarised in the Greek 
koinonia, variously translated as fellowship, community, communion, partnership 
and sharing. Expressions of brotherly love (philadelphia) involve a common way 
of thinking and living, especially in terms of practical hospitality and in supporting 
the needy. By definition, philadelphia cannot be realised outside the community 
of faith (Elingworth 1980, p.210); however, there is strength and security in 
holding certain values and ways of life in common, which allow for the sharing of 
common experiences today and offer a cultural template for tomorrow.   
 
Down the centuries, the church has exercised a powerful influence in matters of 
government as an institution of state, forming the basis of English law, social 
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values, and morals. Industrial productivity during the nineteenth century was 
underpinned by the Protestant work ethic, and prior to 1870, much of the 
Britain’s network of schools had been established by the church. Non-
conformists made a considerable contribution to the delivery of welfare services 
through charitable and philanthropic organisations and set examples of 
alternative models of housing and employment standards for the workforce as in 
the case of Cadbury’s Bourneville, Lever Brothers’ Port Sunlight, and Robert 
Owen’s New Lanark Mills, in response to some of the worst excesses of the 
industrial revolution.   
 
The Co-operative movement   
 
Shared goals and a practical commitment to fellow man are also hallmarks of 
other expressions of community. The Co-operative movement with its origins in 
the nineteenth century is one such example. Again, set against the backdrop of 
the industrial revolution and rapid changes in society through mechanisation, the 
Co-operative movement, alongside other labour and social movements of the 
day, sought to address the welfare issues of the working classes, many of whom 
were forced to live and work in poverty in the growing industrial towns. Robert 
Owen, for example, opened a co-operative store at the New Lanark Mills. But it 
was the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, established in 1844, who 
consolidated previous co-operative efforts by formulating the Rochdale 
Principles. These included the distribution of a share of the profits according to 
purchases known as the ‘dividend’. The Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 
1862 gave co-operatives a corporate status and legal framework. By 1863 the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) had been established and in subsequent 
years the co-operative movement had branched out into manufacturing, 
insurance, banking and education. The Rochdale Principles were formally 
adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1937 and have since been 
updated. By 1995 they were to form part of the Statement of Co-operative 
Identity.   
 
Co-operative values and principles are underpinned by a strong sense of 
democracy and mutual support. Co-operative values are listed as self-help, self-
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responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity (Co-operative Group, 
n.d.). Ethical values are also listed. These are openness, honesty, social 
responsibility, and caring for others (ibid). Membership is voluntary and open to 
all who share these values, evidenced through working together for the benefit of 
all members and taking an active role in the community. The principles are the 
means by which co-operatives put their values into action: voluntary and open 
membership, democratic member control, member economic participation, 
autonomy and independence, education, training and information, co-operation 
amongst co-operatives and finally a concern for the community (ibid). Strength to 
effect change lies in the social bonds and clearly defined collective values of 
organisations.   
 
Saul Alinsky People’s Organisations   
 
What is evident from these examples is that the very notion of community can be 
viewed as a value (Frazer 1999, p.76) drawing together elements such as 
solidarity, commitment, mutuality and trust – similar components to the Christian 
notion of fellowship, koinonia. For Saul Alinsky there is power to be unleashed to 
effect positive change even in the most alienated and disaffected communities. 
The dynamics of power and the interaction between those who are denied 
resources, and those who deny them, is of key interest (Seal 2008). Much of 
Alinsky’s work had to do with organising disadvantaged, alienated, and disparate 
communities to take control of their own circumstances and become effective 
agents for change. Working in the slum areas of Chicago he set up the Back-of–
the-yards Neighbourhood Council, identifying common interests that brought 
previously hostile ethnic and religious groups together. This model was extended 
to other declining urban neighbourhoods through the Industrial Areas 
Foundation. Reveille for Radicals (1946) outlines the principles and practice of 
community organising (demonstrated by Alinsky in the setting up of Peoples’ 
Organisations), the unifying of ordinary citizens around immediate grievances, 
and establishing alternative, effective ways of expressing dissent. Both action 
and direction has to come from the practical concerns of the masses (Alinsky 




‘As an organizer I start from where the world is, as it is, not as 
I would like it to be. That we accept the world as it is does not 
in any sense weaken our desire to change it into what we 
believe it should be – it is necessary to begin where the world 
is if we are going to change it to what we think it should be. 
That means working in the system (ibid, p.xix).   
 
Communities have the potential for changing the system. That communities 
should be active in the real issues that concern them is the key to both 
radicalism and democracy (Seal 2008). According to Alinsky, the American 
radical is one who believes in what he says, holds the common good as the 
greatest personal value, believes in and wholly identifies with mankind, and is 
concerned with the fundamental causes, rather than the manifestations of, the 
issues concerned. The aim of the radical is a world where the worth of the 
individual is recognised, a society where man’s potentialities could be realised 
and where man lives in dignity, security, happiness, and peace. In other words a 
world based on the morality of humankind (ibid). Human rights are placed above 
property rights and free, public education is fundamental to the democratic way 
of life.  
 
In Alinsky’s view, people naturally live together in communities. In a democratic 
society, they express their views and dictates through their own organisations; 
those organisations in which people naturally participate and which they own. 
The power of the people is transmitted through these organisations and 
democracy moves forward (Alinsky 1972, p.46). These organisations are 
genuinely ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’, and by their very 
nature, they formulate and articulate a democratic philosophy. This would not be 
possible if people did not come together, therefore, the existence of 
organisations is fundamental to the functioning of democracy (ibid, p.47). A 
strong and active civil society is essential to the building and consolidation of 
democracy.   
 
Furthermore, popular education is the objective for which any Peoples’ 
Organisation must strive. Community is not a classroom; therefore, Peoples’ 
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Organisations must create the conditions and climate in which people want to 
learn, maintaining dignity and self-respect in all people (ibid, p.164). Peoples’ 
Organisations encourage the acquisition of knowledge and the consequent 
changing of attitudes through the constant exchange of views and sharing 
common experiences. The result is a mutual understanding and a new 
appreciation and definition of social issues (ibid, p.155). Successful outcomes 
are therefore more likely in civically engaged communities because of the social 
connections established through networks and organisations.   
 
Yet these radical ideas are far removed from the Conservative construct of ‘Big 
Society’ which has more to do with handing over elements of state power to 
certain approved groups or communities, rather than having it wrested from them 
by the disaffected.   
 
Putnam: community as social capital    
 
The common framework that underpins the examples of community so far 
presented is what Robert Putnam describes as ‘social capital’, those features of 
social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate co-
ordination and co-operation for mutual benefits (Putnam 1995, p.67). Putnam 
discounts declinist or declentionist analyses of civil society, recognising that over 
time there have been both ups and downs in civil engagement. Life is easier in a 
society blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. Networks of civic 
engagement foster strong norms of generalised reciprocity and encourage social 
trust. Such networks facilitate co-ordination and communication, amplify 
reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. In this 
way, social capital is closely related to civic virtue which is at its most powerful 
when embedded in dense networks of reciprocal social relations. Furthermore, 
when economic and political negotiation is embedded in networks of social 
action, (as with Alinksy’s Peoples’ Organisations) the incentives for opportunism 
are reduced. In this way, social connections and civic engagement pervasively 




The term social capital is not new to Putnam but as he claims (Putnam 2000, 
p.19) has been ‘invented’ a number of times during the twentieth century from 
Hanifan in 1916 to Bourdieu and James Coleman in the 1980s. Social capital is 
simultaneously both a private and a public good. Social connections are 
important for the rules of conduct they sustain in that human networks involve 
mutual obligations that foster sturdy norms of reciprocity. At times this reciprocity 
can be specific – ‘I will do this for you if you will do that for me’. What is more 
valuable is when reciprocity is more generalised – ‘I will do this for you without 
expecting an immediate return but confident that in the future someone else will 
do something for me’ – in other words a belief in the common maxim, what goes 
around comes around. A society that is characterised by generalised reciprocity 
is more efficient, according to Putnam, than a distrustful society. Indeed, it is the 
quality of trustworthiness that lubricates social life. Thus, civil engagement and 
social capital entail mutual obligation and personal responsibility for actions.    
 
In this way, community is recognised as the ‘conceptual cousin’ (ibid, p. 21) of 
social capital, yet Putnam warns that community, although usually conceived as 
something warm and comfortable, is not always so. Networks and associated 
social norms of reciprocity may well be good for those inside the network but the 
external effects are not always positive. Putnam offers ‘nimby-ism’ (not in my 
back yard) as an example here. Plans for a young offenders institution or the 
building of a wind farm may be rigorously opposed by those who aim to achieve 
‘ends that are antisocial from a wider perspective’ (ibid, p.22). In other words, 
social capital can be directed towards malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like 
any other form of capital. Association, a fundamental principle of social capital, 
therefore, does not necessarily generate social cohesion. Narrowly self-
interested groups can generate trust internally but not necessarily from the 
outside. The Mafia would be an example here. Thus the aim is to maximise the 
positive consequences of social capital whilst minimising the negative 
manifestations thereof. To this end Putnam is able to identify different forms of 
social capital from that which emerges from repeated, intensive, multi-stranded 
networks, through to networks convened for both private and public ends. 
Networks, therefore, can be either inward or outward looking or both; inclusive or 
bridging in their aspect, or exclusive or bonding. This distinction for Putnam is of 
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particular import. Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific 
reciprocity and mobilising solidarity, whereas bridging is better for linkage to 
external assets and information. An example in the UK would be Children’s 
Centres in that they not only created networks for young mothers but also aimed 
to link them into sources of information and support networks. It is these weak 
ties to distant acquaintances, who move in different social, political or intellectual 
circles, which are more valuable in the production of social capital, than the 
strong ties established with close family and friends. Bridging social capital 
therefore generates broader identities and reciprocity, but bridging and bonding 
groups should not be seen as an either or alternative, but understood as part of a 
continuum of more or less.    
 
In short, Putnam posits that there is a correlation between social trust and 
associational membership. The greater the density of the latter, the more trusting 
are its citizens. In this way, trust and engagement represent two facets of the 
same phenomenon. Social capital, therefore, represents all that is positive in 
human networks, the most fundamental of which are the family and neighbourly 
connections. For Putnam, the benefits accrued through social capital operate at 
the level both of the individual and the community and thus the notion of social 
capital has strong associations with the ideas of communitarianism. But critics of 
Putnam’s iteration of social capital would beg to differ. Green et.al. (2009, p.20) 
question the relationship between social capital and social solidarity. Although 
the analysis of both may use similar indicators such as trust, the phenomena 
bear little relationship to each other. Social capital may reside in different people 
groups but this will not necessarily make for social cohesion in that intra-group 
bonding does not necessarily translate into inter-group harmony. Only specific 
types of social capital such as Puntam’s ‘bridging’ or ‘linking’ capital may 
contribute to a state of social cohesion. However, as with social capital, social 
cohesion can take various forms, each of which consists of different 
configurations of social characteristics.  
 
Where Putnam’s social capital characteristics such as trust, tolerance and 
association may work positively together at the level of the individual, this is 
seldom evidenced at a national level. Green et.al. (ibid, p.21) identify three, 
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distinctive types of discourse concerning social cohesion emerging from western 
academic thought, broadly defined as: liberal, republican and social democratic. 
It is the liberal discourse that fits most closely with the Cameron’s Big Society 
ideal. This places an emphasis on an active civil society, particularly at local 
level. The role of the central state and its institutional roles for providing welfare 
and social protection, and promoting equality through redistribution, are played 
down. The core values that bind society, in addition to trust, are meritocracy and 
opportunity. Thus, both Putnam and Green et.al. raise questions about the role 
of the citizen, both as individual and as a member of the community, in the model 
Big Society. Is social capital regarded as the sociological basis for the Big 
Society, and if so, what might be preventing this from happening? This will be 
discussed in the first instance with reference to political communitarianism and 
civil society.   
 
Political communitarianism and civil society   
 
What is of relevance to the development of Cameron’s Big Society is the notion 
advanced by Etzioni, of political communitariansim. The community, as we have 
explored in the models so far described, is central: ‘Communitarians, [are] 
people committed to creating a new moral, social, and public order based on 
restored communities, without puritanism or oppression’ (Etzioni 1995, p.2). 
Drawing on a declinist philosophy, political communitarianism asserts that law 
and order can be restored, the family can be saved, schools can provide 
essential moral education, and people can live in communities with an attendant 
increase in social responsibilities. Furthermore, commitment to self-interest can 
be balanced by commitment to the community and powerful self-interest groups 
in government can be curbed (ibid). In essence, political communitarianism is a 
rights and responsibilities approach to community action and democratic 
engagement. Community here represents the nexus of rights and obligations 
embedded within robust social networks. Hoggett (1997) considers Etzioni’s 
model of communitarianism to be moral and authoritarian. It was this model that 
was taken up by the Blair government, appealing to the idea of a lost age of 




Keane: civil society: the context for community participation and action   
 
The tensions that exist between self-interest and commitment to the community, 
represent for Keane (1998), the relationship between civil society and the state. 
The distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) 
suggests two different forms of social bond, one based on similarity, the other on 
interdependence and exchange (c.f. Tonnies 1887 cited in Hoggett 1997, p.4). 
For Keane, civil society represents an ideal-typical category that describes and 
envisages the complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected, non-
governmental institutions that are non-violent, self-organising, self-reflexive and 
permanently in tension with one another, and with the state institutions that 
frame, constrict and enable their actions (Keane 1998, p.6). Democracy 
represents that special type of political system in which civil society and state 
institutions tend to function as necessary, albeit separate but contiguous, distinct 
but interdependent, internal articulations of a system in which the exercise of 
state power is subject to public disputation, compromise and agreement. The 
work of the democratic project is about steering a course between the extensions 
of total state power into the non-state sphere on the one hand and the abolition 
of the state and the building of spontaneous agreement among citizens living 
within civil society on the other. In other words, democracy allows for 
apportioning and monitoring the exercise of power within politics, marked by 
institutionally distinct, but always mediated realms of civil society and state 
institutions. Therefore, this process is necessarily to do with power relations. 
Keane calls for a revised theory of democracy that could meet, head-on, the 
dominant tendency in Western political thought, to define political systems as 
power-ridden relationships between superiors and inferiors. Rather, the exercise 
of power is best monitored and controlled publicly within the democratic order, 
marked by the institutional separation of civil society and state institutions.    
 
For Keane, the worldwide expansion of the language of civil society is bound up 
with the democratic growth of non-governmental civic organisations operating at 
the international level. Civil society offers equilibrium between state and non- 
state institutions. To this end, argues Keane, the language of civil society has 
been over-determined by the dysfunctions created by an over-reach of the state, 
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and a spreading conviction that only civil societies can do certain things or 
perform certain functions best. According to this analysis, a civil society, or rather 
a more civil society - the favoured objective of social institutions such as 
markets, public spheres, and voluntary associations - is considered a ‘good 
thing’. This has led to new controversies about possible types of compromise 
between the state and civil institutions as well as the nature, performance, and 
limits of those civil society institutions themselves. Therefore, defining the 
boundaries between the role of civil society and the role of the state is key to a 
modern democratic settlement that allows for community engagement, 
empowerment and purposeful action.    
 
Thus a belief in the democratic process and the value of human beings, 
underpins these views of community and civil society. The arguments for 
community engagement and empowerment are often strong and redolent in 
righteous zeal. However, communities are not homogeneous. They are multi-
faceted, stratified, and complex. Individuals are members of several communities 
at any one time. Communities exist within communities. Such communities can 
even be conflicting. What binds communities together can also be limiting – 
setting up barriers for entry or exit. That which empowers can also be 
oppressive. It is what happens at the boundaries and intersections of 
communities that is of significance. Inter- and intra-community relations are 
ultimately dependent on the balances of power. Who holds the balance of power 
in the democratic process and to which ‘communitarian’ ideals they allude, in 
their broadest sense, is central to this discussion of the Big Society project.    
 
Big Society an answer to Broken Britain?  
 
Big Society represents a political and philosophical response to popular and 
intellectual notions of a ‘broken Britain’. Indeed, David Cameron, whilst in 
opposition, commissioned a report from the Centre for Social Justice to address 
this issue. Breakdown Britain (Social Justice Policy Group 2006) argued the case 
for a Britain that needs mending; the preferred model for repair being the use of 
third-sector organisations (TSOs), those charitable and voluntary organisations 
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that demonstrate ‘independence, enthusiasm, innovation, commitment and 
diversity’ (ibid, p.20).  
 
The welfare society has been breaking down on the margins, and the 
social fabric of many communities is being stripped away. Although this 
has been increasingly accepted by commentators and academics in 
recent years, a defensive complacency, akin to attitudes towards Britain’s 
industrial decline in the 1970s, has characterised our reaction to this 
problem. Too many either do not care or feel powerlessness to do 
anything about it (ibid, p.14).  
 
The persistent issues of poverty, inequality, social class, and institutional 
shortcomings are the Big Society’s ultimate focus, an analysis that significantly 
fails, however, to take into account the vagaries of the market and the 
inequalities it generates.  
 
Yet, an acceptance of the idea of a ‘broken Britain’, or a Britain in decline, has 
proved a defining motif of political discourse in the twentieth century and one that 
has been carried forward into the first decades of the twenty-first. According to 
English and Kenny (2000, p.253) ‘decline’, at its most basic, refers to a traceable 
process whereby Britain has diminished as a world power. This is decline in its 
absolute sense as opposed to the relative sense, which could be described as 
Britain’s decline in relation to her rivals. The argument here is that there has 
been a diminution of British power in terms of military power, international 
weight, and economic productivity. However, whereas decline may be traceable 
and measurable, ‘declinism’ is ideological and concerns interpretation, 
perception, and diagnosis (Aughy 2010, p.12). According to this analysis, 
declinist philosophy constitutes three broad strands: a cultural critique that 
locates poor economic performance within an anti-modern social structure which 
hinders wealth production, an economic critique of entrepreneurial failure and 
industrial conservatism and finally, an institutional critique of government and the 
misdirection of resources (ibid). Blond (2010, p.72) for example, posits that this 
anomie has occurred at both the civic and social level, through the breakdown of 
trust, to the extent that the ideals expounded by Burke of a civic, religious, 
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political or social middle, acting as a balance between the demands of 
individuals and the power accrued by the state in delivering them, has now gone. 
In line with this declinist thinking, three specific themes related to the Big Society 
are identifiable in Cameron’s (2009) Hugo Young lecture: realising equality of 
opportunity, state retrenchment, and a redistribution of power. State action, 
social action, and social entrepreneurship are the means to achieve this. This, in 
turn, entails a large-scale programme of state decentralisation via greater 
empowerment of intermediate institutions, greater emphasis on sharing British 
culture, a celebration of individual freedoms, and an audit of government 
(Norman and Ganesh 2006).   
 
The size, scope and role of government in Britain has reached a 
point where it is now inhibiting, not advancing, the progressive aims 
of reducing poverty, fighting inequality and increasing well-being. 
Indeed there is a worrying paradox that, because of its effect on 
personal and social responsibility, the recent growth of the state 
has promoted not social solidarity, but selfishness and individualism 
(Cameron 2009).   
 
Far from being a mere programme of change, advocates such as Blond (2010) 
argue that the Big Society project represents a radical, new political settlement 
that combines economic equity with social conservatism, thus creating ‘a new 
politics of virtue’ (ibid, p.185). What is called for is a resurgence of civic and 
community action, based on a renewed understanding of the values of 
community and mutual reciprocity. The model of localism promoted in the Big 
Society project is underpinned by a philosophical belief in aspects of 
communitarianism, reciprocal altruism, and the preservation and/or creation of 
institutions that maintain and promote civic values and co-operation, rather than 
simply ‘rolling back’ the state and allowing community organisations to fill the 
vacuum. The emphasis on institutions (including schools) and tradition (from 
which our civic/moral values emerge) distinguishes this form of localism from the 
way New Public Management was articulated under New Labour’s social welfare 
reform. The language of targets, assessment and league tables has been 
subsumed into a discourse of freedom from central government control, 
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commissioning rather than managing and open access data evidenced in the 
National Health Service reforms where Primary Care Trusts have been replaced 
by GP commissioning services and the much troubled plans for a national 
medical records database.   
 
Such ideas represent more than a simple ideology. According to Norman (2010) 
‘Big Society’ is a political philosophy that contains within it a specific line of 
argument that criticises an over-extension of the state witnessed most clearly in 
recent decades, and the dependency and inefficiency that such over extension 
generates.    
 
The growing evidence is that the state in its present form is 
manifestly insufficient to the task, in areas ranging from pensions to 
education, from housing to welfare provision. Indeed, we have 
reached the limits of the idea of the state as a remedy for social 
and economic failure. What is so striking is how impoverished 
political debate has become on these issues, and how reliant we 
are on a single and inflexible model of state provision of public 
services to solve our social ills (ibid, p.6).   
 
In other words, the tools of government that addressed the needs of post-war 
Britain in the latter half of the twentieth century are no longer fit for purpose and 
must be replaced.    
 
As a political philosophy however, these ideas are not unique to the English 
context and have resonance with the earlier American experience of the 1990s. 
Here, the ‘reinventing government’ movement represented a similar assault on 
‘big government’, where governance was bound up with a normative evaluation 
of government and the programme required to reinvent it (Rose 2005, p.153). 
Osborne and Gaebler (1993) argued that the old bureaucratic models of 
government created in response to industrialisation were no longer suited to the 
modern context of knowledge-based societies, where information and 
communication technologies are evolving quickly. The debate, therefore, should 
not be about how much government is required to address these changes, albeit 
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more or less, but what type of government is necessary. For Osborne and 
Gaebler, the answer was an entrepreneurial model that necessitates a shift from 
government to governance.   
 
Governance is the process by which we collectively solve our problems 
and meet our society’s needs. Government is the instrument we use. The 
instrument is outdated and the process of reinvention has begun (ibid, 
p.24).   
 
Good governance, therefore, means less government, but the reverse, more 
government meaning poor governance, is not necessarily true.   
  
Using economic arguments and the impact of globalisation on standards of living 
as the raison d’être for this change, Osborne and Gaebler argue there is less 
money for government, i.e. for ‘doing things’ such as delivering services, whilst at 
the same time, there is an increased demand for governance  or leading society. 
Government becomes all about steering (policy setting) rather than rowing 
(service delivery) and the two should be separate functions. This is the hallmark 
of entrepreneurial governments. It allows for the use of competition between 
service providers, reserves maximum flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances, and helps to insist on accountability for quality performance (ibid, 
p.35). Underpinning this so-called ‘reinvention movement’ are recurring themes 
of decentralisation and deregulation, employee and customer empowerment, 
mission and outcomes orientation, competition and market mechanisms. Not all 
these themes necessarily converge or are mutually supportive. Instances of early 
Coalition Government policy-making following these guidelines are, the flagship 
education policy of Free Schools, and the extension of civil liberties in the 
scrapping of ID cards and centralised databases such as ContactPoint, 
examples which have demonstrated the inherent tensions between government 
steering and community action.    
 
In spite of obvious tensions and inconsistencies, the Big Society resonated with 
David Cameron’s deliberate promotion of a more compassionate Conservative 
party, acting as an agent of social responsibility. This is seen as an attempt to 
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draw a line under the negative fallout from Thatcher’s contention that ‘there is no 
such thing as society’ (Keay 1987). This particular view of Conservatism, 
standing for a lack of care for the needy, gained further traction following the poll 
tax riots of 1990 and the cash for questions furore of 1994 (Davis 2010). Davis’s 
contention here is that the search to inspire a bigger society, although contingent 
on the rebranding of the Conservative party in a more favourable light, was in 
fact, part of a much wider and long-standing project. For example, David Willetts, 
‘the father of Cameronism’, in his pamphlet Civic Conservatism (1994) sought to 
refashion discussion of social institutions and their potential for co-operation. 
Also cited are Tim Montgomerie who founded the Renewing One Nation project 
(reminiscent of Disraeli’s One Nation Toryism) to ‘strengthen communities’, 
‘invest in families’ and to ‘build character’. The project was to become the 
forerunner of the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) founded in 2004 under the 
leadership of Iain Duncan Smith. Other protagonists of a caring Conservatism 
include Greg Clark, who argued against the invasion of civil society by 
government in his Total Politics, published in 2003, and Steve Hilton,  who set up 
the consultancy ‘Good Business’ in 1997 and, with Gibbons, published a book of 
the same name in 2002. The latter called for corporate social leadership in 
defence of global capitalism, considered the essence of good business.    
 
A third strand in Cameron’s view of civic innovation, identified by Davis (2010) is 
that of Progressive Conservatism. Launched by the Conservative think-tank 
Demos in 2009, the Progressive Conservatism project, chaired by David Willetts 
and run by Max Wind-Cowie, is organised around progressive values of personal 
and community empowerment, combating poverty and wrestling inequality. 
Publications associated with the project to date include such titles as 
Resuscitating Democracy (2009), Recapitalising the Poor (2009a), Everyday 
Equality (2010) and Of Mutual Benefit (2011). These publications, amongst many 
produced by Demos, argue for social responsibility, decentralisation and 
innovation as a counter to top-down bureaucratic approaches. Progressive 
Conservatism here is to be achieved through linking personal acquisition of 
assets and capital where the state helps to facilitate that acquisition. This is done 
through alliances with the private and voluntary sectors, and reform of parliament 
in order to be more responsive to its citizens.  
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The term ‘progressive’ in politics has a variety of meanings, generally associated 
with left-of-centre policy. It was in 2007 that Greg Clark and Jeremy Hunt 
claimed that the Conservatives, under Cameron, were the true progressives of 
British politics (Clark and Hunt 2007). In their analysis, progressive conservatism 
is not only ’orientated towards the future rather than yearning for the past’ but it 
is about ‘confronting vested interests’ (ibid). However, Bale (2012) argues that 
the vested interests the Conservatives are most likely to take on, now they are 
leading the coalition government, are in the public rather than in the private 
sphere, and in the labour movement rather than in the private sector workforce.  
This appears to go against common understandings of the term progressive, and 
the ideas of the American political movement, to which it gave name in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Diamond (2011) on the other hand, presents progressive conservatism in terms 
of strategy rather than ideological direction. In his analysis, the new ‘progressive’ 
Conservatism witnessed in Europe, represents a potent challenge to traditional 
social democratic thought, seeking to control the centre-ground through a 
reputation of economic competence, scepticism about the efficiency of the state 
and efficacy of the  public sector, and a belief in the role of traditional values in 
the context of contemporary society. The aim is a society where the ‘leading 
force for progress is social responsibility, not state control’ (UK Conservative 
Party Manifesto 2010). The state should be smaller, but the communitarian ties 
that bind citizens together remain important. Diamond identifies four strategic 
and pragmatic strands to progressive conservatism. First, establishing 
dominance on the economy by acknowledging the scale of public debt, and 
showing a willingness to make tough choices about the balance of tax rises and 
spending cuts, so as to steer a sustainable fiscal path. Second, redefining the 
political centre-ground by seizing the mantle of progressive reform from the 
centre-left; creating a new role for charities and the third sector in support of the 
poorest and most vulnerable in society, whilst negotiating careful reform of public 
entitlements such as health care, pensions, and social insurance. Third, being 
pragmatic in foreign affairs in terms of selective, international co-operation in the 
European Union, and within global institutions. According to Diamond, such 
strategies have made centre-right Conservative parties in Europe more electable 
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by striking a new balance between the politics of support and the politics of 
power. It means that progressive conservatism can reach out to lower and 
middle-income groups whilst at the same time appealing to its competence and 
fitness to rule rather than to a political ideology. 
 
Finally, there is the argument for renewing traditional values in society, such as 
custom, belonging, morality and tradition; in other words, standing up for ways of 
life that are expressed and embodied within national identity which ought to be 
protected from the forces of modernity and marketisation.  
 
Capitalism and Community 
 
The inference here is that notions of community and civil society are threatened 
by the onslaught of capitalist ideology. Hirschman (1992), however, develops a 
more sophisticated thesis. The idea that commerce and the market economy can 
have a powerful moralising force in civil society is only one of four key critiques 
of market society; the ‘doux-commerce thesis’ of the pro-market, the ‘self-
destruction thesis’ of the anti-capitalist camp and the ‘feudal-shackles thesis’. 
Pro-marketeers from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, such as Thomas 
Paine and Ricard and, later, Smith and Hume, argued for the civilising effects of 
market transactions. These include industriousness, assiduity, frugality, 
punctuality, and most importantly for the functioning of a market society, probity 
(ibid, p.109). Commerce here is a powerful moralising agent which brings with it 
nonmaterial improvements to society. As the Industrial Revolution progresses in 
Britain and Western Europe, so Marxist and conservative critiques of capitalism 
emerged. Capitalist society here displays a pronounced capacity to erode or 
undermine the moral foundations on which any society, including a capitalist one, 
must rest (ibid, p.110). As an almost opposite critique is the feudal-shackles 
thesis or ‘unfinished-bourgoise-revolution’ thesis which claims that certain 
societies that have been penetrated by capitalism have still held on to the 
previous social order. Capitalism has been undermined by holding on to pre-
capitalist institutions and attitudes which militate against a proletarian revolution 
and fraternal socialism. Where there has been no feudal past as in America, 
authors such as Hartz (cited in Hirschman 1992) argued that the absence of a 
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feudal past can have equally deleterious results , where a feudal past is seen 
here as a positive contributor to subsequent social democratic development. In 
short, Hirschman indicates that these theses, although independently conceived, 
all contain elements of truth but no one thesis contains the whole truth. They also 
contain certain irreconcilable contradictions: capitalism as self-destructive and 
capitalism as a positive, moral influence, or capitalism as self-reinforcing and 
capitalism as self-undermining. However, recognising the inconsistencies does 
not mean that contradictory processes do not operate in society at the same 
time. They should not necessarily be represented as an either/or choice of 
ideologies but an indication of the complexities of current processes.   
 
Polanyi’s critique of liberal fundamentalism, that tendency to place the market at 
the centre of human nature and society, takes a slightly different stance. In line 
with Hirschman, capitalism is described as a self-regulating and ultimately a 
destructive system. For Polanyi the market takes place alongside other social 
principles such as reciprocity and redistribution and is normally embedded in 
social institutions; it has become the cornerstone of economic sociology in recent 
decades (Hart 2008, p.1136). His was perhaps a utopian project intended to ‘dis-
embed’ the market economy from society. He does not deny the utilitarian 
aspects of the market but what is rejected, is the notion of a self-regulatory 
system. This is mere illusion as market mechanisms require the intervention of 
the state - an example of this would be the recent trend towards quantitative 
easing as an attempt to keep the flow of money supplies. Thus the tension is 
between claiming that the free market is increasingly disembodied from political 
oversight and acknowledging that it is in reality embedded in political processes 
that are kept largely invisible by liberal ideology. David Harvey (2005) adds to 
this debate claiming that the post-welfare state consensus represented 
embedded liberalism, whereas the neoliberal period is described as 
‘disembedded liberalism’. For Harvey, both represent species of liberalism, 
although the neoliberalism of recent years makes greater claims about the virtue 
of the market. The two major responses of the 20th century, either to emphasise 
the merits of individual freedom, or to subjugate the economy to the political will 
on the pretext of equality, are both unsatisfactory. The one generates huge 
inequalities whilst the other leads to the suppression of freedom. The alternative 
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is to develop institutions capable of guaranteeing a plural economy within a 
democratic framework. This must start from real economic movements rather 
than an abstract notion of social reform.    
 
In summary, Big Society amounts to empowering communities to construct 
services tailored to their own needs through decentralisation and localism. The 
emphasis is on promoting social action, particularly through philanthropy, 
volunteering, charitable donation, and a continuation of New Labour’s drive to 
open public services, this time to greater competition and involvement from the 
charitable and voluntary sectors. In line with liberal discourse, the focus is on the 
personal and collective benefits accrued from such engagements across all 
communities, rather than the targeted and interventionist agenda of New Labour 
that used children and families as the rationale for, and the means of, social 
policy reform (Simon & Ward 2010). Big Society looks to strengthening and 
renewing civic institutions such as the family, the church, unions, and activist 
organisations, to mediate between the needs of individuals and the state that 
could provide for them. As such, it brings together a number of recognisable 
political and philosophical strands from a variety of contemporary and traditional 


















Chapter 2: Intellectual antecedents  
 
What have been described so far are a variety of views claimed by 
Conservatives, and others, to underpin the notion of the Big Society. They raise 
a number of questions of which three are of particular interest: what are the 
intellectual antecedents to the Big Society; to what extent do they inform the 
narrative of the Big Society; what do these antecedents tell us about the limits 
and possibilities of the Big Society in relation to education? Underpinning these 
questions are central beliefs about the relationship between politics, the state 
and the market.  
 
What are the intellectual antecedents, if any?   
 
Amongst Big Society thinkers, two prominent intellectual frameworks are evident: 
a critique of liberalism, particularly neoliberalism on the one hand, and the 
aligning of the views of liberalism and conservatism on the other (Kelly 2012, 
p.23). Phillip Blond construes the Big Society as a pragmatic remedy for the 
failure of liberal ideas that have been in the ascendency since the 1960s on both 
sides of the political divide. Jesse Norman (2010), however, hails it as a means 
of reconciling two seemingly opposing political ideologies – liberalism and 
conservatism. Whilst Blond draws on a rich tradition of European philosophical 
and theological thought, and a historical perspective informed particularly by the 
nineteenth century reformist conservative traditions of Burke and Disraeli, 
Norman turns to the twentieth century British political thinker Michael Oakeshott. 
Both approaches have influenced David Cameron in his attempt to reinvent  
British Conservatism as  ‘a Modern Compassionate Conservatism’ , not through 
‘some slick re-branding exercise’ but through ‘fundamental change’ so that ‘we 
look, feel, think and behave like a completely new organisation’  (Cameron 
2005).   
 
Phillip Blond: Red Toryism and philosophical /theological thought  
 
The work of Phillip Blond offers notable intellectual underpinning for the Big 
Society. Considered for a time the ‘only significant thinker of Cameron’s 
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entourage’ (Gray 2010) his recent publication Red Tory (2010) proposes an 
agenda for this new conservatism. By rejecting vigorously the liberal ideas which 
dominated the twentieth century as responsible for the [perceived] social and 
political malaise in contemporary Britain, he argues for a revitalised, ethical 
conservatism of a property owning democracy as  the counter to the twin evils of 
a rights based liberalism and a centralised welfare state (Chapman 2012, p.278).   
 
Blond’s overarching ideological principles amount to: 
 
• Detaching social conservatism from neoliberal economics 
• Demarking concern for the poor from class struggle 
• Promoting localism and small scale employment initiatives against the 
hierarchies of state and multi-national corporations 
• Establishing a clear role for elites in social management 
(Coombs 2010, p.3)  
 
Detaching social conservatism from neoliberal economics 
 
Red Toryism represents Blond’s attempt to realign conservatism with its roots in 
18th and 19th century political thought. Blond’s thesis is constructed upon a broad 
historical overview of post-Thatcherite conservatism, which he sees as a period 
dominated by an unfortunate split from the conservatism of Burke and Disraeli. 
According to this narrative, the 2007-8 global economic crisis served to reveal a 
profound vulnerability in the British economy, one created by a dual dependence 
on the financial sector and foreign capital flows (Blond 2010, p.39). The ensuing 
‘meltdown’ resulted from the ‘free market’ economic model rigorously pursued on 
both sides of the Atlantic by Thatcher and Regan during the 1980s, and by their 
political successors situated on the left and right of the political divide. This 
particular economic model represents for Blond an assault on the very nature of 
conservatism itself. Whereas, he argues, the Conservative Party represents, for 
many, the party of free markets, those free markets have now dissolved into 
‘monopoly finance, big business and deregulated global capital’ (Blond, 2009, 
unpaginated). In response, Blond aims to position his programme of Red 
Toryism as a ‘triangulation of both the failures of left and right’ (Coombs 2010, 
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p.4), since, in his opinion, neither the Labour party under Ed Milliband, nor 
Cameron’s Conservatives, looked like producing a ‘plausible analysis of the 
meltdown’  (Blond 2009, unpaginated).  
 
In Blond’s view, there were two governing paradigms in Britain in the years 
following 1945 that contributed to this state of affairs. These were ‘state 
sponsored Keynesianism …[and] neo-liberalism’ (ibid). Both positions share 
some important philosophical and economic assumptions about freedom, choice, 
and markets, and both positions have generated cross-party support. However, 
they have resulted, in Blond’s view, in ‘state authoritarianism and an atomised 
individualism’ (ibid).   
 
Look at the society we have become: we are a bi-polar 
nation, a bureaucratic, centralised state that presides 
dysfunctionally over an increasingly fragmented, 
disempowered and isolated citizenry. The intermediary 
structures of a civilised life have been eliminated, and with 
them the Burkean ideal of a civic, religious, political or social 
middle, as the state and the market accrue power at the 
expense of ordinary people. But if both 20th-century socialism 
and conservatism have converged on the market state, they 
have done so by obeying the insistent dictates of modernity 
itself. And modernity is nothing if not liberal. (ibid)  
 
These objections summarise Blond’s assessment of liberalism, an assessment 
that reiterates Burke’s own critique in the aftermath of the French revolution. For 
Burke, the new French nation-state, which emerged from the Revolution, stood 
for a monolithic, top-down and repressive society, far removed from the society 
he valued in England which was made up of a multitude of small, diverse and 
organic communities based on families, local communities and networks (Kelly 
and Crowfoot 2012, p.112). The justification for the commercial society that 
emerged in England, with guaranteed property rights and the free exchange of 
property in markets, had antecedents in the customs and manners of chivalric 
society. Therefore, it follows, that the independent institutions of modern 
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commercial society emerged from this ancient, natural order, where the sanctity 
of profit and private exchange is divinely ordained, and both property and 
political power are distributed differentially according to rank (Edwards 2012, 
p.103). Hence, for Blond,   “[T]he most extreme form of liberal autonomy requires 
the repudiation of society”, that is, as in Burke’s assessment of France, it ushers 
in the necessity of “big government’ (Blond 2009, unpaginated) and what is 
destroyed along the way is society itself.   
 
A vision of the good life cannot come from liberal principles. 
Unlimited Liberalism produces atomised relativism and state 
absolutism. Insofar as both the Tories and Labour have been 
contaminated by liberalism, the true left-right legacy of the 
post war period is, unsurprisingly, a centralised authoritarian 
state and a fragmented and disassociative society (ibid).   
 
This is because: 
 
‘The liberal idea of man is … first of all, an idea of nothing: not 
family, not ethnicity, not society or nation. But real people are 
formed by the society of others (ibid).  
 
The argument is against a liberalism that induces, or at least promises, the self-
satisfaction of the individual. Such self-satisfaction is a threat to what, elsewhere, 
has been termed ‘the ethics of care’ (Held 2006). This moral theory holds with 
the conception that human beings are relational and interdependent (both 
morally and epistemologically), rather than being merely self-sufficient 
individuals. Such a view acts counter to dominant liberal theories that have 
promoted a notion of the person as ‘a rational, autonomous agent or a self-
interested individual’ (ibid, p.13). Every person starts out as a child, dependant 
on those providing care and remains interdependent with others in thoroughly 




‘That we can think and feel and act as if we were independent 
depends on a network of social relations making it possible 
for us to do so’ (ibid, p.14).   
 
From this perspective, the liberal, individualist conception of the person fosters a 
false picture of society and the persons in it. It is impoverished as an ideal, failing 
to value the natural ties with others and the relationships that, in part, constitute 
personal identity. Such theories contribute to the breakdown of associative 
society. As Annette Baier asserts,  
 
‘Liberal morality , if unsupplemented, may unfit people to be 
anything other than what its justifying theories suppose them 
to be, ones with no interest in each other’s interests’ (Baier 
1994, p.29)   
 
Antithetically, social conservatism is about reinstating society.   
 
What Cameron describes as ‘compassionate conservatism’ is a ‘philosophy 
based on trust, responsibility and inclusiveness’:   
 
The more we trust people, the stronger they and society 
become. We’re all in this together… we have a shared 
responsibility for our shared future… There is such a thing as 
society; it’s just not the same thing as the state. 
We will stand up for the victims of state failure and ensure 
that social justice and economic opportunity are achieved by 
empowering people and communities (Cameron 2009, cited 
in Norman and Ganesh 2006, p.1)  
 
Thus, according to Lee (2009, p.54), David Cameron’s construction of 
compassionate conservatism represents a strategic focus for conservative 
policy. Lee argues that a myriad of social problems could be attributed to the 
failures of New Labour’s extensive social policy reform agenda. Compassionate 
conservatism juxtaposes the unprecedented levels of material prosperity and 
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public spending on the welfare state, with examples of widespread societal 
breakdown (ibid). The key task is to separate state and society, particularly the 
state and civil society, through extending the opportunities for entrepreneurship. 
Neoliberalism, although it may be associated with economic growth, efficiency 
and widespread prosperity, cannot, of itself, address all economic and social 
problems. The state must allow civil society to flourish and counter individualism 
with a moral obligation to public service and social justice. Liberalism, therefore, 
in Blond’s analysis can only be a virtue when linked to a politics of the common 
good.   
 
Demarking concern for the poor from class struggle  
 
Such ideas of civil society are closely associated with the origins of the trade 
union movement and other forms of association, configured around working 
class agitation and organisation emerging from industrialisation in nineteenth 
century Britain. Friendly societies and social unions, brought together workers 
and ‘re-made communities and loyalties around their places of work and 
residences’ (Blond 2010, p.14). Blond has praised such ‘autonomous working 
class associations’ (ibid) for bettering the lives of the working poor. However, the 
welfare state that emerged out of this process, considered by its supporters as 
‘the zenith of working class achievement’ (ibid), began the destruction of the 
independent life of the British working class. In Blond’s analysis, the great 
tragedy of the welfare state is the corrosion of longstanding social values held by 
the working class and consequently, the erosion of the mutualism these values 
enshrined. Now the working class expect and rely on the state to provide, rather 
than looking to community, work, familial obligation and civic and economic 
participation (ibid, p.76). In this manner, welfare state policies have shifted the 
primary source of social support from the horizontal social networks of civil 
society, to vertically delivered equivalents. It is not that there should be no 
safety-net for the most vulnerable in society, but that there should also be a 
culture of specific behaviours available to raise people out of poverty, namely 
work, saving, investing and entrepreneurship. That these have become 
‘unfashionable’ is not only the fault of welfarism per se but a succession of 
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economic policies that have preyed on peoples’ desire for security, selling them 
insecurity via mortgaged home ownership.   
 
In Blond’s meta- narrative of post-war Britain, there is emphasis on the necessity 
for massive reconstruction (housing, business and basic social and economic 
infrastructure). Whereas the European response was to ‘pool the interests of 
state, capital and waged workers’ in this enterprise, in Britain few parties saw the 
need to abandon their sectional interests (Blond 2009, unpaginated). British 
unions, particularly, were unwilling to relinquish free collective bargaining. The 
result was industrial relations trapped in a state of unresolved class conflict; a 
state of affairs further exacerbated by the failures of management to re-invest 
profit. Unions, according to this scenario, represented institutions wedded to 
welfare serfdom. In addition, the Conservative response under Thatcher, failed to 
maintain the middle ground, instead deploying the state in favour of ‘the owner 
and the entrepreneur’ (ibid). This meant that the benefits of ‘Conservative 
liberalisation’ accrued to the top, widening the disparity between rich and poor: a 
situation that continued under New Labour. Thus, for Blond, mediating 
institutions such as grammar schools, trade unions, and regional businesses, 
have failed the poor. They have either been eliminated, or are no longer fit for 
purpose (Blond 2013).  
 
Throughout this analysis, Blond holds a strongly anti-Marxist stance, defining 
Marx as ‘just another dispossessor of the poor’ (Blond 2009, unpaginated). 
However, for Coombs (2010), the difference in the ‘red’ of Red Toryism and that 
of Marxism is most obvious in Blond’s belief in localism. The current economic 
situation is attributed to the lack of separation between local, and national and 
international capital. The lack of local capitalism and the grip of what Blond calls 
‘modal capitalism’, is at the root of the crisis (ibid, p.4). The call, therefore, is for a 
conservatism that represents a break from the ‘monopoly logic of the market 
state’ and brings in a ‘traditional, communitarian, civic conservatism’ (Blond 
2009, unpaginated). Described as ’a new form of politics which links 
egalitarianism to the pursuit of objective values and virtues’ this is what John 
Milbank understands as ‘traditionalist socialism or a ‘Red Toryism’ (Milbank, cited 





This ‘politics of virtue’, resembles similar approaches to social policy of the past, 
which sought to move beyond the politics of  left and right and revive a system of 
virtues based on a universally shared set of higher ideals  (Blond 2009, 
unpaginated). In Blond’s view, the erosion of the infrastructure of civil society 
reflects a moral and cultural crisis, far more than an economic one. The state is 
too powerful and intrusive, and the neoliberal conception of the market too 
hegemonic thereby diminishing, or at least marginalising, the place and role of 
the key agents of civil society (Smith 2012, p.332). Power would be better 
devolved to local communities, thus enabling the regeneration of a mutual 
society.   
 
What is called for is a ‘moralised market’, something akin to local protectionism 
(Coombs 2010, p.4) where the market via ‘free guilds’’ and ‘voluntary 
associations’ at local level can flourish as a benign monopoly (Blond 2010, 
p.192). To achieve this form of market without the overbearing hand of big 
government, demands a new form of capitalism based on trust and a different 
form of civic and productive organisation. This notion of a localised market, 
supported by local employers employing local workers, is reminiscent of the 
German Mittelstand. The Mittelstand represents those small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) employing, according to the German definition, up to five 
hundred employees and with an annual turnover of up to €50m or, according to 
the European definition, employing up to 250 employees or with an annual 
turnover of up to €50m. According to the German Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology, many of these successful enterprises are characterised by 
features such as independence and family ownership. Such firms tend to be 
founded and managed by entrepreneurs, who, typically, aim to hand on the 
leadership of these family businesses to their children. Indeed, roughly 95% of all 
German firms are family owned and approximately 85% of these are managed 
by their owner (BMWI, n.d., p.5). Of the approximately 3.7 million companies in 
Germany in 2010, more than 99% can be classed as belonging to the German 




Historically, many Mittelstand companies were started at the turn of the last 
century, with others appearing after World War II. They represented a major 
engine of German industrial growth and played a substantial part in the post war 
‘Wirtschaftswunder’ (economic miracle). By 2011 they accounted for around 37% 
of the total turnover of all German firms. In comparison with similar companies, 
particularly in the US and UK, German Mittelstand companies are active primarily 
in the industrial sector. Almost one quarter of all German employees work in this 
sector (ibid, p.7). According to European Commission figures (ibid, p.10), 
approximately 15.5 million people (61.3%) are employed by the German 
Mittelstand in jobs subject to social security contributions, in comparison to 
53.7% in the UK, and 46.2% in the US.   
 
There are five key factors relating to the success of the German Mittelstand 
model (Studzinski 2013). These have resonance with the Big Society ideal.   
 
First, the Mittelstand ethos is one where business is viewed as a constructive 
enterprise that aims to be socially useful. Making a profit is not an end in itself 
but job creation, client satisfaction, and product excellence are just as 
fundamental. Taking on debt is treated with suspicion. The objective of every 
business leader is to earn trust from employees, customers, suppliers and 
society as a whole. Business and education are ‘natural bedfellows’ (ibid).  
 
Second, the Mittelstand generates a collaborative spirit between employer and 
employees. A system of works councils ensures that employees' interests are 
safeguarded, whether or not they belong to a trade union. German workers 
expect their employers to keep training them and enhancing their skills.   
 
Furthermore, there is a determination amongst Mittelstand companies to build for 
the long term. To this end, they tend to keep core functions such as engineering 
and project management in-house, while outsourcing production whenever this 
proves more efficient (ibid). According to Studzinki’s analysis, the fact that 
Mittelstand companies are overwhelmingly privately owned, and thus largely free 
of pressure to provide shareholder returns, means that they are readier to 
46 
 
innovate and invest a larger proportion of their revenues into research and 
development.   
 
Fourth, German companies work closely with their suppliers, and by inference 
build relationships of loyalty and trust. Finally, the Mittelstand operates within a 
context of a highly decentralised German economy and political system, with the 
result that local banks, businesses, entrepreneurs and politicians build close 
relationships with each other, making everyday co-operation easier. At the 
national level, Germany's leaders rarely miss an opportunity to promote their 
country's industry abroad (ibid). All this sits within a European Union 
Entrepreneurship Action Plan (ec.europa.eu) setting out a desire to promote 
entrepreneurship with regional SME policies and the promotion of SME envoys.   
 
Blond’s moral critique of unfettered liberalism and the UK workforce has more to 
do with the pursuit of wrong ideas, such as free collective bargaining and class 
conflict, rather than the inevitable logic of capitalism (Coombs 2010, p.4), a view 
also to be found in the works of Hayek: free society was ‘gravely threatened’ by 
the powers aggregated by the unions. Unions had achieved a position of unique 
privilege using coercion, in ways not available to other institutions (Gamble 1996, 
p.171). They needed to be brought back within the rule of law. Although starting 
out as civil institutions, they had developed into organisations that restricted the 
freedom of their members and lobbied governments on the merits of collectivist 
schemes, or other measures that would favour their members (ibid). Instead, 
businesses such as the John Lewis Partnership, based on horizontal 
organisational structures, are promoted by Blond as exemplars of ethical, 
commercial, and managerial success (Coombs 2010, p.5; Smith 2012, p.333). In 
this manner, the moral alternative, rather like the German Mittelstand outlined 
above, is a local capitalism based on trust at all levels of the economic system, 
between employer and employee, manager and producer, consumer and 
provider. Morality and provincialism become two sides of the same coin (Coombs 
2010, p.5).  This raises questions of where this shared morality is to come from, 





Establishing a clear role for elites in social management   
 
Blond’s answer is an educated elite, the ‘philosopher kings’ (Smith 2012, p.335), 
amongst whom Blond himself has been named in the British press, will guard 
against people acting according to their own self-interest and making those 
‘wrong choices’ to which his historical account of British liberalism gives 
emphasis. The individualism and self-satisfaction generated by liberalism, has 
removed any sense of collective responsibility from society, where care for each 
other overrides the desire to look after oneself. The proposed new world of the 
Big Society, restores society and the individuals who comprise it, to an elevated 
position over and above the state and market, which, so far, have conspired to 
reduce a large proportion of its constituent members to serfdom. Heading this 
new social configuration are appropriately educated persons, an elite who 
embody those essentially Christian values required for Blond’s moral market to 
exist.   
 
Moral markets, and a return to civic association, require 
Christian values: mutuality, subsidiarity, reciprocity, solidarity, 
mediation (both in the theological and institutional sense) 
(Blond, cited in Beckford 2011)   
 
The idea of philosopher king is found in Plato’s The Republic and relates directly 
to Plato’s notion of the ruler being both philosopher and guardian. For Duncan 
(Duncan & Steinberger 1990, p.1319) the justification for the introduction of 
philosopher kings, is the founding of justice. Guardians can rule over the political 
approximation of the just city but they cannot make the city just. Justice cannot 
be found in the political world (although many believe that it can). The best the 
political world can offer is order and harmony (ibid) but these, of themselves, do 
not equate with justice. Duncan claims that justice, according to Plato, is both 
natural and spontaneous, the product of human contemplation and discovery. 
Justice becomes necessary when human desires in the physical world exceed 
what is necessary for existence. To this end, the kallipolis of Plato’s Republic 
represents the peoples’ wish to have all their desires met and still have justice. 
Only in the political world do men and women need guardians to protect them 
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from each other and from themselves. ‘The rule of the philosopher king makes 
the apolitical city possible again’ (ibid). When they rule, there are no guardians in 
the political sense of the word, rather the two have become one.   
 
One sphere of operation for modern day philosopher kings is the think tank, 
either those independent or sponsored by the various political parties. Think 
tanks such as the Fabian Society date back as far as the nineteenth century. 
Hayek, for example, was most closely associated the Institute of Economic 
Affairs (IEA), providing them with an intellectual and theoretical critique of liberal 
policy. Blond founded ResPublica in 2009. Think tanks offer a vehicle for the 
promotion and dissemination of ideas. In this manner, the role of Blond’s 
philosopher kings becomes closely associated with two, radical and fundamental 
changes required to bring about the new model civil society: that the 
bureaucracy of big government be dismantled and redistributed at local levels, 
and that the stranglehold of globalised markets and ‘modal monopoly’ be 
subverted through the power of local networks of production and economic 
activity. Modal monopoly is:   
 
a model of monopoly that extends beyond whether an 
individual company has undue market influence to whether a 
certain mode or way of doing business constitutes a cartel 
(Blond 2009, unpaginated)  
 
First, in order to return the administrative systems and governing powers to local 
communities, Blond is expecting the elite to go against their own self-interest as 
a class and act according to the principle of self-sacrifice. It is through the 
bureaucratic state that the necessity of a bureaucratic state is undone. In other 
words, there is a power at work in the state that is not self-interested in the 
perpetuation of bureaucracy. There is similarity here with Hayek’s theory of 
knowledge and notion of the ‘Great Society’. Adopting the term used by Adam 
Smith, Hayek’s Great Society is the culmination of an evolutionary process from 
primitive to modern society. It is a highly decentralised society, where as many 
people as possible will be involved in taking decisions about production. The 
ideal individual in the Great Society is the entrepreneur – an individual ‘prepared 
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to take calculated risks, make full use of the unique knowledge they possess, 
and take the opportunities that are open to them (Gamble 1996, p.72). These 
individuals will acquire self-discipline, by taking responsibility for themselves and 
others (their dependents), and in so doing, develop the essential moral traits 
required to sustain and develop the Great Society.   
 
Second, the iron grip of globalised markets can only be loosened via resurgence 
in local democracy and systematic change to the administrative organisation of 
government. Here, the recent housing crash serves as a warning, an example of 
‘the absorption of all local, regional and national systems of credit into one form 
of global credit’. This created undue reliance on one source of credit supply. The 
residential asset market collapsed when this supply was compromised.   
 
[T]he big banks were dedicated to generating price 
fluctuations and asset bubbles and then exiting before their 
demise. This strategy of market manipulation deployed 
enormous amounts of capital in speculative arbitrage (just five 
US banks had control of over $4 trillion of assets in 2007 
(Blond 2009, unpaginated). 
   
This current manipulation of the market by a few, very powerful transnational 
companies, is far removed from that of the small investor envisaged by classical 
free-market thinkers. Phenomena such as the German Mittelstand indicate the 
potential strength of smaller, regional firms as a viable alternative to big business 
monopoly. In the UK, a recent GE Capital Report (2013) Leading from the 
Middle, argued for the strength of mid-market firms in the UK. Like the German 
Mittelstand, the report found that mid-market firms were firmly grounded in local 
markets, outsourcing only 15% of their operating costs and preferring local 
suppliers, thereby retaining spending in the local area (ibid, p.9).  
  
The approach translates itself into a unique sense of 
community. While an average 46% of German, French and 
Italian mid-market firms believe they are pillars of their local 
community, that figure rises to 56% for UK mid-market 
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companies. Similarly, 49% of such firms in the UK recognise 
they are crucial to the local economy compared to 41% in the 
rest of the EU-4 countries (ibid).  
 
Furthermore, they proved to be innovative, particularly in the field of process and 
systems innovation, as against new product innovation. There is a perception of 
a lighter regulatory burden in UK mid-market companies in comparison with their 
European counterparts, although, keeping pace with regulatory change remains 
a significant challenge. Access to affordable finance also appears more 
favourable to the UK context than in other EU-4 regions (ibid, p.10).   
 
Blond’s argument is not, however, that the local replaces the global, if the 
example of the Mittelstand is to be followed. German Mittelstand companies 
have a strong position in foreign markets. Indeed, their mantra is ‘think global, 
act local’ (ibid, p.11). Rather, the German model explains Blond’s assertion that 
local networks of production and economic activity, be that local or international, 
are interdependent.   
 
Blond and Liberalism   
 
In order to understand why the legacy of liberalism produces both state 
authoritarianism and atomised individualism, Blond takes a sweeping historical 
approach, arguing that philosophical liberalism was born out of an 18th-century 
critique of absolute monarchies. Its primary purpose was to protect the rights of 
the individual from arbitrary abuse by the king. However, it was the defence of 
individual liberty that became paramount, leading to the breakdown in society. 
Yet, for Blond, to pursue the logic of individual autonomy would result in a 
society that required ‘a powerful central authority to manage the perpetual 
conflict between self-interested individuals’ (Blond 2009, unpaginated ). Thus, 
the unintended consequence of unlimited liberalism is the controlling state: ‘that 
most illiberal of entities’ (ibid). This explains why:  
 
‘[e]ven the most “communitarian” liberals—from philosophers 
like Michael Sandel to politicians like Ed Miliband—cannot 
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promote community without big government. They see the 
state as the answer, when it usually makes the problem 
worse. The legacy of liberal individualism is the restoration of 
the very absolutism that it originally sought to overthrow—a 
philosophical tragedy that can be summed up as: “the king is 
dead, long live the king” (ibid).  
 
Blond’s critique makes a distinction between ‘classical liberalism’ and its more 
radical cousin, ‘libertarianism’; a distinction which he simplifies into the difference 
between what he sees as the free markets of Hayek’s and Friedman’s 
‘bastardised laissez-faire inversion of it’ (Blond 2010, p.34). His argument is that 
the classical liberalism of thinkers such as Adam Smith, John Locke, and Alexis 
de Tocqueville (amongst whom he also includes Hayek), adheres to laissez-faire 
economic policies, thought to lead to more freedom and real democracy. Yet, in 
fact, Hayek had much in common politically with monetarist economists like 
Milton Friedman (Gamble 1996, p.168), in that both shared assumptions about 
the value of free markets and enterprise and both looked to a limited state as the 
only way compatible with maintaining the autonomous, private sphere. However, 
Hayek never accepted monetarism as a sound economic theory. For him, it 
represented another version of macro-economics, setting elaborate monetary 
targets in an attempt to fine-tune economic aggregates. Libertarians (neoliberals) 
such as Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of economists, favoured 
interventionist, monetarist economic policies, holding the pursuit of liberty 
paramount, particularly economic and commercial liberty, with a corresponding 
de-emphasis on other liberal purposes and values such as democracy and 
justice (Thorsen and Lie n.d.). In contrast, Hayek’s preferred approach was to 
create the right institutional framework that would make sound money possible. 
Favouring laissez-faire economic policies meant the role of the state is kept 
minimal such that, with the exception of the armed forces, law enforcement and 
other public services, the state leaves everything to the free dealings of its 
citizens and the organisations they freely chose to establish and take part in 




On the basis of his analysis of libertarian/neoliberal economics, Blond argues 
that, ‘power and wealth flow upwards to the centralisers of capital’ (Blond 2010, 
p.34), creating a new class of ‘middle men’ who exert disproportionate influence 
over the market, in turn creating monopolies and a class of super-rich who 
reduce the poor to a new form of serfdom. Parties on both sides of the political 
divide have contributed to this legacy of a centralised, authoritarian state and a 
disassociative society (Coombs 2010, p.4). In other words ‘unlimited liberalism 
produces atomised relativism and state absolutism’ (Blond 2009, unpaginated)   
 
Whilst Blond may be correct to locate the rise of liberalism as a defence against 
the power of monarchy, his analysis is selective. Foucault maps out a far more 
complex progression of liberalism on the European stage and locates the 
emergence of neoliberalism, not as part of the natural evolution of classical 
liberalism, but as a new order altogether. Whereas liberalism may stand for 
protecting the rights and liberties of individuals against the power of the state, 
neoliberalism, in its European, German form, represents a justification of the 
state where no theory of state previously existed;    
 
‘what is involved is a new programming of liberal governmentality. 
It is an internal reorganisation that, once again, does not ask the 
state what freedom it will leave to the economy, but asks the 
economy how its freedom can have a state-creating function and 
role in the sense that it will really make possible the foundation of 
the state’s legitimacy? (Foucault 1979, p.95)   
 
The role of the market in constructing the state and its practices of government, 
governance and governing, is crucial to Foucault’s narrative. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries mercantilism represented the state’s form of government; 
the police (law) marked its internal management and the army and diplomacy 
stood for organisation, maintaining equilibrium between nation states across 
Europe. By the middle of the eighteenth century ‘political economy’ exerted self-
limitation on government reason, which set itself the objective of the state’s 
enrichment via the growth of the population on the one hand, and the means of 
subsistence on the other (ibid, p.14). The new art of government, thus, became 
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the organisation of numerous and complex internal mechanisms, whose function 
was to limit the exercise of government power internally (ibid, p.27). The 
consequent appearance of political economy and the notion of least government 
or ‘government frugality’ in this narrative are linked. More significantly, the 
market becomes the locus of truth. Whereas, in previous centuries, it was the 
site of justice, requiring regulation and protection for both buyer and merchant, 
by the eighteenth century the market represented something that obeyed natural 
and spontaneous mechanisms of its own. Through this process, value came to 
assert itself as a measure of truth. Prices, therefore, are not fixed, but fluctuate 
according to what the market can sustain. The state, society and the market are 
inexorably intertwined. Thus, for Foucault, the crucial question of liberalism is 
‘what is the utility value of government and all actions of government in a society 
where exchange determines the true value of things?’ (ibid, p.46).   
 
What Foucault charts is fundamental change on two levels, that of the state and 
that of the market. Justification of the state moves from the (external) anointed 
authority of the monarch, through raison d’Etat (political economy), to internal 
justification via the organisation and mechanisms of state, including economic 
exchange. In the post-war period in Europe, the market itself plays a significant 
role in legitimating the state, as in the case of Germany. In seeking to answer 
Foucault’s question, liberalism shifts from the pursuit of individual liberty and 
property rights that exist apart from the authority and powers of the monarch, to 
the liberty of the market, such that the market was able to extend beyond 
national or international boundaries.    
 
Power, therefore, lies not in labour, as Marx has argued in his labour theory of 
value, but in the possession of property. It is in this respect that both Hayek and 
Friedman shared basic assumptions about the value of free markets and 
enterprise. A limited state is the only way compatible with maintaining an 
autonomous, private sphere of exchange. For economic liberals such as 
Friedman, democracy requires capitalism in order to function. But truth, value, 
and justice become the casualties of exchange in a society where the ownership 
and exchange of goods is not equitable. Liberalism, eventually, was to take two 
different but not necessarily opposing positions. Left-facing liberalism took a 
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more social and ethical stance and included exponents such as Isaiah Berlin. 
This form of liberalism sought to address those inequalities that gave rise to the 
injustices of weak versus strong bargaining positions in the market place. State 
intervention in the market is justified in order to achieve this end. The goal of 
right-facing liberalism or libertarianism, however, was to maintain the status quo 
and the advantages of those with property and therefore power. State 
intervention, according to this view, is justified in defence of market freedoms 
that also serve to legitimate the state. Blond’s critique of liberalism misses the 
subtleties of these shifts and of Foucault’s repositioning of the state in relation to 
the market, although Blond does acknowledge the influence of liberalism on 
party political thought.   
 
For Gamble (1996, p.100), it is Hayek who embodies the convergence of liberal 
and conservative ideas. The new ascendency of the doctrines of economic 
liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, created some issues in terms of labelling. In 
order to distinguish themselves from supporters of collectivism and the extended 
state, with which the term liberal had become associated, proponents of new 
liberalism variously called themselves conservative –liberals, liberal-
conservatives, neoliberals or libertarians. The latter became popular in the 
United States. The amalgam of libertarian and conservative positions, from the 
late 1960s, in both Britain and the United States, was widely described as 
constituting the New Right. Hayek was the single most important intellectual 
influence on their thinking (ibid, p.101), bridging both conservative and liberal 
ideas. Blond appears to be a supporter of Hayek’s because of the latter’s 
favouring of classical liberal principles. Hayek’s own stance is more complicated 
and rests on his distinction between true and false individualism. Hobbes, Locke 
and Mill represent, for Hayek, false individualists. Hume, Smith, Burke and 
Tocqueville on the other hand, are counted amongst the true individualists who 
share a scepticism of human reason and the ability of humans to control or plan 
societies (ibid, p.106). Humans are, however, capable of discerning the 
institutional pattern which will bring about prosperity and progress. Those 
institutional structures associated with capitalism and modern industry, being 
natural and spontaneous, are endorsed and justified whereas those of the state 
and democracy are rejected for being artificial and contrived. Yet the former 
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depend on the latter. Spontaneous evolution alone cannot guarantee the 
preservation of the market (ibid).   
 
It is in this light therefore, that Blond‘s understanding of a symbiotic relationship 
between the state and the market can be understood. The market can both fund 
and deliver state services, because, he argues, big business is better able to 
absorb the cost of renewed social aspirations set by the state and the ensuing 
bureaucratic burden. Listed variously are health and safety regulation, the 
complexity of tax returns, holiday and sickness pay, pension and national 
insurance contributions. The presumption is big businesses and their 
shareholders, led by the moral elite, would shun for-profit practices and motives, 
behaviours that have won them the power and influence they currently wield, in 
favour of alternative procedures that support and maintain local networks of 
commerce. Indeed, this would also involve turning their backs on the products of 
globalisation, the power of transnational corporations, the relentless pursuit of 
economic growth, international integration and the economies of mass 
production and scale (Coombs 2010, p.5).   
 
Furthermore, Blond posits that if society were self-policing through a shared 
commitment to social and moral norms amongst the lower orders, there would be 
less need for heavy central regulation. The diminishing of the regulatory burden 
would enable smaller agents to enter the market place, injecting new blood into 
the system and tilting the system away from the monopolistic interests of the few, 
towards the more holistic interests of the many (Blond 2010, p.286). This, then, 
is the new moralised market, both localised and participatory, and reminiscent of 
the ideals of Burke and Disraeli. Local people would have a stake and a voice in 
the services they engage in. In this way, Blond envisages how ‘the state of 
ownership and the ownership of the state would be extended to the masses’ 
(ibid).  
 
Underwriting Blond’s account of the moral market and the new associative civil 
society is his ‘politics of virtue’ that demands a revitalisation of the family, civil 
culture, and a return to ’virtue, tradition and the priority of the good’ (Smith 2012, 
p.333), where these honourable behaviours and traditions can be learned and 
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practised. However, neither moral values, nor their philosopher king 
gatekeepers, emerge from a vacuum. Although not made explicit in Red Tory, 
there is a Christian subtext to Blond’s vision of the Big Society that is apparent 
elsewhere in his speeches and in his associations with the theologian John 
Milbank and the Radical Orthodoxy movement to which he belongs. Without this 
‘political theology’ underpinning, Blond’s vision of the Big Society struggles to 
find real purchase.   
 
Radical orthodoxy and John Milbank   
 
Milbank’s publications Theology and Social Theory (2005) and Radical 
Orthodoxy (1998) have both been highly influential and form the basis of the 
Christian and politically anti-liberal Radical Orthodoxy movement amongst 
academic theologians. Blond’s political theory is strongly influenced by the 
writings of John Milbank who acknowledged that Red Toryism ‘represents 
Radical Orthodoxy's debut on the political stage’ (Newman 2009). Although not 
altogether explicit in Red Tory, Chapman (2012, p.278)), for example, argues 
that Blond and Milbank share an interpretation of the grand narrative of the 
development of modernity based on the decline and fall of theology found in the 
work of the medieval philosopher-theologian John Duns Scotus. It was Scotus 
who elevated Being (finite reality) to a status above God, where it can be 
understood in its own terms, thereby separating philosophy and theology: the 
natural from the supernatural, faith from reason. In response to this ‘autonomy of 
the secular’ (ibid, p.279) and the ‘violence of denial’, Radical Orthodoxy argues 
for a return to Christianity’s medieval roots where faith and reason were 
inseparable. It is radical in that it claims the radical otherness of God and 
revelation.   
 
Underpinning Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy, is an anti-liberal thesis that warns of 
liberalism’s inherent nihilism. Milbank’s undated Liberty versus Liberalism, calls 
for an altogether new way of thinking. One that:   
 
        ‘will take up the traditions of socialism less wedded to progress, 
historical inevitability, materialism and the State, and put them into 
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debate with conservative anti-capitalist thematics and the traditions 
of classical and Biblical political thought (Milbank n.d., p.1).   
 
It is Milbank’s view, that a secular culture will only sustain what he terms ‘the 
neo-liberal catastrophe’ (ibid).   
 
Milbank argues that the origins of liberalism sprang from the idea that individuals 
need protecting from a variety of threats to themselves and to property. This has 
led to the curtailing of civil liberties by the state and the passing of ever more 
draconian security laws, justified in terms of protecting individual security and 
freedom of choice. Thus, and resonating with Hayek’s thesis in The Road to 
Serfdom (Hayek 2001), contemporary polity is moving inexorably towards 
despotism (Smith 2012, p.335). Following the decay of all tacit restraints 
embedded in family, locality and mediating institutions between the individual 
and the state, Government will ultimately assume an entirely policing and military 
function (Milbank n.d., p.2). One example of this is the Stephen Lawrence affair, 
which indicated undercover activity on the part of the police to discredit the family 
and campaigners in the case of the murdered black teenager (Muir 2013). By 
contrast, the tacit restraints to which Milbank refers, appear to be modelled in the 
‘family’ of the church body, where ‘[d]ifferent people and groups have different 
talents and insights – these they share for the good of the whole body’ (ibid, p.3). 
Such actions imply mutual respect, love, reciprocity, and justice, all of which 
serve as a counter to individualism, since the individual ‘is socially defined only 
as a lone chooser and self-seeker’ (ibid).  
 
Thus, Milbank calls for an alternative view of democracy and economic 
engagement. Democracy is justified because it is essentially theological. This 
belief helps in the understanding of Milbank’s assertion of the giftedness of life 
and a hierarchical society where gift replaces contract. As already indicated, 
people and groups embody different talents and insights, and should share them 
for the good of the whole body. Christians, for example, offer back their goods to 
Christ to be used in his name. In similar manner, the people should give their 
gifts of insight and talents back to the sovereign representative on earth, who 
acts in their name. The role of the sovereign becomes one of distributing the gifts 
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of good governance and order. For Milbank, this is about government pursuing 
the intrinsic fulfilment of its citizens. Subjects share in the government and 
appropriate tasks to themselves. Such an order highlights the radical nature of 
this view of democracy. Sovereign rule is about the offer of the gift of good co-
ordination of talents and needs, based on the Biblical principle of justice and the 
assumption that only a few will be bestowed with such a gift. It is conservative 
rather than liberal, therefore, in that it insists on the monarchic, aristocratic and 
corporate (Milbank n.d., p.4) and furthermore stands totally opposed to the 
notion of the nation state as the ultimate unit.  
 
This theological interpretation of democracy, allies itself with the Catholic notion 
of subsidiarity; the delegation of responsibility to the smallest and least 
centralised component body. An essential element of Catholic Social Thinking, 
subsidiarity derives its meaning from the Latin subsidium, and operates as both a 
positive and negative force (Hanvey 2011, p.4). Positively, subsidiarity is the 
recognition by a higher authority of the legitimate competence and ability of a 
lower authority. It is not, therefore, the mere deregulation of power but rather the 
recognition of a power or competence that already exists. Subsidiarity assumes 
the responsibility of the higher authority to assist the lower authority to exercise 
its competence for the social good in such practical ways as ensuring economic, 
as well as, legal and administrative resources. Negatively this means the higher 
authority will not subjugate the competence of the lower authority to its own 
ends. The former is always aligned to the latter, thus, preserving the realm of 
civil freedoms and initiatives. To some extent, it must protect the civic and 
personal realm from economic exploitation. ‘[S]ubsidiarity attempts to ensure that 
national Government does not ‘rule’ but serves the social body’ (ibid). 
Accordingly, this view of Catholic Social Teaching ascribes to subsidiarity a 
commitment to the political process and the means of creating and sustaining a 
wholesome, civil society, which includes social and economic justice for the poor. 
Milbank’s inference from this is that people form and reform micro-social groups 
(Milbank n.d., p.4). Government, therefore, should not treat people according to 
formal constructs of region, profession, culture, or religion, but look to the talents 
and insights offered by such small groups in the co-production of state 
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government and the outworking of justice. Government interest in mobilising the 
voluntary sector is perhaps a case in point.   
 
Democracy, seen through this lens, has a strong impact on the economic 
domain. In contrast, modern liberalism, according to Milbank’s thesis, has only 
succeeded in delivering mass poverty, the erosion of freely associating bodies 
beneath the level of the state and the ecological dereliction of the earth. The 
rights and dignity of the worker have been abolished. As a counter to this, 
Milbank calls for a truer liberality based on the creed of generosity, which 
supposes that societies are more fundamentally bound together by mutual 
kindness than by contract. Solutions do not lie in the purely capitalist market or in 
the centralised state. Rather, Milbank calls for an element of gift exchange within 
the modern market based on local economies that link local skills, local products, 
and local production. In order for sovereign authority to maintain a ‘light touch’ 
(ibid, p.8) there must be a collective interest in a sustainable and stable economy 
in which every person enjoys what is legitimately his own because it meets some 
of his basic needs and allows sufficient scope for the exercise and marketing of 
his talents. This means that prosperity should be widely and equally dispersed, 
to ensure people have real, creative liberty, little interest in greed and a tendency 
to form self-regulating mechanisms for the exchange of benefits (ibid, p.9). 
Property that is to do with self-fulfilment, rather than the accumulation of wealth, 
is the foundation for free giving and receiving. Giving is only really free and 
liberal where it respects and helps further to create reciprocal norms. 
Professional associations and guilds, as well as co-operative banks and credit 
unions, maintain the agreement about what is valuable. Organisations such as 
these delimit market tendencies towards the ‘anarchy of desires’ (ibid, p.11).  
 
The history of anti-globalisation protests offers an example of Milbank’s collective 
interest in a sustainable and stable economy and a self-regulating society. The 
worldwide movement grew from a disparate series of small single-interest 
groups. Most recently have been the ‘Occupy’ campaigns including the Occupy 
London camp at St Paul’s Cathedral in 2012 (Walker 2012), and the local 




Hierarchies, liberalism and civil democracy  
 
Two factors emerge from the connections between Blond’s political philosophy 
and Milbank’s articulation of Radical Orthodoxy. First, both Blond and Milbank 
share a deep-seated mistrust of unfettered liberalism and hold that, cut off from 
its Christian roots, British society has lost its moral compass and has been 
overtaken by materialist values, capitalism and economic liberalism. Second, 
they both advocate a hierarchically structured civil society within which positive, 
local network associations can thrive, common moral values and norms be 
established and democracy extended.  
 
First, Blond’s political philosophy highlights the tensions that exist between 
classical liberalism and neoliberalism, rooted as it is in the need to maintain both 
individuality and corporate (social) responsibility - how to find a sense of purpose 
in contributing to the wider society - without losing the sense of self. Both 
ordinary citizens and their philosopher kings, are called upon to sacrifice self-
interest in pursuit of the greater good, contrary to the ideals of individual liberty 
and democracy that are central tenets of liberalism. This points to the complex 
question of the precise nature of modern liberalism, namely neoliberalism.  
  
Thorsen and Lie’s (n.d.) critique offers two interpretations of the term 
neoliberalism. At its most basic is the suggestion of a revival of liberalism, 
indicating a one-time absence from political policy-making and discussions, 
which has emerged in more recent times in reincarnated form. Alternatively, 
neoliberalism can be considered a distinct ideology in its own right, descending 
from, but not identical to, classical liberalism.   
 
Furthermore, Crouch (2011, p.3-4), like Thorsen and Lie, points to a distinction 
between neoliberalim and economic liberalism, the latter emerging from classical 
liberalism at the end of the nineteenth century. Whereas economic liberalism 
represents a belief in unchallenged property rights, low levels of regulation and 
low taxes (ibid, p.6), classical liberalism sets an economy of many competing 
firms within a polity of many competing interests and with strict limits on the 
merging of economic and political interests (ibid, p.165). Drawing on the 
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development of liberalism over time, Crouch locates a fracturing of liberal ideas 
along the lines of social and economic interests. Liberalism of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries emerged out of criticism against the combined powers 
of monarchs, aristocrats, popes and bishops. An alternative power base, 
however, was to be found in the commercial and later industrial wealth of the 
middle classes, who also sought freedom from the control of secular and 
religious authorities. By the nineteenth century, through the process of 
industrialisation, the property owning middle classes, themselves, became the 
objects of economic power and criticism. Workers looked for freedom from their 
dominance to a democratising state that would counterbalance middle class 
economic and commercial power. It was at this point that social and economic 
liberalism took their own paths in search of liberty: the former through the 
democratisation of property ownership, the latter via property ownership coupled 
with market transactions.   
 
In Crouch’s analysis, economic liberals found themselves allying with their old 
conservative enemies, in order to protect their authority and property ownership 
in the face of democracy. A democratic state, dominated by a property-less 
working class, threatened to oppose the separation between the economy and 
polity, central to both the concept of liberty and the efficient functioning of the 
market (ibid). The building of the Empire Hotel in Bath in 1901 by architect Major 
Charles Edward Davies is a visible example of this philosophy. The architecture 
of the roof depicts the three classes – a Castle on the corner for the upper class, 
a house for the middle class and a cottage for the poor. In principle, all three, 
provided they had the money to spend, were welcome within its doors. Like their 
classical liberal antecedents, economic liberals favoured laissez-faire economic 
policies, where state intervention is kept to the minimum. However, a further 
development in economic liberalism took place in Germany towards the end of 
World War II. Ordoliberalismus promoted a singular role for the state, in 
particular in its construction of the law in guaranteeing the effectiveness of 
market forces. It was this variation of economic liberalism that spread to the USA 
and became known as neoliberalism, to be developed and shaped by the 




In essence, neoliberalism looks to a proactive role for the state to promote the 
dominance of the market. Coupled with globalisation, it has encouraged the 
growth of large and powerful corporations and businesses that wield significant 
power and influence in political decision-making across the globe, extending the 
business model across a range of private sector institutions such as hospitals, 
schools, and universities. As wealth and power rise upwards, so inequalities 
multiply, the fundamental basis of both Milbank's and Blond’s critiques.   
 
Second, in criticising the effects of neoliberalism, neither Milbank nor Blond call 
for an egalitarian state but rather one based on secular and religious hierarchical 
structures. For Milbank, both hierarchy and elitism represent the indispensable 
ingredients of his politically stable civil society. Like Blond, he has a preference 
for the romantic socialists of the nineteenth century who grounded their criticisms 
in a moral critique of capitalism and sought to lead the masses in moral 
improvement (Coombs 2010, p.9). Milbank argues for a system of dual power, in 
which the church is not only strengthened but there is a blurring of boundaries 
between church and state, so as to bring the policies of the state in line with 
Christian practices (ibid). According to Doak (2007, p.373, cited in Coombs 
2010), Milbank’s desire to strengthen the power of the hierarchical institution of 
the church explains his reluctance to criticise the hierarchies of the secular 
domain. Both Blond and Milbank have called for a hierarchy of excellence, 
represented by the ‘right kind of leaders’ in power, in other words, those who can 
follow through the Red Tory agenda. ‘The more we seek to link social and 
economic prestige with virtue, then the more we can hope for good financial and 
political leaders possessed of compassion and integrity’ (Blond and Milbank 
2010).  
 
This revival of interest in the association of church and state is interesting at a 
time of secularism, religious scepticism, and aggressive atheism. The rise of the 
Christian church as a distinct institution, entitled to govern, can be charted back 
to the fourth century and the alliance of church and state under Constantine in 
the declining years of the Roman Empire. By this time, the church had grown 
strong, both in doctrine and in establishing an ecclesiastical infrastructure, 
making it a useful adjunct to the Empire. Here began a symbiotic relationship 
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that was to extend into the modern era. The church offered the state support, 
discipline, and the promise of civic obedience, whilst the state could nourish and 
protect the Church, including the purity of its doctrine. The Christian tradition, 
thus, suggested two classes of duties, spiritual and temporal. By the Middle 
ages, the Church offered legitimacy to the monarch rather than emperor, through 
the anointing with oil at the coronation and the order of law. In England, the 
appointment of the Archbishop of Canterbury is a consideration of parliament. 
Lords Temporal and Spiritual make up the upper house of the English 
Parliament.   
 
Historically, the church’s involvement in matters of state has been considerable. 
The church was largely responsible for extending a network of schooling to the 
poor, such that, the 1870 Education Act was able to establish compulsory 
primary education with minimal additional building and organisation. It was also 
involved in founding hospitals, poor houses, poor relief and lobbying for clean 
water, medical services and better food. The Church of England continues to 
exert political influence, for example, through the ‘Faith in our Cities’ report 
(General Synod 1985), the recent marriage debate, and the publication of its own 
report on the Big Society (Brown 2010).  
 
Disraeli and Nineteenth century political thought   
 
As well as the theological influences on Blond’s political theory, Red Tory also 
makes explicit connections with a range of historical sources. Writers such as 
Cobbett, Carlysle and Ruskin make up a body of nineteenth century, romantic, 
conservative thought, that looked to the medieval age as a time when people 
cared for each other and none fell outside the care system. These authors, in 
Chapman’s view, sought to align their different varieties of conservatism with 
historical tradition, care for the masses, and the alleviation of many of the 
miseries of modern society (Chapman 2012, p.284). Significant amongst these 
writers was the politician and author Benjamin Disraeli whose manifesto for the 
Young England Movement of the 1830s is set out in his trilogy of novels, 
Connigsby, Sybil and Tancred. The themes of history, social responsibility 
towards the poor and the role of institutions and the church in fulfilling these, are 
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explicit. The novels deal broadly with the character of political parties, the 
condition of the people and the duties of the church (O’Kell 1987, p.213). It was 
these writings that laid claim to one-nation Toryism, (a notion that has been 
enjoying something of a renaissance in current political thought) both Labour and 
Conservative claim to be the party of ‘one nation’  
 
Of the three novels, Sybil deals with the condition of England, particularly the 
problem of poverty and social instability in a context of rapidly expanding 
industrialisation. Bratlinger, however, in critiquing Sybil, contends that the idea of 
Two Nations is a ‘dangerous illusion’ and was recognised as such by Disraeli 
(O’Kell 1987, p.214). The argument is that the poor are in no way a ‘united 
nation’ against the rich, but are rather a miscellany of quarrelling factions who 
were mistaken. The physical state of the people relates directly to their moral 
and spiritual condition. Responsibility for this decay lies with the Whig oligarchy 
of the eighteenth century and the liberalism of the nineteenth century Whig party, 
which held the political monopoly and whose policies, according to this analysis, 
threatened the integrity of the Empire and the greatness of England. Therefore, 
what is called for, is a regeneration of political and social responsibility; a 
revitalised Conservative party that will save the nation from disaster.   
 
Indeed, it is Disraeli’s historical perspective that leads him to conclude that the 
proper representation of the people belongs to the aristocracy and the Church. 
Historic institutions embody the nation’s moral values and are, therefore, vital to 
social cohesion. His was a policy based on imperialism and social reform, 
underpinned by a belief in the preservation of the rights and liberties of a nation 
by its institutions (ibid). Disraeli’s is a theory of government based on the 
constructional balance of power. The House of Commons is not representative of 
the whole people as a nation, that role belongs to the sovereign. Leadership in 
England is best achieved by an hereditary aristocracy, an argument which has 
resonance with Burke’s belief in the stability of aristocratic institutions, as 
opposed to the innate restlessness of human nature. The value of the past is a 




Both liberals and conservatives accept change as inevitable, but, whereas 
liberals see change as progress towards something better, conservatives 
consider change as something to be tolerated only when it removes a specific 
evil. Caution and necessity make for considered change, making conservatism, 
therefore, an essential element of evolution. It was in this regard that Disraeli 
claimed the title of ‘progressive’ for the Conservative party, a designation hitherto 
adopted exclusively by the Liberals.   
 
Thus, if Blond’s political thesis rests on a nineteenth century anti-liberal 
argument and a call for a new conservatism based on pre-enlightenment ideals, 
then the current alliance of the Conservative and Liberal parties looks like a 
betrayal. However, it is Kelly’s contention that the years following the First World 
War marked a serial decline in the Liberal party, with the consequence that 
liberal ideas needed to find a new political vehicle. The ascendency of the 
Labour party of this period appeared to offer a solution, particularly for 
‘progressive, historical commentators’ (Kelly 2012). However, for Kelly, the 
narrative that Liberals and Labour ‘form a common progressive cause’ (ibid), is 
misleading, and ignores the history of a complex relationship between liberalism 
and conservatism. It is this that will be explored in the next section.   
 
Hayek, Oakeshott and Liberal Conservatism   
 
In the twentieth century, ideological conservatism from Thatcher to Cameron has 
been swayed by two highly influential thinkers of the twentieth century, 
Oakeshott – a liberal who declared himself a conservative – and Hayek – a 
conservative who declared himself a liberal (ibid). Both Hayek and Oakeshott 
have been identified with the project of liberal conservatism to which Cameron is 
openly committed:  
 
I am a liberal Conservative. Liberal, because I believe in the 
freedom of the individual to pursue their own happiness, with the 
minimum of interference from government. Sceptical of the state, 
trusting people to make the most of their lives, confident about the 
possibilities of the future—this is liberalism. And Conservative, 
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because I believe that we’re all in this together—that there is a 
historical understanding between past, present and future 
generations, and that we have a social responsibility to play an 
active part in the community we live in. Conservatives believe in 
continuity and belonging; we believe in the traditions of our 
country which are embedded in our institutions. Liberal and 
Conservative. Individual freedom and social responsibility 
(Cameron 2007, cited in Lee 2009)  
 
Kelly’s contention is that both Hayek and Oakeshott were concerned with the 
complex relationship between liberal ideas and practice and conservative politics 
and policy. In the same manner that Milbank and Blond associated the liberal 
project with nihilism, so Hayek considered that the expansion of the state, under 
the auspices of providing greater freedom and opportunity, would lead to 
totalitarianism. Kelly’s critique of Hayek draws out the importance of the role of 
tradition and convention in his favouring of free markets and the spontaneous 
order that emerges from the exercise of individual freedom and choice (Kelly 
2012, p.27). Hayek distinguishes two kinds of order: a made order where order in 
society is based on a relationship of command and obedience and a 
spontaneous order, which no one consciously creates. These are ‘taxis’ and 
‘cosmos’. The former is valued in conservative thinking where rights and duties 
are clearly prescribed. This order is hierarchical and evidenced in organisations 
such as large businesses, and the Catholic Church.  Where authority is 
exercised, it will be authoritarian, top-down and centralised. Hayek’s objection is 
not to authoritarian organisations but the attempt to make society a single, 
authoritarian organisation (Gamble 1996, p.37). For Hayek, there must be order 
in society but this order should be cosmos not taxis. It was the transformation of 
the Conservative Party, from the mid-1970s to 1990s, that led to a resurgence of 
Hayekian liberalism, especially so, given that the overriding discourse of 
conservatism at the time was the freeing up of the economy (Kelly 2012, p.27). 
The spontaneous order of freedom and an open market society require 
tempering with conventional morality and legal moralism .It is for this reason, 
according to Kelly, that Hayek has an appeal to modern day social 




As with Hayek, so Michael Oakeshott is attributed with conjoining liberalism and 
conservatism in his philosophical writing and as such plays a central role in 
Jesse Norman’s account of the Big Society. For Norman, Oakeshott is the 
greatest political thinker since Edmund Burke (Norman 2010, p.97). Oakeshott’s 
political essays were brought together into two volumes Rationalism in Politics 
(1968), and On Human Conduct (1974). For Oakeshott, political theory and 
practice amounted to a conversation rather than an argument. Oakeshott 
described himself as a conservative, although he is also a major liberal thinker, 
who, for Kelly (2012, p.31), formed the basis for the recovery of a conservative 
voice in political theory. Oakeshott’s conservatism represents a philosophical 
disposition rather than an ideological commitment and it was for this reason that 
he was able to combine liberalism and conservatism. His contention was that 
liberalism had lost any specific meaning and had become merely the terrain of 
political discourse. Conservatism is an approach, or attitude, to that terrain, so 
that the contrast is not so much between liberalism and conservatism, as 
between the rationalist and conservative (ibid), where rationalism seeks to 
reduce human experience to so many rules and principles, separating political 
and moral experience at a cost.   
 
Oakeshott is a traditionalist and anti-rationalist. The major function of 
government is to adjudicate, or resolve, the conflicts that occur between citizens, 
borne out of consciousness of the world’s imperfections. Here, there is 
resonance with Disraeli’s understanding that citizens need protection from 
themselves. Morality offers a set of constraints, with moral behaviour describing 
acquiescence to such constraints. Knowing how to behave is a skill and involves 
a serious understanding of the end to which one’s performance is directed, as 
well as one’s part in that performance (Grant 1990, p.48). Therefore, ‘knowing 
how’ may also incorporate ‘knowing that’. Here Oakeshott distinguishes practical 
and technical knowledge, the former being generated through experience in the 
manner of apprenticeship.   
 
These assertions have implications for the understanding of tradition. Practice 
(tradition) is continuously passed from the skilled to the unskilled, is never fixed 
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and is constantly evolving. The individual is never a passive recipient of tradition 
but is transformed and extended by his own contribution to it. Indeed, without 
tradition, the individual would have no terms in which to express himself (ibid, 
p.49). The whole point about tradition is that it is dynamic and mobile. Change 
and the present are facts of life. The art of politics, therefore, is that of ‘knowing 
where to go next in the exploration of an already existing traditional kind of 
society’ (Oakeshott, cited in Grant 1990, p.60). Jesse Norman, for example has 
defended the prominence of ex-Etonians in government, claiming that other 
schools lack commitment to public service. Old-fashioned principles help Eton’s 
students succeed. "Things like rhetoric and poetry and public speaking and 
performance are incredibly important to young people succeeding in life," 
(Norman 2013). Oakeshott’s traditionalism demands that the politician, born into 
a political family and thus equipped with a ‘feel’ for politics, is the one to be 
entrusted with this task. Furthermore, he acknowledges that all citizens, in both 
their private and corporate activities, are engaged in ‘the pursuit of intimations’. 
To this end, it is the role of government to facilitate the process, upholding and 
amending laws as necessary. In this way, government is not only a practice but 
acts as protector of all the diverse, self-chosen practices of the individuals who 
choose to pursue them (ibid, p.62).  
 
Oakeshott’s politics thus offer a merging of liberalism with conservatism. It is 
conservative in his respect of tradition with a liberal distrust of excessive 
government. His objections to socialism are a case in point, suggesting 
officiousness, incompetence and indifference or hostility to freedom (ibid, p.63). 
According to this analysis, socialism is the epitome of Rationalism. Governing is 
a limited activity and not concerned with moral right or wrong. A recent news 
report of GCHQ internet surveillance offers a case in point. Foreign politicians 
and officials who took part in two G20 summit meetings in London, in 2009, had 
their computers monitored and their phone calls intercepted on the instructions of 
the British government, according to press reports (McGaskall et al. 2013).  This 
raises questions about the boundaries of surveillance by GCHQ and its 
American sister organisation, the National Security Agency. Access to phone 
records and internet data was defended as necessary in the fight against 
terrorism and serious crime.   
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Oakeshott’s view of the neutrality of the state emerges from his model of civil 
association, which he distinguishes from enterprise association. In the former, 
life is organised around participation in a system of non-purposive or ‘adverbial’ 
rules. These constitute the opportunities and identities of the individual in a world 
alongside others (Kelly 2012, p.32). Such political association is inherent within 
European and British politics and is held in constant tension with enterprise 
association, where life, identity, and rule, are guided towards an external goal. 
These categories of association help define the nature of the state as a form of 
political association. Here Kelly suggests this distinction marks the difference 
between the conservative and the rationalist, but more significantly, that it 
indicates a liberal model of the state – impartial and neutral, one whose task is to 
tend and maintain the life of civil association, governed both by adverbial and 
constitutive (law) rules. It is in this regard, in bringing liberalism and conservatism 
together, in Kelly’s analysis, that Oakeshott forms the basis of Norman’s new-
Conservatism and upon which, in his view, the Big Society is constructed.   
 
The role of the State   
 
Analysis of the intellectual foundations of both Blond’s and Norman’s theses of 
the Big Society indicate four dominant themes: history, tradition, moral values, 
and the relationship of the modern state to them, discussion that is strongly 
influenced by the writings of Burke and Hobbes.   
 
Intellectual debt to Burke  
 
Edmund Burke, political leader rather than political philosopher, and considered 
the ‘father of conservatism’, subscribed to a political creed that emerged from the 
seventeenth century conflict in England that culminated in the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. The tension here was one between Whig conceptions of 
liberty and the law: liberty being freedom from arbitrary or ruthless coercion, 
whether emanating from the crown, parliament or the people and the law offering 
something permanent, uniform and universal (Raeder 1997). It was to this notion 




According to Raeder, such views were closely associated with those of the 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Adam Ferguson, David 
Hume and Adam Smith, who conceived of society, its complex web of 
institutions, law, morals and customs, to be the culmination of a process of 
development from primitive society to high culture and civilization. Social 
institutions, therefore, were the product of a complex, historical process, 
cultivated through trial and error and an understanding of the constraints that 
preserve social order; hence Burke’s high regard for the British constitution that 
encapsulated this notion of intricate evolution and defined his conservatism. 
Rationalism looked upon tradition as mere superstition and prejudice, which, 
therefore, demanded a reconstruction of traditional moral and legal rules based 
on selected ethical or legal frameworks, whereas, according to Burke’s narrative, 
the social process and the historically evolved society were part of a wider, 
spiritual phenomenon, in which reason had only a limited role. For Burke, the 
preservation of free government and civilised society depends on the willingness 
to be governed by certain inherited rules of individual and collective conduct 
whose origins, function, and rationale may not be fully understood. They 
constitute a ‘superindividual’ wisdom, which transcends that available to the 
conscious, reasoning mind. Reason, therefore, is impotent to create a viable 
social order (ibid). 
 
In terms of economics, Burke defended the free market and was opposed to the 
interference of government in the free enterprise system (ibid). Efforts to alleviate 
poverty should be left to private philanthropy rather than government 
involvement. Government’s role, rather, was to maintain a coherent social order 
with the purpose of achieving a good and peaceful life. For Burke, the laws of 
commerce and economics were laws of nature and a manifestation of the Divine 
Law. There are similarities here with the writings of Locke and Hobbes, 
particularly in terms of concern for economic and physical well-being, however. 
Burke maintains respect for justice, natural superiority and Christianity as 
necessary for the ‘science of government’ (Radasanu 2011, p.24).  Like Hobbes 
and Locke, Burke appreciates that the ‘common good’ is the product of activities 
that are not, of themselves, directed towards such a goal and therefore is not 
necessarily the outcome of just or virtuous actions on the part of citizens. Men 
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are primarily concerned with what is most immediately their own: that which 
makes them concerned with the general or common good does not come 
naturally but must be cultivated by stretching  and enlarging self-interest as 
widely as possible. The common good can, however, be achieved through the 
careful manipulation of human nature. To this end, the prudent and wise 
statesman understands the raw material of politics – men, their passions, reason 
and habits. He cannot aim, therefore, at perfection, but must use whatever he 
has at his disposal for the sake of good public policy. This argument runs counter 
to the doctrine of the perfectibility of man, also rejected by Hayek and the 
Scottish School. For John Passmore (2000) the question of the perfectibility of 
man is both a philosophical and a theological question. He concludes that the 
answer depends, firstly, on the understanding of perfection – be that technical, 
moral, teleological – and, secondly, on the understanding of ‘man’ – as an 
individual or as a representative of mankind.  Theologically, Christians would 
deny the perfectibility of man on earth for ‘all men have fallen short of the glory of 
God [Romans 3:23] (Holy Bible New International Version 2011) but ascribe 
ultimate and eternal perfection (being ‘without blemish and free from accusation’ 
[Colossians 1:21-22]) (ibid), to God’s grace through Jesus Christ. Given this 
Christian perspective of human nature, like Hobbes and Locke before him, Burke 
viewed the purpose of government as staving off the inconvenience of a pre-
societal state where men were not well disposed to one another. His argument is 
based, not on the rights of man, but on utility. Men will not behave rationally or 
justly towards one another, even if revolution is for the sake of achieving such 
high ideals of rationality as justice reflected in equality for all. This is the role of 
government.   
 
Burke’s science of government was one where the King, parliament and the 
people represent different centres of power, each working in tension and, 
thereby, helping to constrain one another. Government is a matter of practical 
know-how acquired over generations. It is not that government is dependent on 
the goodness of men but on the elevation of certain good men. People must 
guard their own liberty jealously and be aware of their value. Competing interests 
make for a healthy state of affairs, which forces individuals and groups to seek 
compromise. The ties that bind, - that love of city or country - begin at home. It is 
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through the family that individuals are attached to others. Trans-generational 
inheritance and family, therefore, act as an analogy for the political community, 
one that is organic and natural, the means of transmitting the inheritance of the 
constitution from generation to generation. Like the family, the constitution is a 
living and evolving treasure inherited by each generation. Respect is called for, 
for those venerable institutions that have survived over time, thereby proving 
their efficacy, whilst, at the same time, allowance is made for the gradual and 
piecemeal improvement of such institutions over time. They form the repository 
of a collective civilization and intelligence.  
 
Burke’s theory of representation looks back to the seventeenth century. He 
rejected the notion of a constituency as a numerical or territorial unit. He denied 
that individual citizens were represented and that numerical majorities have any 
significance in forming mature opinion. In this way, Burke was the founder of the 
modern party system (Radasanu 2011, p.19). Parliamentary government was 
conducted by a compact but public-spirited minority, which, in general, the 
country was willing to follow. Parliament was the place where leaders of this 
minority could be criticised and called to account by their party in the interests of 
the whole country. Once elected, the representative is responsible for the whole 
interest of the nation and empire. He owes to his constituents his best 
judgement, freely exercised, whether it matches theirs or not. Any serious 
statesman must have ideas about what sound public policy requires, must put 
policy into effect and seek the means so to do.  
 
Eclectic nature of Conservatism 
 
So far, this historical analysis of intellectual thought has highlighted the various 
political, philosophical, economic and theological strands, which, once woven 
together, attempt to depict Big Society ideas. What is clear is that these threads 
of thinking do not represent a single body of conservative thought but have roots 
in an ideological mix of liberal and conservative perspectives. There are obvious 
tensions here, which, of themselves, may account for the lack of clarity and 
purchase associated with the Big Society rebranding of party political 
Conservatism. Above all, in spite of the criticism of neoliberalism from a number 
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of notable sources, including Blond and Milbank, there is little engagement with 
the role capitalism has had to play in either the historical narratives, or its place 




Capitalism represents an economic system in which wealth is owned by private 
individuals or businesses and where goods are produced for exchange, 
according to the dictates of the market. Capitalism emerged out of the industrial 
revolution in the West, where Fordist models of mass production technology 
became linked to rising wages and mass consumption. The increased demand 
for mass produced goods engendered confident and secure working class 
consumers. Rather than presenting a threat to capitalism they became a 
constituent part of it, enabling the expansion of the market and profit on an 
unprecedented scale (Crouch 2011, p.11).   
 
The inevitable logic of capitalism is, of course, the accumulation of wealth. This 
means that those who wish to begin an enterprise of their own must seek to 
borrow from this accumulated wealth.  It also means that within any capitalist 
system runs a deep seam of inequality. Of course, there is no one fixed model of 
organising capitalism, that of free market capitalism being only one. Chang 
(2010, p.253), for example, refers to American, Scandinavian, German and 
French models. Nor is capitalism, of itself, fixed. Foucault (1979, p.70), for 
example, refers to the constant presence of phenomena he called ‘crises of 
capitalism’ in the modern world. The most recent crisis being the global crash in 
2008, considered the second largest  economic crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Chang 2010, p.xiii). The response has been, not to 
turn away from free market economics, but to continue to espouse its value.   
 
Announcing the Co-Operatives Bill enabling public sector workers to create 
mutuals to deliver public services, David Cameron, in 2012, returned to the 
concept of ‘popular capitalism’ which attempts to draw together notions of 
property ownership and social responsibility claiming a positive role for open 




"I believe that open markets and free enterprise are the best 
imaginable force for improving human wealth and happiness. They 
are the engine of progress, generating the enterprise and 
innovation that lifts people out of poverty and gives people 
opportunity. 
"I would go further: where they work properly, open markets and 
free enterprise can actually promote morality. Why? Because they 
create a direct link between contribution and reward, between effort 
and outcome. The fundamental basis of the market is the idea of 
something for something – an idea we need to encourage, not 
condemn. So we should use this crisis of capitalism to improve 
markets, not undermine them."(Watt 2012).   
 
Such ideas are grounded in the historical iterations of liberalism and 
conservatism through which can be traced the founding principles of the Big 
Society ideal. From Burke to Oakeshott, the tensions between state, politics and 
civil society have been laid bare, and the ideals of liberalism and neoliberalism in 
particular providing a constant presence. Whereas Phillip Blond argues for the 
Big Society as a response to the perceived evils of neoliberalism, others, such as 
Kelly and Norman, see its construction as a means of aligning conservatism and 
liberalism. Both offer limits and possibilities for the promotion of localism, small 
government and an active civil society that raise new questions about their 
anticipated role in the provision of state education. It is these questions that will 












Chapter 3: English Education policy 
 
If proponents of the Big Society have failed to engage with the part played by 
capitalism in the development of state and society, they are also silent about the 
role and contribution of education in this context. One way of addressing this, 
and making sense of their eclectic mix of philosophical and economic ideas, is to 
apply the optic of Oakeshott’s political and educational philosophy to current 
Conservative Coalition education policy. Justification for this resides in the fact 
that Oakeshott (as demonstrated in the previous section) draws together 
conservative and liberal ideas, particularly about civil society, to which he applies 
his thinking about the nature and purposes of education at some length. His work 
was to have a profound influence on that of philosophers such as R.S. Peters 
and Paul Hirst, who, according to Williams (2007, p.11), have had an equally 
significant impact on education in their work during the 1960s on the definitions 
and nature of education and the curriculum.   
 
O’Sullivan (n.d.) offers four, more specific, reasons for Oakeshott’s relevance for 
the twenty-first century.  First, and in contrast to his contemporaries, Oakeshott 
maintains a fundamentally positive and affirmative outlook on life and the 
positive, life enhancing benefits of teaching and learning (c.f. Williams 2007, 
p.227). Second, this positive and affirmative viewpoint is inseparable from his 
ideal of civilised living. Civility, he suggests, involves three important and closely 
related elements, which Oakeshott believes should be better understood. The 
civilised self is an educated self. Education, therefore, is a process of critical 
induction into the tradition of self-interpretation that constitutes a society’s culture 
(O’Sullivan n.d., p.5). Civility also involves limits, both moral and civil.  
 
The third justification for reading Oakeshott is his view of the role of the 
imagination in throwing into relief the texture and complexity of human existence. 
The imagination is far more than mere subjective flights of fancy.  Rather, 
Oakeshott applies the use of the imagination found in the realm of literature to 
that of the world of facts, whilst recognising that this must be subject to different 
constraints. An author may apply the imagination to characters in terms of what 
seems plausible, whilst an historian brings into play his imagination in order to 
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make the historical evidence intelligible, thus demonstrating the importance of 
the imagination in understanding life itself. In the modern obsession for facts, for 
example, Oakeshott fears we have lost the ability to understand the true nature 
of historical enquiry. History is not only about explaining the past, but about 
discovering it (Nardin 2001, p.4). Positivist theories of historical explanation 
assume that historical enquiry aims to account for the occurrence of events 
whose meaning (character) is already known (ibid). But this is what the historian 
cannot assume. The historian can only infer past events on the evidence that 
has survived into the present. He or she must relate it to antecedent events, in 
order to illuminate its meaning according to the relationship the historian has 
identified. This is Oakeshott’s idea of contingency. Historical inquiry both infers 
and constructs a past on the basis of evidence. This constructionist theory is a 
distinct mode of enquiry (ibid).  It is in this manner that Oakeshott applies ideas 
of modality and contingency to identify the forms of inquiry best suited to 
understanding human activity.   
 
Hence, the fourth and final reason posited by O’Sullivan (n.d., p.5) is Oakeshott’s 
ideal of ‘liberation’, which practically links his philosophy to the personal life. 
Here, liberation is understood as a lifelong task of acquiring a distinctive self 
through critical immersion, rather than rejection of the culture from which one 
comes. It involves maintaining an active, rather than passive, identity (ibid, p.7), 
which links closely to Oakeshott’s definition of liberal education as a means of 
liberating the learner into the realm of the imagination and ideas.  
 
This is not to say Oakeshott’s views are without criticism. His writings certainly 
raise questions and concerns about elitism and cultural imperialism insofar as he 
defends literary culture (Lawn 1996, p.276), as well as issues about access to 
education and inclusivity. Oakeshott’s construct of liberal education was forged 
at a time when only a minority was fortunate enough to progress to post-
compulsory level education studies. However, as Williams and others would 
argue, far from being elitist and exclusivist, Oakeshott was well aware of the 
inequalities in the educational opportunities of his day. He argued that the 
invitation to become educated should extend to all, irrespective of rank or status, 
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for: ‘none of us is born human; each is what he learns to become’ (Oakeshott 
1975, p.24). Thus:  
 
 ‘To be initiated into this world is learning to become human; and to move 
 within it freely is being human, which is an "historic," not a "natural"
 condition’ (Oakeshott 1972, p.93).  
 
In other words, education is not optional for the human being. Being human:  
 
‘is not merely his having to think, but his thoughts, his beliefs, doubts, 
understandings, his awareness of his own ignorance, his wants, 
preferences, choices, sentiments, emotions, purposes and his 
expressionof them in utterances or actions which have meanings: and the 
necessary condition of all or any of this is that he must have learned it’ 
(Oakeshott 1975, p.20).  
 
This requires an inclusive curriculum so that all can join the conversation of 
mankind, which is not to be found in the vocational training (socialisation) so 
readily offered to the masses. It is this ‘socialisation’ that is excluding many from 
the benefits of a liberal education (Williams 2007, p.189).  As Lawn (1996, p.267) 
argues, any conception of education that places training on a par with the quest 
for self-development, self-understanding and self-discovery, is incomplete.   
 
This bifurcation of learning is indicative of Oakeshott’s tendency to present 
arguments as an either/or dichotomy (Williams 2007, p.213) which, on first 
reading, appears to preclude other possibilities. However, his concerns about the 
culture of (government) control in education policy still have particular relevance 
in the current era of mass, compulsory education, where almost 50% of young 
people progress to higher education.  So, too, his views on the essence and 
value of a liberal education, the nature of knowledge and the moral life, and the 
role of educational institutions, including Universities, in promoting such ideas, 
where the overall aim is the achievement of the autonomy or Bildung (ibid, p.13) 
of the individual. These issues will be discussed in what follows, before applying 
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Oakeshott’s conceptual framework to the 2010 Coalition Government education 
policy.   
 
In defense of liberal education   
 
Oakeshott is a proponent of liberal education. For him, genuine education is of 
necessity liberal. Building on the nineteenth century tradition of liberal education 
articulated by the likes of Hegel, John Henry Newman, Matthew Arnold and John 
Stuart Mill, Oakeshott’s philosophy of education, similarly, considers the context 
in which teaching and learning takes place as being set apart from the ordinary 
affairs of life. The curriculum, therefore, should not be subjugated to 
instrumental, utilitarian purposes, but followed for the enrichment it offers. It was 
John Stuart Mill who stressed that a liberal education is not restricted to 
cultivating the intellect alone. Rather, it also has a part to play in the moral and 
aesthetic aspects of learning. Whereas Mill would argue it is beyond the power of 
institutions, such as schools and universities to educate morally, given that such 
values are derived from the home and society, it is, however, the proper role of 
the university, and liberal education per se, to provide an overall interpretation of 
human experience (O’Sullivan 2011, p.7). Thus, for Oakeshott, the ultimate aim 
of a liberal education is to have some thoughts of one’s own. Hence, learning in 
this way is able to liberate the learner into a world of imagination and ideas.   
 
Kevin Williams’s (2007) elucidation of the educational philosophy of Michael 
Oakeshott provides a detailed analysis of this body of work. For Williams, 
Oakeshott offers an elaborate narrative of what it is to be a learner and to learn. 
In order to learn, the individual must possess reflective consciousness and 
understanding. Indeed, a human being is a ‘reflective consciousness’, an agent 
making choices in an understood situation that he or she might attempt to alter 
(Nardin 2001, p.71). The outcome of learning is human conduct, as opposed to 
mere behaviour (a non-reflective manifestation of underlying biological or 
physical processes) which can be identified across all species.  Whether acting 
impulsively or deliberately, human beings respond in a manner learned. Human 
learning, therefore, requires understanding which, in turn, is predicated on an 
understanding of the self and others. Self-understanding cannot be separated 
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from culture insofar as culture, for Oakeshott, is a ‘conversational encounter’ that 
has taken place through the ages, and is composed of ‘feelings, perceptions, 
ideas, engagements, attitudes and so forth’ (Fuller 1989, cited in Williams 2007, 
p.100). In this way, human conduct is seen as an exhibition of intelligence. The 
potential for personal development is, therefore, not fixed in the way physical 
development may be understood. Consequently, the role of the school is not 
about facilitating growth or maturation. Learning is more than this. Achievements 
in learning are achievements in becoming the kind of persons we are (ibid, p.16) 
and our identity is made up of what we have learned to think, feel, imagine and 
do.  
 
Here, Oakeshott makes a clear distinction between practice and process. A 
process is causally determined and subject to measurement, whereas a practice 
cannot be measured. It is the context for all human action. Thus, each of our 
human practices, or modes, has a distinctive language, or living tradition, which 
determines our human actions. Experience in these modes is distinct from 
experience in the ‘world of practice’ (ibid, p.18) and serves to distinguish the 
world of ordinary affairs and desires from that of scholarly pursuits and 
experience.  
 
Thus, Oakeshott makes a distinction between two forms of knowledge, technical 
and traditional (practical). Technical knowledge is present in every art, science or 
practical activity and in many such activities is reduced to rules which are, or may 
be, learned, remembered and put into practice. Practical knowledge, on the other 
hand, is unreflective and cannot be formulated into rules (Lawn 1996, p.270). 
These two forms of knowledge are inseparable, yet distinguishable and are the 
two components of knowledge in every human activity.  It is a shared 
appropriation of the idea of tradition. There is no opposition between tradition 
and reason, for reason cannot be theorised. Practical reason springs from a 
living set of practices which, in turn, emerge from a history of practices or 
tradition (ibid, p.271).   
 
Significantly, practical experience holds an element of moral conduct. Individuals 
come to recognise themselves as equal members of ‘a community of selves’ 
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(Oakeshott 1981, p.201). The practical is the mode in which we conduct most of 
our lives. This separation of the practical, as a mode of experience, from the 
scholarly, namely the modes of scientific, historical and aesthetic experience, is 
useful. If education developed from the practice of initiating young people into 
the skills of adult life, then the development of the school as an institution, and 
particularly since the introduction of compulsory schooling, represents the 
specific and deliberate practice of initiating young people into the aspects of their 
cultural inheritance (Williams 2007, p.19). It is the primary purpose of schooling 
to explore the modes of experience represented in the forms of knowledge and 
understanding (ibid). In this manner, educating demands a unique relationship 
between teacher and learner, one that is distinct from all other formal 
relationships such as buyer and seller, doctor and patient, lawyer and client.   
Education is liberal, according to this analysis, in that it is conducted in an arena 
that is free from intrusion by the demands of the language of practical activity; 
the ‘language of appetite’ (Williams 2009, p.41). It is also liberating or 
emancipatory in that it liberates from the grip of this language: it emancipates us 
from servitude to the world sub specie voluntatis, ‘from the here and now of 
current engagements’ (ibid, p.37).Thus conceived, liberal education is suitable 
for the cultivation of the liberal, or free human being. It is for personal enrichment 
and development.   
 
However, for Oakeshott, this liberal view of education is not about promoting the 
pre-eminence of man such that man should take himself too seriously. 
O’Sullivan’s (2011) view of Oakeshott’s philosophy of education posits that 
Oakeshott has injected into the notion of liberal education an ideal of 
enlightenment: the ‘philosophy of modesty’. The implications are for an 
enlightened education that permits life to be lived free from illusions about our 
relation to the world, society and ourselves;  illusions that have led to feelings of 
absurdity, unthinking exploitation of nature and a foolish faith in state planning as 
the answer to all human misfortunes (ibid, p.11). For Oakeshott, therefore, 
education is not merely about learning to do ‘this’ or ‘that’ more proficiently  but 
about acquiring, in some measure, an understanding of the human condition in 
which the ‘fact of life’ is continually illuminated by the ‘quality of life’ (Oakeshott 
1972, p.26). It is about learning how to be both autonomous, and a civilized 
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human being. Education, seen in this light, has a higher goal than merely 
socialising the student into the prerequisites of the real world. Education should 
not simply replicate, but challenge the norms of society. The burden of creating 
truly human beings, therefore, rests on the whole of education, beginning within 
the family and extending through formal schooling and beyond. The question 
then arises as to what a state system of schooling should look like when viewed 
in this way. 
 
Education as ‘conversation’  
 
One of Oakeshott’s most significant contributions to the discussion of what is 
education is the concept of education as conversation. Oakeshott represents the 
process of ‘School’ as that serious and orderly initiation into an intellectual, 
imaginative, moral and emotional inheritance designed for children who are 
ready to embark upon it (Oakeshott 1972, p.24). The transaction between 
teacher and learner that follows, does not amount to the transfer of the products 
of earlier generations, a  mere stock of ready-made ideas, images and beliefs  
such as might be found in the 2014 English National Curriculum (DfE 2013c), but 
rather it is about learning to look, listen, think and imagine. Education, thus 
understood, is about learning to recognise oneself as a human being. Learning 
becomes learning to study in conditions of direction and restraint and requires a 
teacher with something to impart, which is not immediately (or necessarily) 
connected with the current wants or ‘interests’ of the learner. ‘School’ is about an 
engagement to learn by study that demands effort. What is learned has to be 
understood and remembered.   
 
This construct of ‘School’ offers emancipation through a continuous redirection of 
attention. The learner is animated, not by his own inclinations, but by intimations 
of excellence and aspirations he has never yet dreamed of. The teacher, thus, 
embodies some part, or aspect of this inheritance, in whom it is ‘alive’. In this 
manner, Oakeshott would find the notion of an ignorant teacher a contradiction. 
The teacher, by necessity, is the master of that which he/she teaches. He, or 
she, has deliberated its worth and the manner in which it is to be imparted to the 
learner who is known. The suggestion that education is something that is 
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‘delivered’ or scripted, as is in the National Literacy and Numeracy strategies of 
the past (DfEE 1998, 1999) or intervention programmes such as the Early 
Literacy Support Programme (DfES 2001)  would be anathema.  For Oakeshott, 
the teacher is a custodian of that ‘practice’ in which the inheritance of human 
understanding survives, and is perpetually renewed. The mark of a good school 
is that it bestows on its former pupils the gift of a childhood recollected as an 
enjoyed initiation into the mysteries of the human condition; the gift of self-
knowledge and of a satisfying intellectual and moral identity, rather than one that 
meets predetermined targets and high positions in league tables.   
 
Universities: learning to live or learning to work   
 
As already indicated, Oakeshott makes a distinction between the aims of liberal 
education and those of a vocationally orientated system of education. His fear is 
that the latter has dominated education provision, and where once this might 
have been designed for the poor in industrialised society, it has now extended to 
all social classes (Williams  2007, p.105).This has been exacerbated by 
increasing state control of education. Oakeshott’s attempts to keep these two 
domains of liberal and vocational education separate, serve two purposes. First, 
in order to protect the virtue of school and university education according to 
Oakeshott’s liberal understanding of the education project. Second, to detach 
from the world of work those concepts of satisfaction, fulfilment and the 
development of autonomy that pertain to ‘School’. But this, William’s argues, is 
an example of Oakeshott’s over economy of concepts. Work, indeed, can 
contribute to a person’s autonomy, both practically, in that it enables individuals 
to be economically self-supporting, but also in terms of the more philosophical 
concept of Bildung. For many, work can be a source of immense enjoyment and 
fulfilment. The question remains, how far school and university should be 
subjugated to this aim alone, especially given Oakeshott’s singular view of the 







Exclusivity, elitism or equality of opportunity?  
 
School is the institutional setting for initiation into Oakeshott’s ‘conversation of 
mankind’ and is distinguished from other educational institutions that promote 
vocational training, community centres or distance/e-learning opportunities.   
 
[T]here is no substitute for the school as a specific institution where, in 
personal transaction, a young person is initiated by a teacher into the 
language of human understanding’ (Williams 2007, p.47).   
 
There is, however, a distinction in Oakeshott’s writing between the ‘idea 
“School”’ and the reality of schools, the former representing the virtues, as 
opposed to the vices, of ‘school’.   
 
In stressing the set-apart nature of school, school as a sanctuary, a community, 
engendering loyalty and happy memories, which for some may be indicative of 
the ideal English public school, Oakeshott has been criticised for advocating an 
exclusive idea. Williams argues this is far from Oakeshott’s desire. The type of 
schooling described is intended for all learners, irrespective of background and 
aptitude. Although a formal curriculum may be the core business of school, it is 
not its only business. Building confidence, opening up a variety of opportunities 
and experiences, are to name but a few. Yet Williams argues that Oakeshott 
views too negatively the necessity for state involvement in the education system, 
and the likely subversion of the ideal of ‘School’ to meet economic and 
instrumental purposes. ‘The law of the market and the vagaries of philanthropy 
are unlikely to assure the full benefits of education, or health care to the 
population at large (ibid, p.63), hence state intervention is one way of ensuring 
access to educational goods, especially to those facing socio-economic 
disadvantage. 
 
It may also be considered that Oakeshott’s philosophy of the curriculum, that 
orderly programme of studies based on the languages of human understanding 
and art, (ibid, p.65) is elitist. The curriculum is intended for the initiation of young 
people into these languages. Primarily, Oakeshott’s curriculum consists in the 
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traditional literature, languages, history and science. There is no need to assume 
these languages are to be narrowly conceived and should not reflect the diversity 
of cultures and voices of local communities, nor does this have to be at the 
expense of the traditional elements of the school curriculum per se. 
 
For Williams, Oakeshott is well aware that, historically, the poor have not 
enjoyed educational equality and he deplores their exclusion from the curriculum 
of high culture for the sake of ‘socialisation’ - that instruction in vocationally 
oriented skills designed to accommodate the masses, who were, because of 
their poverty, excluded from any education at all (ibid, p.189). Socialisation 
stands as a misguided, alternative apprenticeship to adult life’ (ibid), that cannot 
provide access to the educational conversation. But if Oakeshott’s ideal of liberal 
education should be accessible to all, he fails to take note of the barriers to 
success presented by limited socio-economic means, such that the higher the 
educational level, the greater the disparities in rates of educational participation 
relative to origins (ibid, p.192). This is further complicated by Oakeshott’s 
philosophy of civil and enterprise association, and his belief that the concern of 
government is with the protection and promulgation of law. It has no function in 
the distribution of material goods, otherwise the state would become an 
enterprise, rather than civil, association. Williams overcomes this by arguing that, 
given government is the custodian of the law, the distributive principle can be 
extended through the tax system. This is particularly so in terms of access to 
education, and the exercise of full citizenship. Where this may be undermined by 
economic deprivation, Williams argues that Oakeshott’s view of the civil life is 
compatible with the notion of social democratic interventionism that permits both 
access to education and the exercise of citizenship, in its fullest sense. This 
Williams views as both participative and active in the spirit of most western 
democracies.   
 
The role of the state - intervention, standards and assessment   
 
‘The culture of control in education engendered a strand of pessimism in 
Oakeshott’s thought and it continues to prompt concern in the minds of many 
educators in the twenty-first century’ (Williams 2007, p.221). Oakeshott was 
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concerned that education had become an instrument of manipulative social 
engineering, supported by the ‘science’ of behaviourism, to realise the purposes 
of the state (ibid). Williams argues that the impulse of the positivism which began 
in the Enlightenment, was designed to control nature. However, the positivism 
that developed in the 1950s, and became a pillar of educational policy in the 
1980s (and beyond), was intended to bring education institutions under the 
control of government and employers. What has developed, in the words of 
Standish (2005 cited in Williams 2007, p.222), is a practice of teaching based on 
a ‘closed economy’ of pre-defined aims, objectives and outcomes, subject to 
repeated quality audits. What is valued in education becomes what is 
measurable, and the excited babble of the ‘conversation of mankind’ slowly 
becomes inaudible against the white noise of targets and assessments. This is 
not to say that there is no role for standards and assessment regimes. Williams 
has argued for state involvement in ensuring equality of educational access and 
for exercising a redistributionist role through the taxation system. He also 
suggests that, internationally, there are examples of state funded schooling that 
provide the very type of liberal education Oakeshott espouses. Where schooling 
and university education is funded through taxation, it is only right that such 
institutions are held accountable for the monies they use. This, however, does 
not have to be at the expense of the liberal educational ideal aspired to. For 
Oakeshott, the concern was for a state intent on social engineering through 
intervention. This, he feared, would result in the ‘abolition of mankind’, an 
alarmism which Williams regards as both understandable and exaggerated (ibid); 
a view based on a belief in the achievement of committed teachers to rise above 
such reductionist trends, in order to preserve a respect for the human person, 
and a delight in learning, in order to join the conversation of mankind.    
 
Thus, Oakeshott’s relevance to current education debate and policy-making is 
evident for a number of reasons. It provides an holistic understanding of what it 
is to be human, the nature of civilised living, the contribution of education in its 
broadest sense, and of schooling in particular, to the development and 
sustainability of both. Rather than being narrowly conceived, schooling should 
extend beyond the passing down of facts or preparation for the world of work and 
contribute to the making of ‘man’. There are, consequently, significant 
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implications here for the teaching profession, teacher training, the system of 
state schooling and higher education provision, and the type of formal curriculum 
on offer. It is these areas that will be discussed next in relation to the 2010 
Coalition Government’s education policy, the analysis of which, using 
Oakeshott’s conceptual framework, will help uncover the tensions between 
liberal and conservative political ideologies at work in the construction of the 
education policy led by the then Secretary of State, Michael Gove. 
 
Coalition Education Policy 2010-2014   
 
Education featured as the first and most urgent arenas for change for the new 
Conservative Coalition government of May 2010. Indeed, the renaming of the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) to the more traditional 
Department for Education (DfE), was to signal a break with New Labour and its 
overtly holistic approach to education and social policy, encapsulated in the 
Every Child Matters agenda (DfES 2003) and the Children Act (HMG 2004). No 
longer did ‘every child matter’ so much as ‘every child [was to] achieve more’ 
(Puffet 2010).  
 
Published in November 2010, The Case for Change (DfE 2010a) outlines the 
rationale behind the radical changes detailed in the accompanying government 
White Paper, The Importance of Teaching (DfE 2010b). The overall narrative 
begins with an assertion that [English] schools can ‘be better’. This is based on 
evidence from the OECD and international comparison tables such as PISA, 
which place English pupils behind their contemporaries in Finland, Hong Kong 
and Canada. Three key lessons define the English ‘problem’; these relate to the 
recruitment and quality of teachers, limited school and teacher autonomy and the 
persistence of the attainment gap between the highest and lowest performing 
pupils.   
 
In order to improve England’s ranking, an immediate raising of educational 
standards, coupled with a drive to narrow the attainment gap is called for. This is 
endorsed, not only as a means of tackling economic inequality (better educated 
pupils will achieve better jobs), but, because it will also address changes in the 
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types of employment and skills-base created by new technologies and the wider 
global economy: better educated pupils will fit the new employment profiles 
demanded by such technologies. Schools would, therefore, require greater 
professional autonomy in order to promote the innovation necessitated by these 
changes. All this rests on the nature and quality of teachers, considered ‘the 
most important feature of a successful education system’ (DfE 2010a, p.6). To 
this end, three key strategies are proposed as the means of enhancing the 
quality of the teaching profession: a focused recruitment of ‘high quality’ 
candidates for teaching, improvement to initial teacher training and induction, 
and the enhancement of systems for continuing professional development. 
These strategies underpin the comprehensive changes to state education 
outlined in the White Paper (DfE 2010b), and validated in the 2011 Education Act 
(HMG 2010a).  
 
The teaching profession  
 
Centre stage amongst these reforms, is a reconceptualisation of the significance 
and quality of teachers in the transformation of the English state education 
system. The preamble to the Teachers' Standards (DfE 2010b) reads:  
 
Teachers make the education of their pupils their first concern, and are 
accountable for achieving the highest possible standards in work and 
conduct. Teachers act with honesty and integrity; have strong subject 
knowledge, keep their knowledge and skills as teachers up-to-date and 
are self-critical; forge positive professional relationships; and work with 
parents in the best interests of their pupils. (ibid, p.10)  
 
Recruitment and Quality  
 
Policy changes, intended to improve the quality and status of teachers, and 
outlined in the White Paper, require:  
 
• that new entrants to teacher training have a minimum of a  2:2 degree; 
• a re-orientation of teacher training to focus more on classroom skills; 
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• that trainees spend more time in schools;  
• the development of Teaching Schools to lead the training and 
professional development of teachers in a similar manner to Teaching 
Hospitals;  
• an expansion of Teach First (initial teacher training based on the 
Teach America model offered through private providers); and 
• the development of new and compressed routes into teaching for 
career changers and persons leaving the armed forces.   
                                                                                            (Morris 2012, p.98) 
 
Furthermore, the Case for Change (DfE 2010a, p.7) sets out identifiable, pre-
professional characteristics of the ‘good teacher’. These are:  
 
• A high overall level of literacy and numeracy 
• Strong interpersonal and communication skills 
• A willingness to learn; and 
• The motivation to teach (Allington & Johnson (2000) cited in (DfE 
2010a, p.7) 
                                             
Such prerequisites allow for the widening of teacher recruitment beyond what 
has become an accepted focus on successful personnel from industry and 
commerce. Troops to Teaching, for example, is a flagship policy aiming to recruit 
newly retired or redundant service men and women to the teaching profession, 
bringing with them strong traditions of team work, discipline and commitment, 
along with high levels of technical expertise in priority subjects such as 
Mathematics and the sciences.   
 
The Teachers’ Standards (DfE 2010b) describe the minimum requirements of all 
members of the teaching profession, from trainee to experienced teacher. These 
are listed as: professional values and behaviours; standards for teaching; and 
standards for professional and personal conduct. They include statements such 
as ‘demonstrate good subject and curriculum knowledge’ (ibid, p.7), ‘uphold 
public trust in the profession and maintain high standards of ethos and 
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behaviour, within and without school’ (ibid, p.10), ‘maintain high standards in 
their own attendance and punctuality’ (ibid).   
 
Initial teacher training and CPD   
 
Changes to initial teacher training involve opening the delivery of teacher training 
to private providers with the aim of a model of training that is more classroom-
based and less theoretical (DfE 2010a, p.7). School-centred initial teacher 
training (SCITTS) and ‘Schools Direct’, provided through a consortium of schools 
and partner education providers, are examples here. So too, Teach First, a 
private, social enterprise, linked to Teach America as part of the Teach for All 
network. Each of these models still involves collaboration with a partner 
university but in essence, the new arrangements serve, principally, to break the 
monopoly of Higher Education in teacher training provision. Ultimately, the 
development of the Teaching Schools programme would mean that ‘alliances’ of 
such schools would ‘take a structured and proactive role in leading, managing 
and taking responsibility for, a school-led ITT system’ (NCTL 2014a). 
Furthermore, teaching school alliances  and their ‘strategic partners’, including 
universities, academy chains, private sector, diocese or local authorities, were to 
take a lead in the continuing professional development of the school workforce, 
from head teacher to teaching assistant (NCTL 2014b). Thus, the advisory role 
of local authorities was all but removed. Expertise was to rest with a system of 
school-to-school-support (system leadership models) and private providers, 
overseen by the National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL).   
 
The state system of schooling  
 
These wholesale changes to the recruitment, training and deployment of 
teachers, were mirrored by an equally radical reform of the state system of 
education, from the nature and diversity of maintained schools, to the body of 
knowledge enshrined in the curriculum and the accumulated powers held by the 
Secretary of State. Gove’s reforms of the teaching profession argued for 
returning greater professional autonomy, both to teachers, and to schools. Since 
1988, all maintained schools in England had to adhere to the newly introduced 
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National Curriculum and to employ state qualified, graduate teachers. However, 
in the few years following the 2010 election, there was a steadily growing 
number of state schools released from this prescription, namely Academies and 
Free schools.  
 
The Academies Act (HMG 2010a) was central to the Government’s school 
reforms, and was enacted with astonishing speed, receiving Royal Assent on 
27th July. It represents the primary mechanism through which levels of parental 
choice and competition were to be raised in the system of state maintained 
school. Academies, already established under New Labour, are state funded, yet 
self-governing and outside of direct local authority control. The 2010 Act was to 
radically extend the scope of New Labour’s academies programme, permitting all 
existing state schools, whether primary or secondary and subject to certain 
criteria, to apply for Academy status.  Furthermore, all new maintained schools 
were to be set up as an Academy or Free school. Free Schools, are ‘all-ability 
state-funded schools set up in response to what local people say they want and 
need in order to improve education for children in their community’ (DfE 2013a) 
and strongly influenced by the Swedish programme of the same name. They 
may be set up by parents, teachers, charities, businesses, and religious groups 
without the support from an existing school or local authority. As such, they are 
‘free’ insofar as they enjoy a certain measure of autonomy in that they are not 
subject to the same day-to-day control over their activities as other maintained 
schools, as in the case of Academies generally. Twenty-four Free Schools 
opened in 2011 and a further fifty-five in 2012.   
 
Historical background   
 
The seeds of Academy and Free School reforms are evident amongst all three of 
the main political parties in England. In the 1980s the Conservative government 
experimented with City Technology Colleges (CTC) introduced in order to 
improve schooling in inner-city areas by bringing private enterprise into the state 
system. Secondary phase CTCs were free from Local Authority control and 
received capital funding from private businesses which were often represented 
on the governing body. They were obliged to follow the national curriculum 
91 
 
introduced in the same 1988 Act but all had to have a specialism in a particular 
area of technology such as information technology (ICT).   
 
The CTC programme was adopted and changed by the Labour Government of 
1997 under the steering of the Education Secretary David Blunkett.  Blunkett’s 
introduction of a programme of City Academies was to form part of a wider 
programme of reforms to extend diversity within the publicly-funded sector and 
raise standards where existing provision was considered inadequate (Blunkett 
2000, p.21-2). The programme permitted the establishment of new public sector 
schools, allowed private schools to convert to the public sector and encouraged 
new promoters from voluntary, religious or business sectors to challenge or 
replace weak schools (ibid). Again, such schools operated outside local authority 
control. Coalition school policy represents a wholesale renovation of this model 
of academies, extensively transforming the landscape of the English system of 
state maintained schools.   
 
Chains and federations   
 
Withdrawal of local authority control and greater autonomy in terms of 
admissions and funding arrangements has facilitated the grouping of schools into 
new forms of networks, federations or alliances for a variety of purposes. Prior to 
the emergence of Academies, there were no school ‘chains’ within the state 
education system, now names such as ARK, The Harris Federation and the 
United Learning Trust are synonymous with the Academy project. These have 
absorbed onetime local authority responsibilities, such as school improvement 
and advisory roles, perhaps bringing closer to fruition the notion of a school-led 
system of education, responsive to local need. One key example here would be 
that of the London Challenge and later City Challenge initiative (Hutchings et al., 
2012), a collaborative exercise in school leadership, with a particular focus on 
school improvement, which appeared to successfully counter the stratification of 
local school systems that marketisation and competition between schools had 
brought in its wake. Indeed, the Case for Change (DfE 2010a, p.20) sets out the 
contention that the most effective systems combine high levels of school 
autonomy with effective accountability. Drawing on international comparison data 
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from the OECD, the assertion is that ‘A system in which schools are free to 
decide how things should be done and are then accountable for the results, 
appears to be the most effective in raising achievement’ (ibid).  
 
Interest in the twin concepts of autonomy and accountability has grown in recent 
decades, albeit in response to different underlying forces that have bridged the 
three dominant political parties in England (Glatter and Young 2013). The Local 
Management of Schools (LMS) introduced in the Conservative government’s 
Education Reform Act, 1988, gave individual schools (headteachers and 
governors), rather than local authorities, enhanced budgetary responsibilities. 
The Act also offered further opportunities for autonomy from local authority 
control in the creation of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) and Grant Maintained 
Schools funded directly from Whitehall. Yet, such autonomy for schools came at 
a cost, for, together with the introduction of a highly prescribed national 
curriculum, in reality this amounted to greater centralisation. In the new 
marketised system, schools became accountable to a number of stakeholders; 
governors, parents, government and, in the case of CTCs, private funders. 
Ofsted, introduced in 1993, was responsible for measuring school standards, 
underlining the assumed link between enhanced autonomy and school 
improvement, although Secretary of State, Michael Gove, expressed 
dissatisfaction with this independent body, considering it unfit for purpose (The 
Guardian, 2014). Glatter and Young (2013, p.563) refers to this array of reforms 
as amounting to the nationalisation of schooling, making schools more uniform 
rather than encouraging greater diversity. What followed under New Labour - 
1997-2010 was a continuation of these tendencies towards centralisation, a 
movement that has gained significant momentum under the Conservative 
Coalition and compounded by increased powers vested in the Secretary of State.   
 
Powers of the Secretary of State   
 
Throughout the whole process of reform, the powers vested in the Secretary of 
State for Education have accumulated significantly. The Education Bill of 2011 
listed fifty new powers, including powers to intervene directly where schools are 
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under-performing and the ability to direct what types of schools communities 
should have (DfE 2011; Burnham 2011; Wolfe 2013).   
 
The Curriculum   
 
The framework for the new National Curriculum in England was published in 
September 2013 to come into effect in September 2014. Some of the changes 
were to be staged such as those affecting pupils in year 2 or 6 who will be 
assessed according to the old Standard Attainment Test (SATs) measures. 
According to the DfE:  
 
The national curriculum provides pupils with an introduction to the 
essential knowledge that they need to be educated citizens. It introduces 
pupils to the best that has been thought and said; and helps engender an 
appreciation of human creativity and achievement (DfE 2013c, p.6).   
 
It was to be taught alongside the school curriculum which:  
 
promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development 
of pupils at the school and of society, and prepares pupils at the school 
for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of later life. The 
school curriculum comprises all learning and other experiences that each 
school plans for its pupils (ibid, p.5).  
 
The rationale given for the proposed reforms to the curriculum and to the public 
examination system is found in Michael Gove’s speech to the Social Market 
Foundation (Gove 2013). Claiming affinity with the writings of Antonio Gramsci 
and E. D. Hirsch, Gove argued the case for a new curriculum  ‘[s]o that more 
time - much more time - is available for teaching, for reading around the subject, 
‘and for the cultivation of the habits of proper thought’ (ibid). This offer is to be 
accessed through a menu of twelve traditional subjects and disciplines, 
organised as ‘core’ (English, Mathematics and Science) and ‘foundation 
subjects’ (Art & Design, Citizenship, Computing, Design & Technology, 
Languages, Geography, History, Music and Physical Education) across four key 
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stages. ‘[O]ur new curriculum affirms - at every point - the critical importance of 
knowledge acquisition’ (ibid). In other words, a linear national curriculum based 
on essential knowledge imparted by teachers. By Key Stage 4, there is a clear 
demarcation between the academic and technical in the restructured GCSE 
programme with the removal of ‘soft’ subjects such as PE, media and drama 
from the GCSE brand (Paton 2011). This division between the academic and 
practical, Core and Foundation subjects, perpetuates and institutionalises the 
abiding legacy of the elementary school system of the past.  
 
Analysis of reforms 
 
The unifying factor across all these reforms is teaching. Teaching, rather than 
teachers, is the chosen driver for change, hence the title of the 2010 White 
Paper: The Importance of Teaching (DfE 2010b). What is to be taught, by whom, 
to whom, where and for what purpose, denotes Gove’s underlying philosophy of 
education. This contrasts sharply with Oakeshott’s philosophy of ‘School” and 
the role of the teacher in the teacher/pupil relationship.  
 
Conceptualising pedagogy  
 
The nature of teaching is closely determined by the presumed purposes of 
education, and more specifically by the intended outcomes of the curriculum, in 
current education policy. Indeed, Hinchcliffe (2001, p.31) makes a clear 
distinction between ‘pedagogy’  understood as instrumental learning placed at 
the service of government, political power or the economy and ‘education’, ‘that 
more disinterested endeavour in which teacher and learner engage in a form of 
enquiry’. Whereas the former is guided by specific objectives, the latter takes an 
open-ended view of the outcome of education - an outcome that should be left, in 
part, to the interaction between teacher and learners, as in the case of a 
conversation. For Hinchcliffe, this means that, constructed as education, learning 
cannot be measured by a common standard, whereas, if constructed as 
pedagogy, the outcomes have to be measured, given that the whole point of 
learning is to equip learners for specified social, political and economic functions. 
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A view that takes education and pedagogy as polar opposites is, perhaps, 
unhelpful. A more sophisticated understanding of these concepts is called for.  
 
According to Michael Gove:  
 
Teaching is a craft and it is best learnt as an apprentice 
observing a master craftsman or - woman. Watching others, and 
being rigorously observed yourself as you develop, is the best 
route to acquiring mastery in the classroom. (DfE 2010b).   
 
What Gove presents here is a particular understanding of pedagogy - teaching 
as a ‘craft’ (Brown & McIntyre 1993) but which can also be categorised as an ‘art’  
(Eisner 1979) or ‘science’ (Simon 1981) of teaching. Alexander (2004, p.10), in a 
similar vein to Hinchcliffe, argues that such definitions offer a restricted view of 
pedagogy, one that ‘excludes any sense of how pedagogy connects with culture, 
social structure and human agency, and acquires educational meaning’. This 
model of pedagogy relates more closely to Friere’s (1972) notion of ‘banking’ 
rather than Oakeshott’s notion of conversation. 
 
UK emphasis on curriculum - pedagogy subsidiary to curriculum   
 
For Alexander, restricted notions of pedagogy represent: 
 
judgement rather than substance and justification; and with teaching 
rather than the wider sphere of morally purposeful activity, of which 
teaching is a part, which we call education. Teachers, in this 
characterisation, are technicians who implement the educational ideas 
and procedures of others, rather than professionals who think about 
these matters for themselves (Alexander 2004, p.12).   
 
As an alternative, Alexander (ibid, p.11-12) offers a typology of pedagogy which 
addresses such concerns. This constitutes a number of domains and values. His 
first grouping relates to what is to be taught, to whom and how, in other words 




           children: their characteristics, development and upbringing 
 learning: how it can best be motivated, achieved, identified, assessed and 
 built upon; 
 teaching: its planning, execution and evaluation; and 
 curriculum: the various ways of knowing, understanding, doing, creating, 
 investigating and making sense which it is desirable for children to en-
 counter, and how these are most appropriately translated and structured 
 for teaching.     
 
The second grouping acknowledges that teaching takes place in a context and 
responds to requirements and expectations. These comprise:  
  
school: as a formal institution, a microculture and a conveyor of 
pedagogical messages over and above those of the classroom; and 
policy: national and local, which prescribes or proscribes, enables or 
inhibits what is taught and how.   
 
It is here that teaching is formalised and legitimated. Finally are the domains of:  
 
 culture: the web of values, ideas, institutions and processes which inform, 
 shape and explain a society’s views of education, teaching and learning, 
 and which throw up a complex burden of choices and dilemmas for those 
 whose job it is to translate these into a practical pedagogy;  
 self: what it is to be a person, an individual relating to others and to the 
 wider society, and how through education and other early experiences 
 selfhood is acquired; and 
 history: the tool for making sense of both education’s present state and its 
 future possibilities and potential.  
 
These serve to locate teaching in time, place and the social world. It anchors 
teaching firmly to questions about human identity and social purpose 
Applying this typology, it is possible to explore Conservative Coalition education 





Learning is mentioned 46 times in the Importance of Teaching, primarily as part 
of the phrase ‘teaching and learning’ but also in terms of what should be learnt 
(knowledge) by pupils, teachers and Government in relation to international 
comparisons. At no point is there any indication of an overriding theory of 
learning beyond a call for ‘deep learning’ (DfE 2010b, p.40) and ‘synoptic 
learning’ (ibid, p.49), neither of which are defined. The whole process for 
improving teaching and learning would, therefore, appear to be unsystematic and 
pluralistic, in that individual schools can develop their own approaches to 
learning, acknowledging, at the same time, that the outcomes of such processes 
are assessed through a centralised and prescriptive model of accountability in 
the form of Ofsted inspections.   
 
We envisage schools and teachers taking greater control over 
what is taught in schools, innovating in how they teach and 
developing new approaches to learning. We anticipate that in a 
school system where Academy status is the norm and more 
and more schools are moving towards greater autonomy, there 
will be much greater scope for teachers to design courses of 
work which will inspire young minds. But there will still be a 
need for a national benchmark, to provide parents with an 
understanding of what progress they should expect, to inform 
the content of the core qualifications and to ensure that 
schools which neither wish, nor have the capacity, to pursue 
Academy status have a core curriculum to draw on which is 
clear, robust and internationally respected (ibid, p.40).  
 
The Case for Change (DfE 2010a) is equally silent on any underlying theory of 
learning that may underpin professional practice. What is to be encouraged is 
the sharing of ‘best practice’; teacher autonomy, in providing appropriate 
‘learning environments’; and accountability measures that monitor teaching and 
learning as part of the inspection process. It would appear from this that the 
proposed reforms are not explicitly supported by any generally accepted theories 
98 
 
of child development or teaching and learning. In other words, there is no sense 
in which ‘education’ or even pedagogy in its broadest sense, has any part.  
Rather, what is presented is a consistently narrow and instrumental view or 
teaching and learning, where teaching is presented as a craft, grounded in 
classroom experience. The transfer of teacher training from institutions of Higher 
Education into schools only serves to reinforce this model.   
 
Yet for Oakeshott, education has more to do with learning for its own sake. 
Oakeshott’s concept of a practice makes the distinction between education and 
pedagogy decisive. Learning construed as pedagogy, relates to instrumental 
practice or ‘prudential art’. Those who join together in pursuit of a common want, 
or to promote a common interest, form what Oakeshott refers to as an enterprise 
association. But there is another form of practice in Oakeshott’s armoury - the 
practice of agency. This, unlike the enterprise association, has no ‘extrinsic, 
substantial purpose’ and is typified by a ‘morality’ or ‘open practice’ where agents 
themselves subscribe to the terms of the practice. Education, according to this 
analysis, belongs to ‘open practice’ and initiates the learner (or agent) into an 
understanding of those terms (Hinchcliffe 2001, p.40-42). Learning to understand 
the rules of a practice is therefore, by necessity, self-reflective and tied, 
inextricably, to human conduct. Oakeshott’s desire to see education as separate 
and uncorrupted by instrumental purposes is, perhaps, unfortunate, for education 
historically has never been free from the instrumental purposes imposed by 
either church or state. Perhaps the purest form of learning, therefore, should be 




On first reflection, current education policy depicted in both The Case for Change 
and The Importance of Teaching errs heavily on the side of instrumentalism. This 
is evidenced not only in the representation of learning but also in its 
understanding of teaching and the teaching profession.   
 
At the heart of our plan is a vision of the teacher as our 
society’s most valuable asset. We know that nothing matters 
99 
 
more in improving education than giving every child access to 
the best possible teaching. There is no calling more noble, no 
profession more vital and no service more important than 
teaching. […..]we believe in the importance of teaching – as 
the means by which we liberate every child to become the 
adult they aspire to be [….] The importance of teaching cannot 
be over-stated (DfE 2010b, p.7).   
 
The ‘importance of teaching’ rests on the notion of teacher and school autonomy. 
An autonomous teacher is one freed from the burdens of an over prescriptive set 
of standards and curriculum orders, and is able to make professional decisions 
about what is best.  However, of the 36 times autonomy is mentioned in the 
White Paper on only two occasions is it used explicitly in relation to head 
teachers and teachers, and once obliquely to ‘the front line’. According to the 
OECD (ibid, p.3), it is countries which give the most autonomy to head teachers 
and teachers that do best and the best performing and fastest improving school 
systems have achieved their envied status through combining high levels of 
teacher and school autonomy with rigorous accountability measures (ibid, p.18). 
Indeed no education system can be better than the quality of its teachers (ibid, 
p.3) and the status of teaching depends on strengthening the authority of 
teachers in the classroom. Good quality teaching depends on good quality 
teachers, hence an emphasis on the recruitment and training of teachers. 
Reference is made to the importance of teaching reading, systematic synthetic 
phonics and mathematics, of teaching schools and teaching assistants. Yet, 
despite great emphasis on the importance of teaching, as in the case of learning, 
there is no underlying theory or theories of teaching or pedagogy. Key elements 
of teaching are listed as:  
 
the best approaches to the teaching of early reading and early 
mathematics, how best to manage poor behaviour, and how to 
support children with additional needs, including Special 




but again, without any explanation of what these may look like beyond a 
statement that:   
 
skilled and precise assessment of pupils’ work – both of the 
level at which children are working and of what they should be 
learning next – is an essential part of good teaching.   
 
Indeed, any implicit or explicit reference, to the planning, execution and 
evaluation of teaching is missing. There is much, on the other hand, about the 
rigorous accountability of teachers and assessment of pupils.   
 
Again, what is presented here is precisely that restricted model of pedagogy 
which has reduced teaching to a craft predicated on a set number of skills. There 
is nothing here that would point to the higher aims of education as espoused by 
Oakeshott. For, it is the nature of the teacher /pupil relationship that moves 
teaching beyond imparting certain facts and types of knowledge to the pursuit of 
‘education’ proper. Both teaching and learning converge in Oakeshott’s 
metaphor of ‘Conversation’.   
 
There is a clear distinction in the writings of Oakeshott between teaching as 
imparting and teaching as instruction. Instruction is the passing on of certain 
facts and information; ‘teaching that’, or what Oakeshott has referred to as 
‘drilling’ suggesting verbal and non-verbal routines of a mechanical, nature. 
Imparting, on the other hand, has to do with the communication of judgement. 
Judgement here is not abstract and cannot be reduced to so many propositions 
learned apart from the practical skill to which it belongs. The role of the teacher 
then is that of exemplar, suggesting an apprenticeship model of learning at the 
feet of the master.  The master provides him with an ‘opportunity not only to 
learn the rules, but to acquire also a direct knowledge of how he sets about his 
business (and, among other things, a knowledge of how and when to apply the 
rules)’ (Oakeshott 1981 cited in Williams 2007, p.162).   
 
The teacher pupil relationship is therefore complex and hinges on questions of 
values and knowledge, what is to be taught and how. 
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Curriculum   
 
In a school system which encourages a greater degree of 
autonomy and innovation the National Curriculum will 
increasingly become a rigorous benchmark, against which 
schools can be judged rather than a prescriptive straitjacket 
into which all learning must be squeezed (DfE 2010b, p.10).   
 
The curriculum, as interpreted here, clearly has more to do with standards and 
less about knowledge or teaching and learning. This becomes a question values.  
 
The recent review of the National Curriculum has been the third produced since 
2009. Both the Rose Review (DCSF 2009) and the Cambridge Primary Review 
(Alexander 2009) focusing on the primary years, advocated the division of 
knowledge into areas or domains of learning. By contrast, the 2014 National 
Curriculum orders mark a return to the supremacy of ‘subjects’. This renewed 
emphasis on knowledge breaks with the 2007 reforms of the National Curriculum 
which emphasised the interests and experience of learners (Young 2011, p.266). 
For Young, the nature of the curriculum links closely with ideas of the purposes 
of schooling. Referring to a previous study (Young and Muller 2010), Young’s 
argument is that a prescribed body of knowledge which every child should know, 
and which every teacher must transmit, treats access to knowledge as the core 
purpose of the curriculum and assumes that the boundaries that delineate that 
knowledge are largely given (Young 2011, p.266). Knowledge is valued for its 
own sake, suggesting that schooling is an intellectual challenge for both teachers 
and pupils. The inference is that teachers are technicians, as in Gove’s 
understanding of pedagogy as craft. They are not expected to engage critically 
with the material or educational ideas they are to implement (Alexander 2004, 
p.12). This is in contrast to Oakeshott’s view of the curriculum as an orderly 
programme of studies based on the languages of human understanding and of 
art (Williams 2007, p.65).   
 
For Oakeshott then the purpose of the curriculum is to initiate young people into 
these languages for the ultimate purpose of assimilating them into the 
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conversation of mankind. This is in sharp contrast to socialisation to which 
schooling has been reduced by state control. Education, rather than socialisation 
demands a particular form of curriculum. This would be a curriculum that offers 
the pupil substantive, identifiable bodies of knowledge and skill that can be 
taught and learned. These must emerge from the languages of human 
understanding in a way that reflects the genuine nature of those languages 
(Williams 2007, p.67). Here Oakeshott sets up the distinction between two 
modes of thought - ‘language’ and ‘literature’ or ‘text’, in other words a distinction 
between a manner of thinking and what has been said before - facts, information, 
discoveries- in the context of a specific language (ibid). Such an understanding 
leads Oakeshott to promote a linear curriculum from early education to 
university. It is a curriculum that is not intended to serve the wants of pupils but 
that initiates them into the languages of mankind.  He concedes however, that a 
curriculum based on subjects is probably best for this purpose (ibid, p.69).  
 
What constitutes knowledge in the new national curriculum?   
 
The aims for the new, scaled-back national curriculum outlined by Gove (2010b) 
are to make opportunity more equal and to give teachers more professional 
freedom. This is based on a belief that ‘knowledge is a basic building block for a 
successful life’ (Gibb 2010). Learning is essentially a knowledge producing 
activity and, indeed for Gibb, education is about the transfer of knowledge from 
generation to generation (ibid). But what constitutes knowledge? Knowledge can 
be said to take three fundamental forms: cognitive, skill -based or dispositional 
(Scott 2014, p.1), where dispositional means the propensity to behave in certain 
ways in certain conditions. All three forms of knowledge are different and require 
different forms of assessing and evaluating. Given then, that knowledge is 
contested, the decisions about what should be included or excluded in terms of 
curriculum content will, also be different and contested.  
 
Nick Gibb, as Schools Secretary, offers an insight into what government values 
as knowledge. Formulated around subjects, knowledge in science is about 
‘getting to grips with the basics - of elements, of metals, of halogens and of 
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acids’ with the purpose of understanding some of the great advances that have 
revolutionised our lives (Gibb 2010). Tellingly:   
 
The facts, dates and narrative of our history in fact join us all together. The 
rich language of Shakespeare should be the common property of us all. The 
great figures of literature that still populate the conversations of all those who 
regard themselves as well-educated should be known to all (ibid).   
 
The reforms to the National Curriculum, therefore appear to preference 
knowledge above skills. However, the key issue concerns what particular 
understanding of knowledge underpins the national curriculum; a question which 
is almost systematically avoided by educationalists and was absent in the 
debates leading to the 2014 curriculum reforms led by politicians (Young 2013.) 
Oakeshott’s typology of knowledge distinguishes between articulated knowledge; 
the knowledge of an activity that can be put into words, and ‘complete’ or 
concrete knowledge that is made evident through the practice of the activity itself 
(Williams 2007, p.152). This relates to Oakeshott’s language/literature divide. 
Every human skill from mowing the lawn to the activities of the scientist or 
historian can be understood as a metaphorical language of human achievement 
(ibid). In the same way, every skill also offers a literature - the propositional 
element of knowledge or ‘information’ (ibid). Every skill therefore is capable of 
generating technical literature or technical knowledge understood as the rules 
that govern the skill (ibid, p.153). It is ‘disjunctive’ in so far as it is disjoined from 
the knowledge in use. It is distinct from theoretical or propositional knowledge in 
that the latter is derived from enquiry.  Disjunctive knowledge does not allow an 
individual to practice a skill given that rules do not tell an individual what to do in 
a particular situation. Thus knowing that Wellington rather than Nelson fought at 
the battle of Waterloo may be important cultural knowledge for Nick Gibb (2010), 
but it does not make an historian. Disjunctive knowledge therefore alone does 
not constitute ‘complete’ knowledge. To acquire this form of knowledge  - the 
exercise of a skill through the mastery of its language, the learner must acquire 
‘practical’ or ‘technical knowledge' - ‘know-how ‘, ‘connoisseurship’  or 




But for what purpose? Oakeshott’s philosophy argues the purpose of learning is 
to be initiated into the conversation of mankind. The curriculum, therefore, is 
constructed of those modes through which the conversation is conducted, 
particularly natural science and history. For Gove and Gibb, however, the 
purpose of the curriculum is at once far ranging - to reduce inequality and the 
bureaucratic burden on teachers, and prescriptive setting out specific content 
relevant to each year. The purpose is to  
  
ensure that pupils have the knowledge they need at each stage of their 
education, and restore parity between our curriculum and qualifications, 
and the best the world has to offer: whether that is Massachusetts, 
Singapore, Finland, Hong Kong, or Alberta (Gibb 2010).  
 
Summary   
 
Coalition education policy and the Big Society  
 
Like everything in the agreement that unites this coalition government, our 
education policies are guided by the three principles of freedom, responsibility 
and fairness. We’re going to give schools greater freedom and parents more 
opportunity to choose good schools (Gibb 2010).  
 
Freedom from or freedom to?  
 
The central tenet of the Big Society is the production of small government, the 
reduction of state intervention in lives of individuals, communities and institutions 
such as schools and hospitals. Freedom from state control is promoted through 
the Conservative Coalition education reforms as autonomy; professional 
autonomy for teachers and school leaders, civic autonomy for communities to 
decide on the type of schools they require and moral autonomy to do ‘what is 
best’. To some extent this can be evidenced though the promotion of Academies 
and Free Schools - freed from local authority control and created in response to 
local choice in the instance of Free Schools. Such schools are also freed from 
the restrictions of the national curriculum, creating a puzzling division between 
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those who have access to this body of knowledge, the concepts of which ‘must 
be taught. And they must be taught to everyone’ (ibid) and those who do not. But 
freedom from is not the same as freedom to. Limits and boundaries are set to 
maintain centralised control over the school system and education reform as a 
whole. 
 
Responsibility and fairness  
 
Inevitably then, alongside state constructed freedom comes state imposed 
responsibility, particularly in the realms of welfare, work and training together 
with social responsibility, volunteering and philanthropy. Fairness is sought in 
narrowing the attainment gap between the best and poorest performing pupils 
and schools with the ultimate aim of narrowing the gap between the performance 
of England’s school system and those nations at the top of international league 
tables.  
 
What emerges from this brief analysis is what Brian Simon referred to as ‘the 
dominance of ideology over principle’ (Alexander 2004, p.8) where theoretical 
understandings of pedagogy are subjugated to political ends. This may be one 
way of containing the natural fault lines between the Conservatism of Cameron 
and Gove, and the Liberalism of Clegg and Gibb. Certainly, in their outline for 
government the two political leaders were positive about the strengths of the 
arrangement:  
 
when you take Conservative plans to strengthen families and encourage 
social responsibility, and add to them the Liberal Democrat passion for 
protecting our civil liberties and stopping the relentless incursion of the 
state into the lives of individuals, you create a Big Society matched by big 
citizens. This offers the potential to completely recast the relationship 
between people and the state: citizens empowered; individual opportunity 
extended; communities coming together to make lives better (Cabinet 




However, how far this agreement is evident in education policy and sustained 



































Chapter 4: Reflections on Policy in Relation to the Big Society   
 
Introduction   
  
So far, this thesis has explored the concept of the Big Society, its central tenets, 
intellectual antecedents and instantiation in the Conservative Coalition education 
policy enacted by Michael Gove as Secretary of State (2010-2014). Arguably, 
the Big Society is perhaps the most significant ideological theme to have 
emerged from the UK Conservative Party in recent years. Ideology of this nature 
serves two political purposes: first to provide a framework within which politicians 
and others can operate, and second as a ‘marketing device’ or electoral tool 
(Heywood n.d.) to secure potential voters. These two purposes are, of necessity, 
interrelated and require traceable roots within party thinking and a vision which 
resonates with the public at large. Yet, the notion of the Big Society has found 
difficulties on both counts, acknowledged early on by the House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee (PASC 2011). In their analysis, the want 
of a coherent policy agenda across all government departments explains the lack 
of transparency and public understanding. Thus, in a departure from the original 
intention of the role of the state in realising the Big Society, they claim Whitehall 
is now referring to the Big Society merely as ‘a set of principles underpinning the 
Government’s policy agenda rather than a self-contained project’ (PASC 2012, 
p.4). These principles, however, remain unchanged: empowering people, 
encouraging social action and opening up social services to private enterprise.   
 
This shift in thinking, from agenda to underlying principles, is significant, 
particularly at is raises questions about the limits and possibilities of the notion of 
a Big Society and how such limits and possibilities might be evidenced in English 
education policy. These limits and possibilities are framed both by the internal 
coherence of the policy concept of a Big Society and the external pressures 
exerted upon its interpretation and implementation. In order to explore this 
further, two contrasting frameworks are employed here. The first draws on 
French anthropologist Lévi-Strauss’s notion of bricolage whilst the second 
considers the agency of political ideas in policy-making. Vidovich’s (2007) 
hybridised model approach is also explored, one ‘which can simultaneously draw 
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on the strengths of different approaches’ (ibid, p.285) in an attempt to make 
sense of the wider contexts in which policy is formulated and enacted.  
 
Policy as Bricolage  
 
Bricolage, as defined by Lévi-Strauss (1962), is, at its simplest, a technical 
metaphor for both a cognitive and creative process. In other words, it is about the 
use and deployment of tools and materials. These might be physical instruments 
or, in the case of policy making, intellectual capacities. In the realms of business 
and industry, the imperative of maintaining sustainable, competitive advantage, 
requires the continuous generation of innovative and coherent policies. New 
knowledge is generated in several ways. Cibbora (2004, p.45), for example, 
alludes to innovation as creating new knowledge about resources, goals, tasks, 
markets, products and processes. The skills and competencies required here, 
represent both the resources to hand and the constraints for innovation.  
 
For Lévi-Strauss, the activity of bricolage is achieved through the agency of the 
bricoleur, rather than the reverse. In The Savage Mind (Lévi-Strauss 1962), the 
bricoleur is distinguished from the engineer in that:  
 
The ‘bricoleur’ is adept at performing a large number of diverse 
tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of 
them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and 
procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of 
instruments is closed and the rules of his game is always to make 
do with whatever ‘is at hand’, that is to say, with a set of tools and 
materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous… 
(ibid, p.17).  
 
There is no direct parallel for bricoleur in the English context, but it is closest to 
the notion of a Jack-of-all-trades or professional odd-job man. Bricolage, 
therefore, is essentially about the process of selection and combination of 
resources. Resources are heterogeneous in that they have no relation to any 
particular project.  
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Weick (2001, p.63) sets out the processes engaged in by the bricoleur: 
retrospection, reflection, projection and generalisation. Applying this optic to the 
conceptualisation of the Big Society and ‘compassionate conservatism’, 
demonstrates how conservative thought over time has been drawn together to 
articulate and justify Big Society ideals.  
 
A retrospective: the miscellany of conservative thought  
 
The first step in Weick’s process is retrospective in that it involves interrogating 
the existing set of resources. At first sight, the Big Society argues for ‘citizens 
empowered’; individual opportunity extended; communities coming together to 
make lives better (Cabinet Office 2010a), but deeper analysis has so far in this 
thesis, indicated a miscellany of intellectual and political ideals, brought together 
pick’n’mix style, in order to articulate Cameron’s social and political agendas. 
This resonates with Jesse Norman’s conclusions about what may be termed 
‘intellectual conservatism’: conservatism as a cluster of ideas competing with 
each other for the market share. It differs from its political rivals in that ‘it is 
instinctive, not theoretical, a disposition not a doctrine, realistic and sceptical not 
grandiose or utopian, accepting of the imperfectability of man, not restless to 
overcome it’ (Norman and Ganesh 2006, p.32).  Interrogation of this intellectual 
legacy suggests to Norman, a mélange of ideas organised around two traditional 
camps; the liberal/libertarian and the paternalistic conservative (ibid, p.29). 
Liberal or libertarian conservatives hold to free market economics, localism and 
private property, whereas paternalistic conservatives prioritise community and 
social stability.  Both intellectual positions appear in Conservative Party thinking 
and serve to illustrate the complexity and heterogeneity of conservative thought. 
Kelly (2012, p.23) further highlights the complicated history of liberal ideas within 
the Conservative Party. He demonstrates that the ideas of both Hayek and 
Oakeshott have framed conservative thinking in the latter half of the twentieth 
century and are, in essence, concerned with the intricate relationship between 






Reflection: historical experience 
  
The second step in the process of the bricoleur is to reflect upon the prior uses  
of resources in order to identify what the object signifies- what do we know about 
certain resources from historical experience? Kelly’s reference to “Orange Book’ 
conservatism, for example, capitalises on the Liberal Party’s publication The 
Orange Book (Marshall and Laws 2004) where four phases of liberalism: the 
personal, political, economic and social were identified. Based on this historical 
retrospective, Kelly concludes that the aim of the liberal politician is to strike a 
balance between all four phases of liberalism so described. Other key influences 
identified in the early chapters of this thesis sought to demonstrate how 
interpretations of the role of the state and society, from Hobbes and Locke, 
Burke and Disraeli, to Saul Alinsky and Amitai Etzioni have been used to define 
the Big Society. From the perspective of the bricoleur, it is the prior uses and 
understandings of these espoused concepts that are then manipulated and 
recombined in order to advance the new project.  
 
Projection: possibilities and potential   
 
The third step in Weick’s analysis of the work of the bricoleur involves projection 
- what possibilities do these resources hold in addressing the current problems 
and issues at hand? The construct of new forms of conservatism and how they 
might be defined by Big Society ideals looks to a political philosophy that 
stresses the use of conservative approaches and concepts, such as a belief in 
traditional institutions and property ownership, to improve the general welfare of 
society. Hence, in moving away from the Thatcher legacy, David Cameron, in his 
acceptance speech as leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, called for “a 
modern and compassionate conservatism which is right for our times and our 
country” (Norman and Ganesh 2006, p.1).  However, the fact that this is not 
achieved suggests capitalism wins. 
 
This new model of conservatism, for Norman, addresses what he considers to be 
the twin threats to society of a lack of trust emerging from the breakdown of 
social ties, and a lack of security derived from perceived external threats such as 
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terrorism, diminishing energy supplies and irreversible environmental damage. 
These threats are inextricably linked and so far, according to Norman, have been 
tackled through a single and inflexible model of state provision of public services 
which has failed. In his view, compassionate conservatism offers an alternative 
to this post war, persistent, statist consensus and ‘a humane principled, long-
term intellectual basis for social renewal’ (ibid, p.3). This is to be achieved 
through the building of a greater sense of cultural identity based on British 
society, its institutions and values and its contribution to the world. As a social 
agenda, it requires the devolution of power from Whitehall to independent 
institutions, the private and voluntary sectors and to local government. It 
demands a new understanding of the relationship between the state and the 
individual, thus stressing the horizontal bonds of civil association found in the 
philosophy of Oakeshott, as opposed to the vertical, top down social contract 
model of Hobbes. Yet, what is missing from both these philosophical 
understandings is any notion of the connectedness of the individuals that make 
up society. Compassionate conservatism, for Norman, therefore, embodies three 
principal insights: that persons are social animals, that they create institutions of 
extraordinary range and diversity which, of themselves, help shape those who 
belong to them and society more widely, and finally, that some of these 
institutions stand between the people and the state, acting as buffers, conduits, 
outlets and guarantors of stability. Here one might allude, (although Norman 
does not) to the central role of education as a mediating institution. Education 
stands between the political aims of government and civil society and should 
serve both the general and personal good.   
 
Generalisation: creating the new 
 
Finally, through the use of generalisation, analogies and comparisons, the 
bricoleur assembles resources into new arrangements. Norman, as one of the 
key exponents of the Big Society, draws on strands of liberal and conservative 
thought to construct, in the manner of the bricoleur, a new iteration of 
conservatism that is more relevant to the current social and political context. 
Calling on the work of Michael Oakeshott, Norman (Norman and Ganesh 2006) 
argues for a compassionate conservatism that takes further Oakeshott’s dual 
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concepts of an ‘enterprise’ and ‘civil’ or associative society.  Both operate 
according to different rules. In an enterprise society the role of government is to 
achieve certain social objectives. It is not content merely to govern but directs its 
activities, such as the creation of laws, to serve its goals. In a civil society, rules 
are more procedural, setting frameworks within which people can live, rather 
than goals to achieve. But Oakeshott’s categories of procedure and purpose do 
not describe in sufficient detail the institutions that emerge from both civil and 
enterprise society. For Norman, the crucial feature which helps explain the 
centrality of institutions such as family, supporters’ clubs or a company, is that 
they are ‘in very different ways […] based in and constituted by human affection’ 
(ibid, p.42). This missing category is defined as philic association after the Greek 
philia (friendship, tie, affection). This points to a society constructed on horizontal 
lines which produces connection and identity for its citizens.  
 
The challenge for all of us is to develop public policies that 
recognise, protect and enhance our connected society, and that 
enrich the cultural conversation within it (ibid, p.55).  
 
Norman’s contention, therefore, is that the whole nature and character of 
individuals is determined by their existence in society. Markets are not an end in 
themselves, but the ‘greatest’ means of generating wealth and have an inherent 
capacity for promoting freedom and, therefore, for challenging bureaucratic 
authority. Thus, in order to achieve its goal, compassionate conservatism is built 
on the three principles of freedom, decentralisation and accountability. Freedom 
from excessive state intervention in the lives of individuals, and freedom to take 
personal responsibility; the decentralisation of power and responsibility from the 
state to the individual, and accountability where political power is made 
accountable to the citizenry. This, for Norman, represents limiting state power 
and preserving and extending democracy.  
 
Blond, on the other hand, puts together a different set of ideas in his construction 
of Red Toryism referred to in Section 2 of this thesis. In his view, social 
conservatism is the means of countering the effects of neoliberal economics. 
Here, any traditional links that  position concern for the poor in the context of 
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class struggle are separated; localism and small scale employment initiatives are 
promoted in order to counter the hierarchies of state and multi-national 
corporations (along the lines of the German Mittelstand), and elites are given 
clear roles in social management. Blond’s account of a moral and associative 
civil society pulls together certain views on the family, civil culture and moral 
values, influenced by his reading of political theology.  Hence, as Cibbora (2004, 
p.49) claims, the resources at hand for the bricoleur, in this instance strands of 
party political intellectual and theological thought, become the tools for change 
that define, in situ, the heuristic to solve the ‘problem’ of a ‘broken Britain’. 
Practices and situations disclose new uses for and applications of these 
intellectual ideas. This relates to what Harper (1987: cited in Weick, 2001, p.63) 
sees as the role of the bricoleur; a thinker who makes creative use of whatever 
builds up during the process of work.  There is an obvious connection here with 
the contributions made by party intellectuals such as Lord Wei, Lord Glassman 
and Jesse Norman, as well as members of think tanks and ‘philosopher kings’ 




If the concept of bricolage helps explain the process of selection of intellectual 
antecedents in the construct of the Big Society and Big Society discourse, then it 
may also highlight its own inherent limitations as a tool for both assembling and 
interpreting policy. Principal amongst these limitations is the recognition that 
there is a degree of dependence upon the past in terms of the elements selected 
and used for policy formation. Resources, as stated earlier, are affected more by 
the ways in which people have codified them in the past, than how they might 
envision the future (Weick 2001, p.64). Accordingly, failure, from the perspective 
of the bricoleur, may occur because:  
• people are too detached and do not see the present situation in 
enough detail 
• past experience is limited or unsystematised 




• a preoccupation with decision rationality makes it impossible for 
people to accept the rationality of making do (ibid) 
 
Certainly, the notion of the Big Society has failed to gain purchase in some 
quarters. The House of Commons Select Committee (PASC, 2012) construes 
this as a failure of policy implementation: a lack of a coherent cross-department 
implementation plan and cross-Government coherence. Citing the experience of 
charities, whose work straddles a number of government departments, the 
Select Committee raise concerns about accessing government funding for cross-
department projects.  For example, the charity Emmaus, who serve the 
homeless, address:  
 
issues such as mental health, alcoholism and addiction, and 
educationand skills, as well as homelessness. These issues are 
covered separately by the Department of Health, the 
Department for Work and Pensions and the Cabinet Office as 
well as local authorities, who have statutory responsibility for 
homelessness. Existing Government programmes, such as the 
Work Programme, work in only single departments, and are not 
suitable for people with multiple and complex needs (ibid, p.4).   
 
The Committee also highlight the difficulty Government has had in 
communicating the notion of the Big Society in ‘simple language’ (ibid, p.3). 
Amongst those in the third sector and faith based groups, there was a belief that 
they were already ‘doing’ the Big Society. For example, in their report on the Big 
Society, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (2011) state that ‘it’s clear that the 
sector wants to be part of the debate around the Big Society. Many feel they are 
delivering the Big Society already – and have been doing so for many years – 
and they are keen to have their voices heard’. The Church of England (Brown 
2010) have equally commented on the similarities between the life and work of 
the church and the out working of Big Society ideals. Applying the optic of 
bricolage may, therefore, explain the puzzlement of the Select Committee and 
others, highlighting their misunderstanding of the nature and complexity of both 
policy construction and its subsequent implementation.  
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Application of bricolage as a theoretical framework also shows up the inherent 
inconsistencies and lack of internal coherence contained within the Big Society 
narrative itself. Norman and Blond, for example, each have contrasting views on 
the aims and means of a Big Society. Whereas Norman is looking to extending 
the power of citizens whilst limiting that of state generated bureaucracies in order 
that citizens might flourish in a market driven society, Blond points to moral 
values as a means of militating against the harsh realities of neoliberal 
economics for both individuals and communities. On the one hand the market is 
to be welcomed, on the other it is to be treated with caution. What is provided as 
evidence of a ‘broken Britain’, and the negative effects of free market liberalism, 
are blurred in the construct of an ostensibly neoliberal ideology that favours a 
small state and a proactive role for entrepreneurship. An alternative approach to 
addressing the questions of policy formation and enactment is to consider work 
done by Hall, Gourevitch and Hirschman amongst others (Hall 1988) on the 
diffusion and uptake of ideas across nations.  
 
Policy and the Power of Ideas 
 
If applying the theoretical lens of bricolage to the notion of a Big Society has 
highlighted its intrinsic contradictions and limitations, then exploring the political 
power or agency of ideas uncovers certain extrinsic pressures and limitations at 
work in its construction and implementation. Indeed, Hall (1988, p.4) argues that 
ideas have a significant influence over policy-making, and play an important role 
in the affairs of state. In exploring the adoption of Keynesianism across nations, 
Hall (ibid) identified three theoretical models that go some way to explaining this 
influence: the economist-centred; the state-centred and the coalition-centred 
approaches.  
 
The ‘economist-centred’ model 
  
In analysis of the Big Society this may be considered a ‘specialist -’ or ‘expert - 
centred’ approach that represents a trickle-up model for the diffusion of ideas. 
Over time, one theory supersedes another because it proves better at explaining 
empirical observations that remain atypical in terms of earlier theory. The 
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persuasiveness of new ideas depends on the way they fit with other existing 
ideas and relevant theories. It also depends upon the institutional parameters 
that structure communication with policy makers. Hall points to the institutional 
parameters that structure the nature and means of communication, with policy 
makers at the top. He cites the degree to which there exists a large and 
sophisticated body of academic thinkers and practitioners, the influence given to 
younger exponents of the ideas, the openness of public authorities to advice and 
personnel and the relative influence of professionals inside the policy-making 
arm of government. The ability to lobby parliament is perhaps also crucial. The 
role of think tanks and their access to persons of influence in the corridors of 
power at Whitehall is pertinent here, such as the close associations of Phillip 
Blond and his think-tank ResPublica, or the Lords Wei and Glassman or Jesse 
Norman and their access to Cameron and the Conservatives in the early days of 
the 2010 Coalition Government. Specialists and key thinkers, particularly in the 
fields of social policy, community, faith and third sector organisations, have all 
contributed to the construct of the Big Society agenda, building on prior 
understandings and analysis of the socio-political context in which they operate. 
The interest of businesses such as the Reg Vardy motor company or the Harris 
Federation with its roots in carpet manufacture in developing academy chains or 
creating Free Schools, serve as examples. This ‘specialist-centred’ model then, 
is a bottom-up approach to policy making, dependent upon the credibility of 
ideas, the empirical evidence which supports them and a wide acceptance of 
them amongst practitioners and experts on the ground.  
 
The ‘state-centred’ approach   
 
Second in Hall’s typology, is the state-centred approach (ibid, p.11). In this 
instance, the reception accorded new ideas is influenced by the institutional 
configuration of the state and its experience with related policy.  This represents 
a more trickle-down approach to policy construction. The relative openness of 
policy-making institutions to advice from outside experts is said to affect the 
speed with which new ideas are incorporated into policy. The administrative 
biases implicit in the institutional division of responsibility within the state will also 
condition the receptiveness of key agencies to new ideas. A state may have the 
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bureaucratic structures already in place to implement a new policy relatively 
swiftly, otherwise it may not. Equally, some states may be predisposed toward 
certain policies, making their adoption fairly straightforward. In England, the 
political inclination towards new public management on both sides of the House 
since the 1990s has already predisposed the administrative arm of government 
towards ‘rolling back the state’ and for actively promoting a localism agenda, 
albeit for a number of different reasons. Although this model has some merit in 
drawing attention to the role administrative problems play in the process of 
policy-making, in Hall’s view, it also has limitations in that it presents a dominant 
role for the apparatus of the state and diminishes the role of the political world 
(ibid, p.12). In other words it appears to privilege the role of officials, including 
civil servants, over that of politicians.   
 
The ‘coalition-centred’ approach  
 
Finally, is the coalition-centred approach advocated by authors such as Peter 
Gourevitch (ibid, p.12). Here, policies are seen to require support from a broad 
coalition of groups on whose votes and good will politicians ultimately depend. 
The argument is that a nation’s readiness to implement new policies depends on 
the ability of its politicians to forge a coalition or partnership with a broad base of 
social groups, large enough to sustain them in office and who will regard the new 
policy as something that is in their interests. This suggests a more pragmatic 
approach to policy making and one perhaps more suited to fixed term 
administrations such as those in England. The advantage of this approach is that 
it acknowledges the broader political context in which ideas are forged and 
throws into relief the competition between interest groups for scarce resources 
(ibid, p.13). The interdependence of politicians and social groups in the co-
construction of policy is therefore highlighted. But for Hall, the model also leaves 
open the question of how these groups come to define their interests in a 
particular way, in other words their ability to reframe their own thinking to fit the 
emergent conceptualisation of a policy and facilitate its uptake by government. 
This is indicated by the orientation of many organisations towards Big Society 
aims in the early days of the coalition government such as those claims made by 
Wycombe District Council (n.d.) who identify existing partnership activities as 
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relating to the Big Society. These include an Arts Centre, a community bus 
service, advice and support for the homeless and even the existence of the 
Council’s web page on Facebook.  
 
Three factors then, are at work in policy construction: the availability of relevant 
ideas, their advocates and the role of national leaders in their uptake; the role of 
relevant social groups or coalitions in supporting or opposing policy innovation 
and the institutional arrangements that facilitate or impede the entry of innovative 
ideas into policy (Weir 1998). Hall’s analysis is that ideas are central to politics in 
two ways: a sense of collective purpose is forged from the many competing 
moral visions put forward by contenders for political power and solutions to 
common problems are devised out of the policy proposals generated by 
intellectuals and officials alike. These processes are complementary. They hint 
at the power relationships between the state and the institutions of government 
and civil society.  Furthermore they indicate that the interplay between ideas, 
state power, administrative structures and interest groups is highly complex.   
 
Vidovich’s ‘hybridised model’   
 
A third way of understanding the construction and implementation of the Big 
Society agenda is to take Vidovich’s (2007) hybridised model approach: a model 
which highlights the importance of context in relation to policy formation. It aims 
to dislodge policy from the exclusive domain of policy elites at the macro level 
and give focus to those operating at all levels of the process. To some extent the 
potential for this is indicated in Hall (1998) in that the currency of particular ideas 
and the agency of their proponents is noted across all strata from practitioner 
and expert, to government ministers. Vidovich’s contribution of a hybridised 
model moves away from presenting policy research in terms of mere dualisms 
(such as post-modernist versus post structuralist perspectives) and brings 
together both macro and micro perspectives on the policy process, 
acknowledging both agency and constraint for all policy actors concerned 




The balance between constraint and agency for policy participants 
will vary depending on the specific policy and the particular time 
and place, because the dynamics of policy processes are context 
specific (ibid, p.295). 
 
Central to understanding this balance between constraint and agency and the 
outworking of power relations between policy actors is the socio-political and 
economic context in which policy is constructed. The twin ideologies of 
capitalism and neoliberalism define the context in which Western and, therefore, 
English policy making takes place and these same ideologies, simultaneously 
frame and militate against the policy changes encapsulated in the Big Society.  
 
We are all neoliberals now  
 
Crouch (2013, p.23) distinguishes three different meanings of the idea of 
neoliberal. Pure neoliberals, claim that society will be at its best when the 
conditions of the perfect market can be achieved in all areas of life. This requires 
extensive competition among multiple producers and a strong state that restricts 
itself to maintaining the conditions in which such markets may operate. The role 
of the state is to protect property rights, to extend the role of markets into further 
areas and to guarantee competition. This ‘neoliberalism of the first kind’ restricts 
itself to these tasks only. ‘Neoliberalism of the second kind’, however, accepts 
the value and priority of markets in the economy but is aware of their limitations 
and deficiencies, in particular their inability to deal with externalities (those by-
products of market activity) and public goods. There are some areas where the 
market is not appropriate and neoliberals holding to this view will act to protect 
these. Unlike socialists, they accept the superiority of the capitalist economy over 
state ownership, but seek to use the state and other non-market institutions to 
militate against its defects (ibid, p.24). Finally ‘neoliberalism of the third kind’, or 
‘actually existing neoliberalism’ stands diametrically opposed to its originating 
ideas and refers to the amalgam of the corporate lobbying of government and 
the development of corporate and other private wealth in politics that usually 
accompanies the introduction of the neoliberal agenda. It is this kind of 
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neoliberalism, neoliberalism as a political movement, that, in Crouch’s analysis, 




Markets offer certain advantages (ibid, p.25). They can operate as efficient 
allocators of resources, enabling citizens to engage in transactions and choices 
without needing to refer to a central body. Furthermore, a market economy 
provides for choice in a context of alternatives, change and adaptation. It actively 
encourages innovation. Choice works on both consumer and producer so that in 
a free market certain goods will still be chosen. But markets also create 
problems. Often termed market ‘failures’ (ibid, p.26) Crouch identifies these 
‘inadequacies’ as imperfect competition, inadequate information, the existence of 
public goods and the existence of negative externalities. In reality, market 
competition is often imperfect, there may be, by necessity, only a few producers 
serving particular customers, as in the case of public utilities. Or it may be 
difficult for new producers to enter a particular market because of the start-up 
costs. Access to the necessary information in order to make ‘right’ choices, 
similarly can be problematic, particularly for ordinary citizens. How, asks Crouch 
(ibid, p.29), are parents and children to know the value of education to them in 
twenty or thirty years’ time?   
 
Education is a public good and the existence of public goods in a market 
economy is, for Crouch, also considered troublesome. The question of public 
goods hinges on the generally accepted rule that they are non-rival and non-
excludable. Non-rival refers to those goods that may be consumed by one 
person whilst not preventing another from doing so (for example access to radio 
waves or the internet) whereas non-excludable means it should be impossible to 
exclude people from the enjoyment of a non-rival good (for example the 
environment). If it is not possible, then such goods cannot be provided in the 
market. State education, according to this rule, is (and should) operate as a 
public good. In a pure market economy, goods that cannot be provided by the 
market will not be provided at all (ibid, p.30) and they will be subject to neglect. 
This logic means that many public goods will not exist. The apparent alternative 
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in a market society is either to turn them into marketable commodities (the 
opening of state education to private enterprise) or for government to create a 
public agency with responsibility for caring for the public good (The Environment 
Agency). Finally, the issue of negative externalities, those unintended 
consequences or by-products of market activity, also require one of three 
responses; to consider the externality insufficiently important to warrant public 
attention, to levy a tax or other charges to make producers limit or remove the 
undesirable outcome of production (pollution) or to subject producers to legal 
regulation.   
 
In each of these instances, a tension exists between ‘the market wherever 
possible’ and ‘the state where necessary’ (ibid, p.26). Thus, although in England 
state education has long been considered a public good, its existence within the 
market economy means that more and more it is regarded as a marketable 
commodity where policy-makers must grapple with the market/state tensity. The 
same is true for the National Health Service and welfare provision more 
generally. What emerges is political neoliberalism that threatens social 
democracy in that the general and widespread interests of the many come a 
poor second to those of a privileged few (ibid, p.47) To demonstrate this, Crouch 
moves beyond the language of ‘producer’ and ‘consumer,’ common to neoliberal 
discourse, to highlight a key separation in the role of ‘consumer’ between 
‘customer’ and ‘user’. The division serves to indicate the extensive nature of the 
power of corporations and the passivity of individual citizens (teachers and 
parents) in the neoliberal economy. Customers are not necessarily users. 
Crouch (ibid, p.46) takes an example from the sale of monopoly rights to televise 
sporting events. The market relationship is between the owner of the event and 
the corporation buying the monopoly. Those who watch the sporting fixture are 
not customers but mere users. Translated into the field of state education the 
‘corporation’ is the business interest sponsoring academy chains such as 
Ormiston Education, E-Act (formerly EduTrust Academies CharitableTrust) or 
CfBT (Centre for British Teachers) for example; the passive users are parents 
and children. This political neoliberalism is far removed from the liberal ideals of 
Edmund Burke or Michael Oakeshott, whose philosophies look to the betterment 
of all persons in society rather than a privileged elite who are able to win 
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advantage on the basis of knowledge and wealth. This explanation offers a 
strong indication why a social institution such as education has proved incapable 
of addressing the widening achievement gap between the socially and 
educational elite able to pay for, or obtain access through house purchase, to the 
best state and private schools, and the majority who appear left behind. 
Education becomes a positional good rather than for the good of all. The 
question remains, when and how does the state become necessary?  
 
Before such a question can be answered, Crouch draws on the writings of 
Polyani to demonstrate that the introduction of markets during the spread of 
capitalism destroyed the fabric of social relationships in traditional society (ibid, 
p.49) such as that of landowner and peasant. A similar claim is made by 
Hirschman in his Rival Views of Market Society (1992). Where destruction 
occurs, Crouch argues that the significant issue is what the market puts in its 
place and how that alternative might be evaluated. To this end, he points to 
some of the key confrontations between markets and institutions so as to 
illustrate the complexities of both markets and the attempts to address the 
problems they cause. These he explores in terms of markets and trust, markets 
and morality, markets and externalities.  
 
Markets and Trust  
 
The argument here is that in traditional societies, where markets have not 
penetrated, trading agreements depended on trust. Indeed Hirshman goes so far 
as to argue that in the early days of capitalism one of the positive by-products of 
markets was a:  
 
more polished human type - the more honest, reliable, orderly 
and disciplined as well as more friendly and helpful ever ready 
to find solutions to conflicts and a middle ground for opposed 
opinions (Hirschman 1992, p.109).  
 
Modern markets have changed this through the effective law of contract intended 
to drive out the unreliable, incompetent or dishonest, if the market mechanisms, 
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themselves, fail to do so (Crouch 2013, p.50). In this way, the growth of the 
market displaces trust between individuals with a sophisticated law of contract. 
Furthermore, as Polyani pointed out, the replacement of trust by contract can 
undermine those very institutions that had supported trust (ibid, p.51): institutions 
such as schools, Christian marriage or the National Health Service.  The logic of 
this argument progresses as follows. The law of contract displaces the need for 
trust. Trust is no longer cultivated nor valued and the mechanisms that supported 
it are neglected. People, therefore, find they can no longer trust each other and 
find themselves relying on contract. As a consequence, trust becomes eroded 
outside the normal reach of the market. Hence the introduction of Home School 
Agreements in1999 and upheld by the coalition (DfE 2013b) which operate as 
quasi-contractual agreements between parents, pupils and the school, or the 
move towards legalising the status of prenuptial agreements (Bowcott 2014) and 
the tendency towards litigation in cases where medical treatments go wrong 
(Crouch 2013, p.51).The process is further illustrated in the financial banking 
scandal of 2007-8. Fuelled by a breakdown in trust between trading banks the 
‘problem’ was viewed simply as inadequate regulation. Yet:  
 
despite all the prominent teachings of neoliberalism that the market 
alone could manage economic relationships, trust still plays an 
irreducible role in human interactions, even in this field of purest 
financial calculation (ibid, p.52).  
 
Crouch (ibid, p.53) uses this example to highlight the tension between three 
sources of order, each of which failed: the conservative institution of trust, the 
neoliberal institution of the market and the social democratic preference for legal 
regulation, his conclusion being that the participants in the process failed to 
recognise how far trust and regulation had been eroded by the market until 
significant damage had been done.  
 
Markets and morality   
 
The market also proves itself amoral, putting a price on human beings, their 
security, their organs and even their death (Sandel 2012). This, Crouch argues, 
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is the natural logic of neoclassical economics (Crouch 2013, p.55) and this logic 
removes the need for a morality or ethics in behaviour. The moral issue of trust 
between patient and doctor on the basis that the doctor is a good and honest 
person is now replaced by a trust in the governing institution of the medical 
profession in order to guarantee high standards of behaviour. Moral trust then 
becomes institutional trust. This presents tensions for conservatives who favour 
the ‘small state’ against a social, democratic welfare state and redistributive 
taxation (ibid, p.57), and yet are uncomfortable with the amorality and civil 
injustice that arise from a rigorous market approach. In Crouch’s analysis this 
leads conservatives to invent elaborate reasons to explain why it is the welfare 
state, rather than neoliberalism, that is to blame for the unpalatable aspects of 
contemporary society. Choice solutions to improving services are offered as 
counters to state monopoly based on the assumption that competition will 
improve quality and responsiveness to customer demand. This assumes of 
course that both customers and users are aiming for the same objectives.  
 
Sandel’s theory of crowding out  
 
However, where there may be limits to the promise of market solutions, there are 
seemingly no limits to market incursion. Sandel refers to this as ‘crowding out’ 
(2012, p.113). Market values crowd out non-market values which are worth 
caring about. What those values might be are both situational and open to 
debate. However, if society decides that certain goods may be bought and sold, 
then these goods become commodities; instruments of profit and use. 
Government and society would not explicitly allow children to be bought and 
sold, yet schooling has been turned into a commodity and as such we might 
argue that the product of schooling, those principles of teaching and learning, 
pedagogy and knowledge, have been corrupted, even degraded. For Sandel, we 
have moved from having a market economy to being a market society, where 
market values seep into every aspect of human endeavour and where social 
relations are made over in the image of the market. The monetary motive crowds 
out other, perhaps higher considerations (ibid, p.58) and this raises moral and 
political questions, rather than purely economic ones. Where the market erodes 
non-market norms, the moral question is whether the loss is significant. Some 
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moral assessment is called for, such as whether the loss of non-market norms 
and expectations would change the character of an activity such as teaching, in 
ways that we would, or should, regret. Does, for example, the introduction of 
performance related pay for teachers or the removal of the requirement for 
Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) for teachers in Academies and Free Schools 
alter the perception of who might be considered a ‘good’ and dedicated teacher? 
Market reasoning involves moral reasoning.  
 
Markets and externalities  
 
Perhaps one of the most tenacious by-products of neoliberal societies is 
widening diversity and growing inequality amongst the populace. Different levels 
of wealth-holding determine how well individuals can face risk in terms of both 
prosperity and knowledge (Crouch 2013, p.72). Wealth, and the knowledge upon 
which it draws, allows its holders to win the best deals. This is a problem, not of 
ideology, but the power of globalised capital which operates at national and local 
levels through the funding of political campaigns, ownership of mass media, 
resources for lobbying and the ability to purchase the best brains (ibid, p.190). 
On this basis, societies in Britain and the USA particularly, have become more 
and more stratified and this has particular consequences for the state provision 
of schooling (Ball 1993; Whitty 2001; Riddell 2003). Indeed Ball (1993, p.4) 
argued that the introduction of markets into education represented a ‘class 
strategy’ the consequence of which has been the relative reproduction of class 
(and ethnic) advantage and disadvantage. This, he relates to ‘the interplay of 
three key elements: the self-interest of some producers, the self-interest of some 
consumers and the control of the performance criteria of market organisations - 
which in this case lies with the State’. Indeed, the Big Society Audits (Civil 
Exchange 2012, 2013) highlight the impact of urban disadvantage on the take up 
of the Big Society initiatives which depend on the extent to which communities 
trust and support each other. Those in disadvantaged and urban communities 
appear less able to take initiatives forward than those in more privileged ones 
(Civil Exchange 2012, p.7). In other words, ’It is harder for privileged children to 
fail than it is for disadvantaged children to succeed’ (Bottero 2009, p.10). This 
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clearly has implications for all schools but especially those schools working in 
challenging circumstances.  
 
So at what point is ‘the state where necessary’?  
 
The Big Society: part of the answer or part of the problem? 
 
Viewed in this light the construct of a Big Society looks like an attempt to 
minimise the consequences for society of political neoliberalism. This next 
section explores this claim in relation to Crouch’s ‘market inadequacies’ 
framework and current education and social policy. Whereas it may appear that 
issues of imperfect markets and inadequate information can be more easily dealt 




The debates concerning the introduction of the market into education have long 
been rehearsed. The market context in which education in England exists is 
more properly termed the ‘quasi-market’ (Carroll and Walford 2006, p.4). This is 
different from the open, classical market in a number of fundamental ways: on 
the supply side, schools will not necessarily be privately owned or have profit 
maximisation as their main objective. On the demand side, as Crouch has also 
indicated, the ‘purchaser’ (customer) is not necessarily the consumer (user) of 
what schools have to offer. More fundamentally, children realistically have only 
one chance of receiving basic education. If the ‘wrong’ choice is made there is 
little or no option to buy a different brand. Finally, unlike the classical market, the 
act of choosing a school transforms the product - some schools become full 
while others empty and a choice for a small school becomes invalid if demand 
outstrips the availability of places (ibid). The Big Society response is to 
manipulate this quasi-market so that Academies and Free Schools can be 
established outside of local authority control and to encourage schools to 
increase the number of places on offer. This has the potential of increasing 
competition (and thereby standards) and widening options for parental choice 
thereby limiting the possibilities of making a ‘wrong’ choice. The strategy also 
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increases the availability of pupil places. However, where there is already a 
surplus of places, as in Bath and North East Somerset, for example, such action 
threatens the viability of all local schools in the area. These actions, based on 
principles of empowering people, encouraging social action and opening up 
social services to private enterprise, are in fact, adding to the problem of an 
imperfect education market rather than addressing this particular  ‘market 
inadequacy’. Increasing choice and widening the number of education providers 
operates to serve the interests of education consumers - those businesses and 
entrepreneurs servicing the market as owners of academy chains or facilitators 
in the processes of academy start-up or conversion such as lawyers 
BrowneJacobsen and the Free Schools Network respectivley. This is far 
removed from localism and tapping into the power of local people in local 
communities to address their particular education needs.  
 
Inadequate information   
 
Extending choice policies is not of itself an answer to the market inadequacies. 
The ability to exercise choice successfully, depends on the accessibility of 
information. Knowledge is power. Burgess and Briggs (2009) for example, 
compared the chances of poor and non-poor children getting places in ‘good’ 
schools. Their conclusion was that the lower chance of poor children attending a 
good school is essentially unaffected by the degree of choice, but, given that 
schools matter and that schools differ means that ‘education markets have to 
solve an important assignment problem’ (ibid, p.639), in other words how pupils 
are allocated to school places. For Burgess and Briggs, the composition of a 
school inevitably determines the publicly available measure of school quality. 
This in turn affects parental choice. Schools with higher proportions of poor 
children will generally produce below average scores in publicly available league 
tables. Location and distance were presented as key factors in parental choice, 
but so too the nature and availability of school data and information. Access to 
information, and the ability to interpret measures such as ‘value added’ (the 
contribution a school makes to the progress of an individual pupil) can be costly 
for parents. Furthermore, statistical data on schools is not value free but is 
produced by government. Other publicly available information, such as that on a 
128 
 
school’s website or in its brochures, is managed for marketing purposes by the 
school. Even when controlling completely for location, the Burgess and Briggs 
study suggested that information and the ability to ‘work the system’ and pay for 
additional costs such as travel, accounted for the differential between pupils from 
poor and non-poor backgrounds in their ability to secure a place at a ‘good’ 
school. Not only this, but pupil data was also thought to work against pupils from 
low socio-economic backgrounds in situations where schools were 
oversubscribed. In these instances, schools operate ‘ways of choosing pupils 
according to their incentives and this correlates negatively with FSM [free school 
meal] status’ (ibid, p.647). Again, we see the Big Society response of 
encouraging local communities to establish a ‘good’ school where one may be 
lacking, or to use mediating institutions such as the NCTL or Ofsted to challenge 
school quality, operating as a market response to the problems created by 
markets. Those mediating institutions are part of the [neoliberal] bureaucratic 
arm of government.  
 
Externalities   
 
It has already been argued in this thesis that one of the most pernicious and 
persistent ‘externalities’ of establishing a market in education has been the social 
and economic stratification of schools and communities and within school 
populations. This as Ball (1993) has argued, amongst many others (Brown 2013; 
Strand 2012; Riddell 2003; Whitty 2001) has significant consequences for pupil 
outcomes. The Big Society response has been to promote initiatives that give 
greater agency to localities and individuals, in order to tackle these ensuing 
educational inequalities. One example discussed above is the flagship education 
policy of establishing Free Schools in localities where a ‘good’ school is thought 
to be absent. Others include the changes to teacher training along school-based 
apprenticeship lines such as Schools Direct, or the promotion of ‘Teach First’ as 
a strategy for attracting high quality graduates into schools facing challenging 
circumstances. But again, these are government-promoted initiatives favouring 
market solutions which, of themselves, are undermined by ‘market 
inadequacies’. This is exemplified in the government’s relationship with voluntary 
and charitable organisations, ‘the ostensible cornerstone for the delivery of the 
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Big Society agenda’ (Williams 2012, p.126). Charities and voluntary 
organisations are called upon to support schools in a number of ways: providing 
breakfast or after-school clubs, offering supplementary schools for particular 
minority groups, or funding for school research projects. At a time of austerity 
and economic downfall in 2011, the voluntary sector faced deep cuts in 
government funding and subsidies and there were concerns that charities were 
being exploited and expected to provide their services for free as a means of 
reducing the costs of private, work programme, providers (ibid). The language of 
neoliberalism pervades the ensuing Government and voluntary sector 
discussions.  ‘Building a Stronger Civil Society’ (HMG 2010b) and ‘Supporting a 
Stronger Civil Society’ (Cabinet Office 2010b), for example, speak of the 
importance of national infrastructure, mobilising people, partnerships and the 
independence of the sector, yet at the same time welcome links with multi-
nationals such as KPMG and Microsoft and the use of an auditing tool, The 
Volunteer Investment and Value Audit (VIVA) to assess the value of volunteer’s 
time in relation to the resources used to support them.  This tool is a means of 
capturing the number of volunteers, the nature of their roles and the number of 
hours ‘gifted’ over a period of time for any one voluntary organisation. Even 
volunteering has to be cost effective to those investing their capital.  
 
Thus, as Crouch argues, the use of technical solutions to address issues created 
by externalities, such as those outlined above, is far from straightforward. This is 
also true for the existence of public goods in market economies.  
 
Public Goods. State monopoly vs quasi-markets  
 
Arguments for the inadequacies of state monopolies serve to give purchase to 
market solutions.  Ball (1993, p.4) outlined a number of these: for example the 
fact that the financial support via taxation for state schools is not linked directly to 
the satisfaction of its clients or the lack of profit and loss motives for school 
managers leads to conservative, self-interested strategies. State monopolies 
offer systems of democratic control where parents’ and students’ interests are 
outweighed by teachers’ unions, professional organisations and other 
entrenched interests. An example of this would be the allocation of pupils to state 
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schools via designated ‘catchment areas” where allocation within that area 
depends on certain rules such as a family’s proximity to the school. Schools do 
not compete with each other for pupils or resources but are allocated a budget 
(historically in England this was via the Local Education Authority). This 
allocation would in turn be subject to rules such as the staffing level of the school 
or the facilities it has on offer. Monopoly systems of public service delivery have 
also been criticised for their inefficiency and lack of incentive to improve 
performance. As Le Grand (2011, p.:83) argues, if dissatisfied users know they 
have nowhere else to go they will continue to provide the same level of service. 
Incentives to improve are generally driven by a higher authority. Furthermore, Le 
Grand argues that monopolies tend to favour the better off in terms of the 
distribution of utility or well-being. Middle class parents are more able to move 
into the catchment area of a preferred school.  
 
However, the final point of Le Grand’s argument is to consider the motivation of 
providers of public services which, he argues, depends on three dimensions: 
those who work for public services may be driven by the public service ‘ethos’; 
altruism and a deep concern for the welfare of those they serve. In the case of 
teachers this would be concern for the holistic rather than purely educational 
well-being of their pupils. Secondly is the consideration that altruism is superior 
to competitive self-advantage. ‘Any replacement of public by private providers 
involve[s] diminishing the pool of altruistic behaviour - and perhaps altruism itself 
- in society’ (ibid, p.86). Finally, is a utilitarian argument that altruistic providers 
offer better consequences for the well-being of their users: ‘public services that 
are supplied by providers that are motivated by altruism (or the public service 
ethos) will provide services of better quality and higher quantity than those that 
are supplied by those fuelled only by financial self-interest’  (ibid, p.89).  
 
Education, however, exists not within a pure market but within a quasi-market 
where the state owns the institutions of public service such as schools and 
hospitals but the provision of services is undertaken by competitive providers. 
The public service is still offered free, or largely free, at the point of delivery and 
service users are not allocated to providers, but can make a choice. The state 
pays the provider for the item of service provided. These providers may be either 
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for-profit or not-for-profit organisations or, indeed, other public service providers 
(Le Grand, 2011, p.81).  
 
For Crouch (2013, p.40) it is a neoliberal response to tackle the problems of 
public goods by making as many as possible private. There is a reluctance, 
however, to turn education over completely to the private market. Despite an 
initial hesitation on the part of the state to become directly responsible for the 
provision of elementary education prior to 1870 (Ball 2012, p.90) there is now a 
movement, post 2010, to return to the situation of a ‘patchwork of many 
providers with enhanced autonomies’ (ibid, p.89). What this amounts to is a 
redrawing of the public-private divide and which is evidenced in:  
 
…the creation of executive agencies (and boards, councils and 
trusts), the establishing of private–public partnerships (of many 
different kinds), contracting out state services to private providers, the 
use of think tanks, consultants and knowledge companies for policy 
research and evaluation, philanthropic activity and sponsorship to 
fund educational programmes and innovations, the involvement of the 
voluntary sector (charities, NGOs, trusts, foundations, etc.) in service 
provision, the ‘incorporation’ of public sector organisations, and the 
use of social entrepreneurs to address intractable and ‘wicked’ social 
problems – sometimes in complex combinations. In other words, tasks 
and services previously undertaken by the state and public sector 
organisations are now being done by various ‘others’ in various kinds 
of relationships among themselves and to various parts of the state 
(ibid, p.97).  
 
These changes Ball refers to as the ‘liberalising’ (ibid, p.94) of education 
and are indicative of the state/market tensity referred to earlier. The current 
phase of education reform he calls post-neo-liberal, and follows on from 
New Labour’s (1997-2010) approach in which ‘the state became the 
powerhouse of public sector reform and a ‘transformer’ and ‘market-maker.’ 
New Labour were ‘doing’ many Conservative policies but doing them 
differently. The Coalition is now ‘doing’ many of the reforms set in train by 
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New Labour - such as academies - but ‘doing’ them differently. Whereas 
New Labour reformed education through regulation and centralised 
programmes, the Conservative coalition is reducing and stripping out 
regulation, giving schools and head teachers more autonomy and allowing 
greater diversity and emphasising consumerism (ibid, p.93). Central to this 
process is the emphasis on choice such that Le Grand suggests that, for 
the libertarian, choice in a quasi-market is a good, in and of itself (Le Grand 
2011, p.82).  
 
However, in applying the same critique to education markets as is applied 
to state monopoly education, it is Ball’s (1993) contention that the issues 
defining the purposes of state education, in other words education as the 
public good, are obscured in the debate about parental choice. The market 
solution that choice will satisfy both individual and national interest is little 
more than ‘an act of faith’ (ibid, p.15). The underlying assumption that 
individual and national ‘needs’ and individual wants are the same thing is 
unsupported. Market, and Big Society solutions to the existence of public 
goods, within market economies, albeit a quasi-market, are at best no more 
capable of addressing this market ‘inadequacy' than the use of a powerful 
state to protect and secure public goods such as education. What is at 
stake is social democracy in a system that privileges wealth and knowledge 




The Big Society and the problem of political neoliberalism  
 
It was Stephen Ball (1995) who, commentating on a previous Conservative 
administration, remarked that neo-conservatism had been undermined by 
neoliberal capitalism. As shown above, this observation holds true in the current 
context. The ideals of the compassionate conservatism of Jesse Norman and the 
Red Toryism of Phillip Blond, those contemporary iterations of traditional 
conservatism, are being ‘crowded out’ and undermined by an aggressive 
neoliberal project. In recognising that society is built upon social networks, and 
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the construction of a diversity of institutions that protect and perpetuate the 
ideals and values of that society, both compassionate conservatism and Red 
Toryism also acknowledge that some of these institutions should offer a buffer 
between the state and the individual. However, as the boundaries of the state 
become more permeable or ‘redrawn’ under the influence of political 
neoliberalism, the ability to mediate between the individual and the state is 
compromised. The voice of the individual is overpowered by the will of a global 
financial system operating through imperfect markets or oligopolies. In order to 
address this the Big Society turns attention away from the root problem to the 
potential power for maintaining welfare and social order, latent within local 
communities: the informal and formal social networks and groupings represented 
by charitable, private and voluntary organisations and institutions. In other words, 
the Big Society actively shifts responsibility and accountability from the state to 
the individual as a ‘right of choice’. By removing the bureaucratic hand of big 
government, civic society is to find local solutions to local, and national problems; 
those destabilising effects of widening inequalities and the breakdown of trust. 
However, ‘local problems’ are rarely isolated, situational and generated by mere 
local practices, nor can they be addressed simply by local panaceas or technical 
solutions.  Rather, they are indicative of far greater issues that originate from the 
practice of political neoliberalism. Housing, employment, issues of social class, 
educational inequality and institutional failings are all part of the same neoliberal 
Gordian knot. It is in this way that the Big Society agenda, which set out to 
ameliorate these negative effects in public and social policy, including education 













Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
How should the notion of the Big Society be appraised? This thesis set out to 
explore what is meant by the Big Society and to establish how far the concept is 
encapsulated in the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government 
education policy under the aegis of Secretary of State Michael Gove. 
 
Chapter 1 indicated that the Big Society was not a new concept but drew on a 
wealth of traditions and ideas about strengthening communities, civic action and 
co-ownership of public services, all of which pointed to a redistribution of state 
power from the centre to communities at the periphery. Notions of community 
proved to be a strong feature of its long ideological history, readily adopted as 
the organizing tool in public policy discourse by governments of various political 
persuasions, first as a means of enhancing social capital and second as a way of 
making public service provision more sustainable. However, the epigrammatic 
nature of the ‘Big Society’, presented as the antithesis of ‘big government’, turns 
attention away from the central issues for government, namely the governance of 
public service provision and maintaining social order. 
 
Overall there was little consensus on what a Big Society might mean. Chapter 2 
outlined two very different accounts from key exponents of the Big Society. 
Whereas Norman focused on the potential of aligning liberal and conservative 
political tradition and thought, Blond sought to address what he viewed as the 
failure of political liberalism post 1960. Both grounded their arguments in various 
historical iterations of liberalism and conservatism ranging from Edmund Burke 
to Michael Oakeshott, Benjamin Disraeli to John Milbank.  The evident lack of 
coherence in conservative thinking led to a programme of education reform, 
outlined in Chapter 3 that is similarly devoid of internal rationality or consistency. 
This can partly be explained by theories of policy construction such as Levi 
Strauss’s notion of Bricolage or Hall’s views on the agency of political ideas and 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Analysis of the 2011 Education Act, however, brings into sharp relief the tensions 
inherent in a policy built on neo-conservative principles that are essentially 
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neoliberal: ‘the market wherever possible, the state where necessary (Crouch 
2012:26). If, as the Big Society asserts, the institutions of civil society, including 
the education system, serve as a buffer between the state and the individual, 
then the ability to mediate between state and society has been undermined by 
an aggressive, neoliberal project. On the surface, promoting an active and 
participatory civil society may look like a means of ameliorating the big hand of 
government, but in reality this has less to do with enhancing social capital and 
more to do with shifting responsibility and accountability for welfare and social 
order away from the state. In other words, it is unlikely that Putman’s notion of 
social capital forms the sociological basis of the Big Society as evidenced 
through education policy 2010-2014. Rather, acquiescence to the power of the 
global market, social class and the vested interests of [powerful] individuals or 
corporate business serves to limit the agency of civil institutions and reduce them 
to an instrument of state. It is the state that coerces social institutions, 
philanthropies and business to act on its behalf.  Certain schools, for example, 
have been forced to convert to Academy status or applications for Free Schools 
turned down whilst the wishes of local communities have been overruled. Rather 
than devolve or redistribute state power, this has continued to centralize. The 
powers accrued to the Secretary of State for Education under the 2011 Act 
serves as an example here. In other words, power is reorganized in accordance 
with the wishes of government not to meet the needs, aspirations or wishes of 
society. 
 
In the final analysis, there was no consensus on what a Big Society meant and in 
consequence no overall acceptance of the concept as a policy initiative. In turn 
this meant that there was to be no coherent policy across government 
departments, including that of education. It has left unanswered questions about 
the purpose of a state system of education. In continuing the centralisation of 
state power in relation to civil society, the Big Society may, in reality, have 
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